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In the cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) substantially developed the law of targeting. They did so in line 
with the precedence of the principle of humanity and a worldview strongly guided by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. In affirming that the provisions of Additional 
Protocol I relating to targeting can be the basis for a conviction, the judges rendered certain 
earlier provisions incorporating ‘military necessity’ (although not the broader principle itself) 
potentially obsolete in this context.  
 
This application of the principle of humanity was not, however, at the expense of military 
perspectives. The judges paid considerable attention to the views of those with military 
experience. They considered their judgments to be supported by a body of military opinion 
even if, in places, there were military practitioners who disagreed with their judgments. 
 
A large amount of expert and technical evidence was provided to the judges to assist with the 
evidential determinations required to apply the law of targeting; in relation to establishing 
who fired artillery and with what intention. The experience and knowledge of military and 
civilian non-expert witnesses who had physically experienced the effects of the targeting 
decisions in question also, however, had a significant influence on the judges’ findings as to the 
evidence.  
 
ICTY jurisprudence gave precedence to convictions pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute 
rather than Article 7(3) superior/command responsibility. An absence of direct evidence of 
targeting decision making by these commanders meant, alongside evidence of the orders they 
had issued, the judges considered circumstantial evidence including that of the accused’s role 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 
This study is about the demarcation of the line between lawful and unlawful conduct of 
warfare carried out by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’). By 
‘demarcation’ it is meant something akin to demarcation following the delimitation of 
boundaries; we may, technically speaking, know the agreed line of a boundary but until it is 
physically marked there is room for uncertainty as to where it actually falls on the ground.1 In 
the context of this project the study of demarcation translates to an investigation into the 
judicial findings as to individual criminal accountability for the commission of certain war 




The ICTY and the law of targeting 
 
The Yugoslav war of the 1990s was one in which civilians were attacked directly and 
specifically as such through campaigns of ethnic cleansing.2 The Yugoslav war was also one in 
which recognisable military operations between armed forces did occur. The Office of the 
Prosecutor (‘OTP’) at the ICTY made the decision to address the conduct of these military 
operations where they believed that criminal breaches of the international laws governing the 
conduct of warfare had taken place, indicting soldiers for ‘ostensibly doing the things they are 
supposed to do’.3  
 
This was a significant decision made by the OTP which led to judicial consideration of matters 
that are usually left firmly in military hands. The judges of the ICTY were in these 
circumstances given the role of deciding where the line between lawful and unlawful conduct 
in war falls.  
 
                                                          
1 For an explanation of the development of the definition and use of these terms see Dennis Rushworth, 
‘Mapping in Support of Frontier Arbitration: Delimitation and Demarcation’, IBRU Boundary & Security 
Bulletin 5, no. 1 (1997): 61-64.  
2 James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2003), 3-4 and Chapter 5. 




This study focused on the treatment of the law governing the conduct of hostilities relating to 
‘targeting’ decision making of armed forces by the judges of the ICTY. Michael Schmitt states 
that 
 
Targeting is the sine qua non of warfare. Reduced to its essence, war is about attacking 
the enemy. The law of targeting consequently lies at the very heart of the law of war.4 
 
Establishing the precise contents of the international legal rules to be complied with in order 
for the conduct of warfare to be lawful requires a study of treaty and customary law that may 
not always give a straightforward answer. Applying these rules in certain real-life scenarios is 
likely to be even more difficult. The question of what can and cannot, should or should not be 
targeted in an attack can have a humanitarian, legal, political or practical answer, among 
others. Even though they may provide a framework within which decisions should be made, 
however, the legal rules ‘rarely provide the actual answers'.5 The law in this area is not always 
able to specify exactly as to where the line is crossed into illegality in targeting matters.  
 
In certain cases before the ICTY, the judges were asked to decide what constituted a legitimate 
target and the limits on how it may be attacked. The law governing these questions of the 
legality of attacking/targeting a particular object or location in a particular manner is what I 
mean by ‘the law of targeting’. That is, the law of targeting is defined here as the law 
governing what can and cannot be lawfully attacked; and if it can be attacked under what 
circumstances and conditions this may take place. 
 
The question this study set out to answer was how had the judges in certain cases at the ICTY 
implemented the law of targeting and, given this, could any factor(s) be identified as having 
influenced the many decisions on law, evidence and responsibility they had made in reaching 
their judgments? In particular, did the principle of humanity, identified in the literature as a 
motivating feature of the ICTY judges’ work in other areas have a role in this demarcation of 
the law of targeting? 
 
In relation to the law that the ICTY was to apply, David Scheffer wrote that: 
                                                          
4 Michael N. Schmitt in his Foreword to William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), vii. See also Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’, in Testing the 
Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law, eds. Susan Breau and Agnieszka Jachec-Neale (London: 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2006), 277-307.  
5 Th A. van Baarda, ‘Moral Ambiguities Underlying the Laws of Armed Conflict: A Perspective from 





The legacy of Nuremberg and its focus on individual criminal responsibility reasserted 
itself as we labored to build a new tribunal. There was little difficulty in determining 
what constitutes an atrocity crime ripe for prosecution by the tribunal, for by 1993 the 
general framework of such crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes—was embedded in international law to a degree that welcomed a new age of 
criminal prosecution. The inevitable nuances would have to be sorted out by the judges 
in their reasoned judgments. [Emphasis Added]6 
 
The opportunity for the ICTY judges to pronounce on matters of the legality of military attacks 
was, in fact, unprecedented. In 2000, William Fenrick stated ‘there are no usable precedents 
for judicial determination of the lawfulness of particular attacks’.7 As will be described later in 
this and the next two chapters, the establishment of the ‘nuances’ of the law in reality meant 
the significant development of the law of targeting by the judges. The law as drafted in the 
treaties was not written as a criminal code. The judges had to establish the precise contents of 
the relevant rules where there were significant uncertainties, room for interpretation or ‘gaps’ 
in the law and precedent available to them. In these spaces it is apparent that the judges had 
to exercise ‘judicial creativity’ to come to a decision.  
 
It is here, in this significant work in defining and applying the law of targeting that the judges 
of the ICTY carried out, that this research is based. It looks to what the judges did to apply the 
law in the absence of clear precedent as regards the law, handling of evidence and rules of 
individual responsibility. There was room for extra-legal considerations and the interplay of 
humanitarian and moral impulses with the legal work before them and political situation 
around them. There was also, however, in the context of criminal proceedings, a need to 
respect the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (the prohibition of retroactive effect of law) 
and ensure that the accused were given fair trials. 
 
It is not the question of which law applies which is key to this study (although this in itself can 
be more complicated than first appears given the legal situation in the break-up of the Former 
Yugoslavia).8 The key is instead what the applicable law means for those seeking to apply it. 
                                                          
6 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), 21. 
7 W. J. Fenrick, ‘Commentary: A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: Comments 
on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor V. Tihomir Blaškic’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law 13, no. 04 (2000): 931. 
8 This includes questions as to when various parts of the SFRY became independent states, succession to 
the SFRY’s international treaty obligations and whether and at what times the conflict or parts of it were 




This study is interested in how judges use the black letter or textbook rules on the laws of the 
law of war to come to findings of individual criminal responsibility or innocence. It is therefore 
a question of interpretation and application. Most law is applied without having to question 
what exactly it means. In unclear cases, however, it is usually a court (or other authority given 
a quasi-judicial power to so decide) who ultimately decides what the law means in a particular 
situation. What was particularly striking about the establishment of the ICTY was that it was 
established to apply international criminal law, therefore providing a rare forum for matters of 
international criminal law to be decided upon by international judges.  
 
Despite some arguments to the contrary, recourse to war and what is permitted within it has 
been subject to regulation, from varying sources and to varying degrees, for thousands of 
years.9 Arguments as to the consequences of these breaches are equally ancient. The approach 
to war in international law that dominated the twentieth century and now the twenty first is, 
given that war is something that remains inevitable, how should it be regulated so that it 
causes the least possible harm to those who should not be harmed.10 This is not the only 
potential option, but it is widely supported.11  
 
The regulation of war had traditionally been broken down into two broad fields; the Hague 
field of law derived from various Hague Conventions focussed on the conduct of hostilities,12 
and the Geneva field based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions which brought in more 
protections for those not actively involved in the conflict, including civilians.13 The Additional 
                                                                                                                                                                          
related to the shelling of Dubrovnik in Croatia early in the conflict (Case No. IT-01-42, Trial Chamber 
Judgement of 31 January 2005 and Appeals Chamber Judgement of 17 July 2008). 
9 See, for example, Gregory P. Noone, ‘History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II’, 
Naval Law Review 47 (2000), 176-207 and Karima Bennoune, ‘As-Salamu Alaykum: Humanitarian Law in 
Islamic Jurisprudence’, Michigan Journal of International Law 15 (1993-1994), 605-643.  
10 This is the approach of the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’). See their summary of 
their Mandate and Mission available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-
mandate-mission.htm (last accessed 28.09.2019). 
11 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, The American Journal of International Law 
94, no. 2 (2000): 241.  
12 Including the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex.  
13 In particular in Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
12 August 1949. See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) for descriptions and contents of the full range of Hague and Geneva 
Conventions. See Robert Kolb, ‘The Main Epochs of Modern International Humanitarian Law since 1864 
and their Related Dominant Legal Constructions’, in Searching for a 'Principle of Humanity' in 
International Humanitarian Law, eds. Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper and Gro 
Nystuen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45-52 for a description of the important 





Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have rendered the Hague/Geneva distinction somewhat 
irrelevant as they encompass elements of both.14 This initial division, however, explains the 
development of the use of the two main terms used to describe the laws governing war; the 
law of armed conflict (‘LOAC’) and international humanitarian law (‘IHL’). There remains 
debate as to whether these now refer to identical concepts although the terms are used 
interchangeably in this study.15  
 
This legal approach of restricting the permitted means and methods of armed force is 
frequently described as constituting a compromise between military necessity and 
humanitarian requirements.16 The relative position of the compromise between the two 
considerations may vary between provisions, but it runs throughout the law governing armed 
conflict.17  
 
Mirroring the balance between humanity and military considerations in the law, the academic 
and broader debate in this area tends to divide broadly into military and civilian viewpoints. 
Although it is obvious that military personnel are not inhuman and civilians are capable of 
appreciating military concerns, there is a perception that the answers as to the demarcation of 
the line between lawful and unlawful conduct of hostilities would be different from each side. 
Two different interpretive communities have been described, who have, on the whole, 
adopted an adversarial position to each other: those in the military who start from the 
viewpoint of military necessity (LOAC version) and those humanitarian lawyers who start from 
the viewpoint of the principle of humanity (IHL version).18 
 
One factor which sets the modern law of armed conflict apart from most other areas of 
international law is that individuals as well as states may be found in breach of the rules, and, 
for some actions, incur criminal liability for this breach. There are many different acts which 
                                                          
14 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (‘API’) and 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts. For an introduction to API see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, 
Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 420-422. 
15 Page Wilson, ‘The myth of international humanitarian law’, International Affairs 93, no. 3, (May 2017): 
563-579.  
16 See, for example, Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (The 
Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 2011), 68-70. 
17 van Baarda, ‘Moral Ambiguities Underlying the Laws of Armed Conflict: A Perspective from Military 
Ethics’, 25.  
18 David Luban, ‘Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 




are prohibited by the laws of war and some of these are also classed as criminal acts which 
should be prosecuted as such.19 To the extent the laws of war are concerned with criminal 
conduct, it forms part of international criminal law (‘ICL’). 
 
International courts or tribunals have been established for the purpose of prosecuting war 
criminals, most famously including the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for the 
Trial of the Major War Criminals (‘Nuremberg IMT’), but this was, until relatively recently, an 
unusual occurrence. The international political situation around the Yugoslav war of the 1990s, 
however, gave rise to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and 
from this, a rare opportunity for international judicial consideration of the line between lawful 
and unlawful conduct of hostilities.  
 
The law of armed conflict had historically rarely been considered from a jurisprudential 
perspective, possibly arising in part from the, now old fashioned, ambiguous status given to 
international law by legal philosophers.20 It was also because of the lack of actual cases of 
international courts applying IHL and/or ICL after the Nuremberg and Tokyo International 
Military Tribunals. What has, however, been noticeable in the past decade or so is the increase 
in consideration of the theory of ICL and IHL. This has clearly been driven by the creation of the 
various international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court which have been 
considering and applying this law in practice.21 
 
The main body of literature regarding IHL and ICL as it specifically relates to targeting and 
command responsibility is written from a practitioner viewpoint as to the current contents of 
the law22 or from the perspective of its historical development. There is very little broader 
theoretical or critical writing here. The strong practise/theory divide, with emphasis on the 
former, is typical of legal literature and makes sense given the practitioner driven development 
of this field. 
                                                          
19 See, for example, Terry Gill and Dieter Fleck, eds., The Handbook of the International Law of Military 
Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapters 24, 29, 30. 
20 Typified by the approach in Chapter X of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1994). See Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart’, 
European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2010): 967-995.  
21 For other factors, see Tom Ginsburg and Gregory Shaffer, ‘How does International Law Work?’ in The 
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, eds. Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 754-755. 
22 For example, William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and 
Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 3rd ed. 





Where there has been some significant analysis of the development of the law is that 
considering the ‘judicial creativity’ of the ICTY.23 This study fits within this field of analysis and 
seeks to take the findings of judicial creativity in this literature and attempt to demonstrate 
some of the influences that were at work in relation to the law of targeting. Although it is 
‘critical’ of the work of the tribunal, as in it considers and assesses the work of the judges, the 
appraisal of judicial creativity here is not a critical approach in the sense used by critical legal 
scholars. It is, in fact, one of the most ‘internal’ forms of criticism, not questioning the broader 
or underlying presumptions and power structures of the tribunal and its work.24 
 
The judges of the ICTY were not permitted to ‘make’ the law. This is an application of the 
fundamental legal principle that someone cannot be convicted of or punished for a crime that 
did not exist at the time of their actions that are under scrutiny.25 At the ICTY, however, the 
judges had to fulfil their function of applying the existing law even in cases where it was not 
clear what the law was or what it required. This opens up questions of legal philosophy, 
discussed later in this chapter, as to what, exactly, the role of the judge is and how far their 
‘interpretation’ of the law or their ‘judicial creativity’ can and should go. This in turn leads into 
consideration of a theme of the influences, including that of the idea of ‘humanity’, on the 
judges in the judgments of the ICTY relating to the law of targeting. 
 
This study looked in some detail at the facts as presented to the judges at the ICTY in the three 
cases under consideration. It is clear that it is not only the law that is interpreted by the judges 
in the process of producing a judgement, but also the evidence before them. Gerry Simpson, in 
introducing the book Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials, describes law as a ‘producer of 
truth’ and ‘memory’ but notes an unease of the relevant authors in this book towards ‘the idea 
                                                          
23 For example, Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly, Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
24 See Chapter 1 in Christine Schwöbel, ed., Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An 
Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
25 This was highlighted in the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993 (‘Report of the Secretary General’) which 
recommended the terms on which the ICTY be established. Certain elements of the description of and 
comments on the Report of the Secretary-General and the law and cases under investigation included in 
this thesis have been published in Catherine Adams, ‘Chapter 4: International Law and Institutional 
Legacy’ in Prosecuting war crimes: lessons and legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, eds. James Gow, Rachel Kerr, and Zoran Pajić (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 




that law could provide a definitive accounting or any sort of stable representation of atrocity 
or trauma’.26  
 
Geoffrey Nice states in his summary for a chapter interestingly entitled ‘Legal Process as a Tool 
to Rewrite History’ that the ICTY trials did not set out to ‘write history’, pointing out that ‘every 
trial record produces at least two competing narratives… none of which may be accurate’. 27 
The judges at the ICTY had to consider a massive amount of this conflicting evidence and put 
together in a judgment a convincing appraisal of the meaning of what they had seen and heard 
as it specifically related to the accused and the applicable law.  
 
The novel nature of the situation at the ICTY in what the judges were being asked to judge 
upon in relation to targeting matters is one reason for the focus of this study. The other is that 
there was an absence of an examination beyond the usual case report approach of what was 
involved in the judicial work of demarcation of this boundary between lawful and unlawful 
conduct as it related to questions of targeting (in part linked to the uniqueness of the relevant 
cases at the ICTY). There seemed to be room to add something to the academic understanding 
of what the judges were doing through a study using a qualitative social scientific approach to 





The question at the core of this research is, in the demarcation of the line between lawful and 
unlawful conduct of targeting in warfare, in an arena apparently pulled between the dictates 
of humanity and military necessity, how did the judges implement the law of targeting and, 
given this, could any factor(s) be identified as having influenced the many decisions on law, 
evidence and responsibility they had to make in reaching their judgments?  
 
It is clear from the academic consideration of other aspects of the ICTY judges’ work that 
concepts such as humanity and morality potentially played a role. The literature points out 
that where they were given room to enhance the protections afforded to those caught up in 
                                                          
26 Gerry Simpson, ‘History of Histories’, in Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials, eds. Kevin Heller and 
Gerry Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 43.  





rather than fighting the war, they tended to do so. This research set out to ask whether it was 
the idea of humanity, broadly defined as a regard for the need to protect the innocent from 
the effects of war, that most influenced the judges in their demarcation of the law of targeting. 
Was ‘humanity’ a clear overriding influence in the case of the application of the law of 
targeting or could other factors be identified as equally or more important to the judges? 
 
The first element of the research question was, therefore, how had the judges approached the 
legal questions arising from the application of the law of targeting and to what extent did 
humanity, or any other concept or factors, influence the findings of the judges in this regard? 
That is, where they were required to define the law and make legal findings as regards 
targeting were there any identifiable influences on the work of the judges? The findings in 
relation to this question are presented in Chapter 3 (Law). 
 
It is not just on the content of the law that the judges had to make decisions. They had to 
assess the evidence before them and establish what they found to be sufficient to rely on to 
make a finding of what had in fact happened in the scenario before them. Where would the 
idea of humanity fit, if at all, in such considerations? The second element of the research 
question therefore asks how the judges approached and decided on questions of evidence in 
relation to the law of targeting and what influences were apparent on this. The findings in 
relation to this question are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 (Evidence I and II). 
 
The third element of the research question asks what findings the judges made in relation to 
individual criminal liability for acts breaching the law of targeting and whether any influences 
can be identified regarding these findings as to criminal responsibility, that is, as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused before them. The findings in relation to this question are presented 





To answer how the judges had implemented the law of targeting and to identify any factors 
that had influenced their findings required a consideration of the framework within which the 
judges were working; this was set within the war crimes jurisdiction of the ICTY and was 




that of criminal responsibility) and the rules of procedure and evidence. It also required that 
the different aspects of the decisions reached by the judges were broken down: that is, the 
findings as regards legal definitions, evidence and individual responsibility all required judicial 
determination and were relevant to answering the research question. 
 
There are four key findings of this study which arise across four substantive chapters (Law, 
Evidence I: The witnesses, Evidence II: Finding criminal intent and Responsibility) which cover 
the elements that must be considered by the judges to come to a finding of guilt or innocence, 
to place the line on the ground between lawful and unlawful conduct: the law, the evidence 
and individual responsibility. Some of the findings are specific to one of these elements, others 
cross the whole thesis. 
 
The first key finding of this study is that the ICTY developed the law of targeting in line with the 
precedence of the principle of humanity and a worldview strongly guided by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’). In affirming that the provisions of Additional Protocol I 
relating to targeting can be the basis for a conviction, the judges rendered certain earlier 
provisions incorporating ‘military necessity’ (although not the broader principle itself) 
potentially obsolete in this context. 
 
The second key finding is that the ICTY judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint and 
they considered that their judgments were always supported by a body of military opinion – 
even if in places there were strongly opposing views. This is important as it shows the judges 
were not interested in making findings that were incomprehensible or unworkable to those in 
fact having to make the targeting decisions. 
 
The third key finding was the importance of the evidence provided by civilian witnesses with 
lived experience of the effects of artillery. This was even the case where there was also a large 
amount of technical or expert evidence available. 
 
The fourth key finding is that ICTY jurisprudence gave precedence to convictions pursuant to 
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute rather than Article 7(3) superior/command responsibility. An 
absence of direct evidence of targeting decision making by these commanders meant, 
alongside evidence of the orders they had issued, the judges considered circumstantial 





The concept of humanity was clearly a strong factor in the judges’ approach. There was, in 
addition, however, an important role for the military viewpoint that proved particularly 
powerful in the case of the application of the law of targeting. This military viewpoint was not, 
however, lacking in any apparent humanity. 
 
The next section will consider in some more detail the concepts of judicial creativity and 
humanity which form the basis of the framework of this thesis. This chapter will then go on to 




Demarcation of the line: Judging war crimes charges 
 
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991 was established by the United Nations Security Council on 25 May 1993.28 The resolution 
creating this tribunal was one of a series of Security Council resolutions adopted in response to 
the ongoing conflict in what had been the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’).  
 
In Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) a Commission of Experts was established to ‘examine 
and analyse’ information already submitted to the Security Council as well as that it was to 
‘obtain through its own investigations’. This was to be done ‘with a view to providing the 
Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia’.29 In Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), the Security Council 
stated that ‘having considered’ the interim report of the Commission of Experts in which the 
experts ‘observed that a decision to establish an ad hoc international tribunal in relation to 
events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia would be consistent with the direction of its 
work’, it had decided to establish an international tribunal ‘for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’. In the same resolution it requested that the Secretary 
General of the United Nations report back on ‘all aspects of this matter, including specific 
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proposals and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation of’ 
this decision.30 
 
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) approved the resulting ‘Report of the Secretary General 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808’ (‘Report of the Secretary 
General’)31 and adopted the suggested statute for an international tribunal annexed to that 
report (the ‘ICTY Statute’).32 The ICTY Statute set out the basic structure of the tribunal 
comprised of the Chambers (judges), Prosecutor and Registry. The judges were to be divided 
into trial chambers and an appeals chamber to hear cases and their appeals, with their first 
role being ‘as a whole’ to draft and adopt rules of procedure and evidence to govern the ‘pre-
trial phase of the proceedings, the conduct of trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, 
the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters’.33 The Office of the 
Prosecutor (‘OTP’) was to investigate cases, prepare indictments and prosecute the accused.34 
It was not, however, by any means certain at this point that a fully functioning tribunal could 
or would be brought into existence and it took some years of uncertainty, and the dedication 
of its supporters, before it could be recognised as such.35  
 
The initial name of the tribunal did not include the word ‘criminal’ but it is clear that this 
tribunal was intended to be a criminal court, in the words of Resolution 827, to ‘bring to 
justice’ those who were responsible for the ‘widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia’. The tribunal’s more 
enduring title, the ‘International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ or ‘ICTY’ reflects 
this.  
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The law set out in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols forms the basis of but also must 
be distinguished from the criminal law that the ICTY was established to apply.36 International 
criminal law (‘ICL’) is a much broader field than that of criminal breaches of IHL/LOAC but the 
work of the ICTY brought this aspect of it into the spotlight. In his report, the Secretary General 
set out the relevant crimes he considered to be firmly established in international law. These 
were translated into the ICTY Statute which set out the crimes over which the ICTY was to have 
jurisdiction, namely the crimes of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.  
 
The ICTY was widely seen as picking up the baton of the Trial of the Major War Criminals at the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (‘Nuremberg IMT’) and, although mentioned less 
often, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (‘Tokyo IMT’). Even though the 
Nuremberg IMT was established by treaty, the London Agreement of 8 August 1945,37 and the 
Tokyo IMT was established by Special Proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, the 
Supreme Commander Allied Powers, on 19 January 1946,38 the ICTY, established by the 
Security Council, in very different circumstances, was seen by those establishing it as their 
direct descendant.39 
 
Reading even the first few pages of Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg will probably give any 
student of the proceedings at the ICTY a sense of déjà vu.40 It is taken for granted that the 
Nuremberg IMT is the main precedent for the establishment and legal jurisprudence of the 
ICTY, insofar as the ICTY is an international tribunal, applying international law to crimes 
committed during war. What is sometimes lost is how familiar the questions that arose in 
relation to judging the defendants before the ICTY would be to those members of the 
Nuremberg IMT judging the major war criminals. A description of both institutions, particularly 
in the early years of the ICTY, could equally include judges from differing legal backgrounds 
and jurisdictions judging on ill-defined crimes and means of responsibility within a novel and 
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sparsely demarcated procedural and evidential framework. It could also include that both sets 
of judges were particularly interested in the live testimony of victim witnesses. Taking the 
comparison further, at both institutions prosecutorial forces sought to stretch the application 
of the law and defence counsel were overwhelmed by mountains of documentary evidence 
and at times failed to effectively challenge the prosecution and misunderstood or aggravated 
the judges. 
 
Bradley Smith starts Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg with the statement ‘To assess the 
judgment in a trial, we must first know who is doing the judging, who is being judged, and 
what are the charges and the system of law in use.’41 What is worth highlighting and that may 
seem unusual in this quote from Smith is the equal importance placed on those ‘doing the 
judging’ with those being judged. This is because we usually presume that it does not or should 
not matter who is doing the judging – if they have become a judge they will be applying the 
law with reference only to the law and evidence. As Schmitt points out, technically it is only 
states who have the power to create and alter the international law of armed conflict.42 Smith 
has, however, highlighted a fundamental matter of legal philosophy – that is, what role do and 
should judges have in legal decision making where the law and evidence do not present a clear 
answer. This was important at the Nuremberg IMT and was important at the ICTY. The legacy 
of judicial institutions depend to a large extent on the perceived legitimacy of their findings. If 
the judges are seen to be making up the law to suit their own, or others’ agendas, the 
legitimacy of and what power a judicial decision could have will fall away.43 
 
The Nuremberg IMT’s members had differing views on how they should make important legal 
decisions in areas where there was no clear law. One of the Soviet judges held the view in 
relation to the questions surrounding the charges of planning an aggressive war that ‘the 
judges were there to innovate, and they should frankly admit that they were establishing a 
new basis in international law’.44 The ‘Western’ judges saw this as ‘far too daring and 
potentially dangerous’ and brought the discussion back within ‘customary legal discourse’.45 
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The use of customary law was one of the key features of the judgments of the ICTY, and will be 
discussed in detail below. 
 
This idea that the judges of the Nuremberg IMT were ‘innovating’ in some of their decisions 
remained unspoken in public, however, looking at the state of the law before and after the 
judgement of the Nuremberg IMT it is clear that in large areas that was ultimately what they 
were doing. This is particularly evident in the Nuremberg IMT’s acceptance that individuals 
could be responsible for breaches of international law, described by one author as ‘a necessary 
and desirable quantum leap’ in the law.46 It would be hard not to make a comparison to the 
work of the ICTY judges here.  
 
Applying the law can be a purely mechanical application of a rule and in the vast majority of 
cases this is what happens. In some cases, however, a scenario of rules and facts arise that do 
not allow for a straightforward application of the text or which permit more than one possible 
interpretation of the applicable law. The ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
were both silent on the question of legal interpretation. This means that the judges were left 
to their own approaches in exactly how they established the contents of the applicable law 
and applied this to the evidence when the circumstances required some interpretation on 
their part.  
 
The ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence also contained no rules as to the 
relevant sources of law that could be used by the judges in reaching their decisions, in 
contrast, for example, to the list provided in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (‘ICJ’). The Secretary General intended that customary international law would be 
applied, however, what actually constitutes customary international law in many cases is not 
at all self-evident. The judges had to adopt their own approaches to establishing the existence 
or otherwise of customary law as well as the place of treaty law and rules of national 
jurisdictions.  
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The judges have resorted to the identification of general principles of law and the other 
sources of law identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.47 They have also used the 
interpretational rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, even though 
the ICTY is not a treaty based institution.48 These approaches have not necessarily been 
considered a negative development, however, it has led to a discussion of the existence of 
judge ‘created’ rather than ‘found’ law at the ICTY.49  
 
One particular term that has been used to describe what it is in fact that the judges ‘did’ at the 
ICTY in defining and applying the law in cases where the law was not readily apparent is that 
they exercised ‘judicial creativity’. The remainder of this section will be used to discuss this 





The judges of the ICTY have not said that they were being ‘creative’ in carrying out their 
mandate at the ICTY. They would say that they were applying the law. This disagreement 
reflects the traditional legal debate between ‘positivism’ and alternative interpretations of 
what it is that judges do (or should do) when faced with a lack of law to apply or no clear 
answer. 
 
The following sections aim to establish what is meant by ‘judicial creativity’, how its exercise 
arises and the factors that were particularly relevant to decisions made on targeting law 
(including the influence of the principle of humanity). 
 
 
Judicial creativity and positivism 
 
Legal positivism is the approach that most lawyers take to the law without even thinking about 
it. It is expressed in the fact that they look to statutes, codes, treaties and case law to find the 
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answer of what the law is in any particular situation. Positivism looks to the systems of law 
themselves to know what rules are legally binding and separates itself from questions of 
morality (unlike theories of natural law). Where no straightforward answer can be found, 
those applying the law have to look to ‘rules of recognition’, rules of the system itself, to 
assess whether otherwise non legal norms can be used to reach an answer.50  
 
Joseph Powderly, one of the editors of the book ‘Judicial Creativity at the International 
Criminal Tribunals’, is of the view that the ICTY ‘was certainly not the best venue for the 
expression of a heartfelt belief in the fundamental applicability of legal positivism’.51 In 
Powderly’s view, in carrying out their role to apply international criminal law ‘in the absence of 
the right to expressly ‘make’ substantive law – there was only one acceptable or appropriate 
means available to the bench, namely the interpretation of the applicable law.’52 
Interpretation in this sense, however, led to room for judicial creativity at the ICTY.  
 
Positivism, however, appears to be a broad school. Isabel Feichner describes ‘critical 
positivism’ as ‘what appears to be Cassese’s favoured method for realist utopian scholarship’ 
and ‘a method that probably constitutes the predominant method of normative international 
law scholarship in Europe today’.53 She places it in the middle between natural law and policy 
oriented approaches on one side and doctrinal constructivism on the other. This is because it 
has a relatively strong emphasis on existing international law and finding guiding values from 
within the international legal order but it also utilises teleological interpretation and non-legal 
considerations (including political ones) in the interpretation and construction of the law.54  
 
Given that Cassese’s tenure as President of the ICTY led to some of the most widely recognised 
judicial creativity, including in the Appeals Chamber’s Tadić jurisdiction decision,55 it seems 
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that that phrase is not best described in pure opposition to ‘positivism’ as now understood. It 
is clear, however, that the role of interpretation and the factors – legal or otherwise – that 
form part of that interpretation are key.  
 
 
Judicial creativity as an interpretive strategy 
 
As Bruce Anderson says, ‘Interpretation covers just about everything that everyone in the legal 
profession does.’56 Balkin states, ‘The history of the law is iteration; the development of law is 
the development of legal materials, which are subjected to new interpretations as we read 
them over and over again in different factual, historical, and political contexts.’57 As Duncan 
Kennedy pointed out, however, interpretation is not a neutral process. 58 
 
Although he said it in the context of the domestic legal system of the United States of America, 
Robert M. Cover’s comment that legal interpretation ‘takes place in a field of pain and death’ 
is particularly apt in the field of humanitarian law.59 Decisions made as to what or who to 
target are ‘Legal interpretive acts [that] signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon 
others’.60 The interpreter  
 
articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his 
property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications 
for violence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters 
have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been 
torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence.61  
 
As the judges at the ICTY were well aware, those interpreting legal texts therefore do so with 
immense responsibility for the effects of their decisions on others. This includes very 
particularly the impact of their decisions on the victims of the war as a whole and the victims 
of the particular crimes found to have been committed, as well as the individual defendants.  
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Dworkin later in his career rejected both positivist and interpretivist approaches (although he 
used to be an interpretivist himself). He saw both as treating law and morals as separate areas 
whereas he had come to the conclusion that law should itself be treated as part of ‘political 
morality’. His form of interpretation as a means of reaching the correct solution does seem, 
however, still to be key and involves moral judgement. 62  
 
In one of his last pieces of work Dworkin states that the ‘correct interpretation of an 
international document’ requires an interpretation that ‘makes the best sense of the text’ in 
line with the ‘underlying aim’ of international law. He sets out his list of the aims of 
international law as 
 
the creation of an international order that protects political communities from external 
aggression, protects citizens of those communities from domestic barbarism, facilitates 
coordination when this is essential, and provides some measure of participation by 
people in their own governance across the world. These goals must be interpreted 
together: they must be understood in such a way as to make them compatible.63 
 
Dworkin thought that a developing law requires its existence to be justified in political morality 
although once it was accepted ‘doctrine’ its basis in political morality would not need to be 
discussed in day to day legal argument. He saw that ‘a rigid separation between legal and 
moral argument in the development of international law would be premature now and would 
accelerate its practical irrelevance’.64  
 
Dale Stephens gives an example of how Dworkin’s interpretive approach can be seen to have 
been applied at the ICTY: 
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The increasing trend within international adjudicative jurisprudence to highlight and 
prioritize humanitarian considerations in LOAC, as reflected in the Kupreškić case, 
suggests a methodology different from that proffered by positivism. In the context of 
LOAC, the proportionality principle is a standard that admits to an open texture of 
discretion. In constraining that discretion by relying on the application of broad 
principles strongly implicates the ‘reasoned elaboration’ methodology often associated 
with Ronald Dworkin. This perspective sees law in its very essence as an interpretative 
enterprise. It anticipates an approach that seeks to divine meaning not through a textual 
excurses but rather through the identification of a set of coherent principles that 
underpin the law.65 
 
It seems Stephens considers that the judges of the ICTY were interpreting the proportionality 
principle under the guidance and constraint of the principle of humanity. The problem with 
this approach is, in Stephens’ view, that it undermines ‘the necessary balance between military 
necessity and humanity’ and demonstrates ‘the indeterminacy/manipulable nature of 
law/policy’.66 
 
Robert Cryer, in the context of the ICTY’s development of the law of command responsibility, 
sees an overlap between Judge Shahabuddeen’s views on the role of a judge’s personal 
opinions and those of Ronald Dworkin. He refers to Judge Shahabuddeen’s statements being 
reminiscent of Dworkin’s position that, where there is indeterminacy in the law, a judge’s 
personal moral views can play a role in the interpretation of the existing law so long as it does 
not ‘undermine the integrity of the legal system’.67  
 
Alexander Zahar is very clear in his view, in the context of the law of internal armed conflict, 
that the judges at the ICTY were ‘writing morality as law’.68 He considers that judges were, in 
this case, finding the law to be what they thought it should be, rather than what it in fact was.   
 
What is also interesting is how Zahar sees the work of the ICTY directly assisting the ICRC in 
‘driving’ the development of international humanitarian law; and both utilising customary 
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international law as a means by which to develop the law.69 He strongly criticises the process 
of identification of the contents of customary law typified by the approach in the Kupreškić et 
al case, where perceived opinio juris is given a stronger role than state practice in the name of 
the ‘maximization of civilian protection’ in filling gaps in the law.70 
 
Darryl Robinson points to ‘victim focused teleological reasoning’ on the part of judges applying 
international criminal law. He states that 
 
Notwithstanding the general declarations offered by ICL, examination reveals that a 
technique commonly used in ICL is (i) to adopt a purposive interpretive approach; (ii) 
to assume that the exclusive object and purpose of an ICL enactment is to maximise 
victim protection; and (iii) to allow this presumed object and purpose to dominate 
over other considerations, including if necessary the text itself.71 
 
Robinson is strongly of the view that the judges were acting to ensure the law was used for the 
protection of victims, even if this was not the ordinary meaning of the text. Although this is all 
based on good intentions, Robinson highlights that it works to undermine the requirements of 
a fair criminal justice system.72 This and other concerns regarding judicial creativity in the 
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Judicial creativity in the context of criminal law 
 
It should be noted that ‘judicial creativity’ has a somewhat negative connotation even when it 
is being mobilised in order to reach a ‘just’ decision. Darcy asks whether ‘the expansive 
treatment of the law of war crimes is in keeping with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
and the traditional international lawmaking process’.73  
 
In addition, Robert Cryer points out that the ICTY is applying criminal law which ‘is (and ought 
to be) subject to more stringent standards of interpretation than other areas of international 
law’.74 This is because, as Robert M. Cover was pointing out in the quotes above, the finding of 
guilt under criminal law results in punitive action being taken against the accused, an individual 
who will lose their freedom. The seriousness of the consequences of a finding of guilt require 
protection of the rights of the accused. 
 
As regards the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (the prohibition of retroactive effect of 
law), or the broader principle of legality, there is a potentially fundamental problem with 
judicial creativity when contrasted with the basic tenets of what a fair criminal system should 
entail. Noora Arajärvi considers the principle of legality in the context of the use of customary 
law by the international tribunals pointing out that the ‘uncodified’ nature of customary 
international law gives the judges applying it ‘great discretion over the specific substance of 
rules to be applied’ with the consequent risk that they will exceed the ‘constraints imposed by 
the principle of legality.’75 
 
Robinson is clear that ‘[t]he problem with victim focused teleological reasoning is that it 
conflates the ‘general justifying aim’ of the criminal law system as a whole…with the question 
of whether it is justified to punish a particular individual for a particular crime.’76 Mia Swart 
argues, however, that ‘law-making’ by judges in the context of ‘gaps’ in a new legal system 
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such as that of international criminal law as applied by the ICTY ‘can be a matter of necessity’ 
as well as ‘desirable and inevitable’.77 
 
The next section considers the potential factors that may be influencing the judges in cases 
where there is room – or a gap – for interpretation or judicial creativity. 
 
 
What factors play a role in judicial creativity?  
 
There are many factors potentially involved in judicial creativity. It is widely agreed, for 
example, that the international war crimes tribunals set up to date are political creatures.78 All 
the cases at the ICTY took place in a ‘highly politicized context’.79 This included accusations 
that the ICTY was pursuing a particular political agenda in the selection of those to be 
prosecuted.80 Some of those charged, including Gotovina, were celebrated as national heroes 
in their own countries for their role in the conflict and gained a broader political importance in 
the relationship between the ICTY, countries outside the Former Yugoslavia and their own 
country.81 Outright claims of outside political influence on judicial decision making were made, 
including by a judge of the ICTY, Judge Harhoff. Judge Harhoff believed that there had been 
political pressure put on certain judges to influence the development of some elements of the 
law. He went so far as to voice his concern about this in private correspondence which was 
leaked to the public.82  
 
This study does not consider the politics of the judges and judgments in the sense of pressure 
being applied by external actors, however, it is clear that the judges do not come to the 
courtroom as blank canvases. As Smith states in relation to the Nuremberg IMT: 
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If the Nuremberg situation is any bellwether, the elevation of the judicial process to 
the level of international politics does nothing to increase its consistency or efficiency. 
Judges cannot transcend the views of their own time and society, nor do they abandon 
the prejudices that they use in their daily lives at home.83 
 
The individual experience, characteristics and beliefs of the judges will clearly play a role in 
carrying out their work; even simply to the extent that they have a preference for a 
conservative approach or a more creative one. What sings from the pages of Reaching 
Judgment at Nuremberg is the importance of each judge’s approach to the challenges facing 
them, from establishing their role in the courtroom to deciding on the highly complex legal 
questions and then the level of responsibility of the defendants. Each judge’s personal 
characteristics and beliefs – particularly their views on how legal matters should be 
approached – as well as their actual knowledge and experience were all important. The judges 
were concerned about their own ‘legal reputations’ as well as the judicial process itself: 
 
None of the eight judges seems to have had the slightest doubt that the defendants 
were men who deserved severe punishment, but this attitude, paradoxical as it may 
sound, was not a decisive factor. As Biddle and Parker realized early, their central 
problem as Tribunal members was to try to reach a publicly acceptable verdict while 
upholding a charter with a shaky basis in international law. They wanted to leave this 
situation with legal reputations and the judicial process intact. In short, not just the 
judges’ biases against the defendants, but their attitude toward legal process and the 
situation’s complexities were the decisive factors.84 
 
Guido Acquaviva states in relation to Judge Antonio Cassese, one of the judges behind the 
Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, ‘Law was not something abstract and cold, to him - it was one of 
the ways to improve the human lot, and he definitively was interested in anything related to 
humankind.’85 Judge Harhoff’s famous letter demonstrated, if nothing else, that there was a 
suspicion on the part of at least one judge that the work of the tribunal, including that in the 
Gotovina Appeal Judgement, may have been being bent towards a politically motivated goal 
held by Judge Meron.86 What is interesting here is that Judge Cassesse clearly had a political 
agenda too. It was just that it was in line with expanding the remit of the ICTY and not the 
pulling back that was charged against Meron.87  
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One key factor that is repeatedly identified in the literature as a motivation of the judges at 
the ICTY in general is that of a desire to protect civilians (as, for example, suggested by 
Robinson).88 This is also described as a desire to further the ‘principle of humanity’. For 
example, in the context of the law governing internal armed conflicts, and under the heading 
‘the sentimental roots of ICTY law’, Zahar states that ‘[o]ver the almost two decades since the 
Tribunal's establishment, during which the states have kept silent, the ICTY judges have built a 
legal structure consistent with the ICRC's humanitarian ideal.’89 
 
The principle of humanity is considered by most to be a fundamental part of IHL, usually 
described within its cornerstone relationship with ‘military necessity’. The next section 
considers what this ‘principle of humanity’ or ‘humanitarian ideal’ might mean. After this the 
relationship between the ‘principle of humanity’ and ‘military necessity’ is considered. 
 
 
The principle of humanity 
 
What ‘humanity’ means is as wedded to the age and context in which it is deployed as any 
other. Larissa Fast sets out that the initial legal sense of ‘humanity’ contained in the first 
Geneva Convention was a reference ‘primarily and even exclusively to wounded soldiers, thus 
reflecting the reigning European prejudices of the day’.90 Fast also warns that it is the emphasis 
on one side’s own exclusive ‘humanity’ that can lead to the circumstances enabling violence 
against the de-humanised enemy.91 
 
The International Court of Justice have held that ‘the principles and rules of law applicable in 
armed conflict - at the heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity - make the 
conduct of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements’.92 The principle of 
‘humanity’ is the first of seven fundamental principles governing the work of the ICRC.93. It has 
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not, however, been clearly defined by the ICRC and can be seen to have more than one 
interpretation.94 In 2001, Robin Coupland concluded: 
 
At present, the meaning of humanity is ambiguous. It is currently perceived as little 
more than a source of international law with tenuous links to natural law. This 
ambiguity has led to a failure to recognize humanity as a continuing and powerful 
influence on international law and as the only valid objective of that law. It is therefore 
denied a place in legal dialogue.95 
 
In his textbook, Yoram Dinstein set out that the ‘principles of humanity’ are not equivalent to 
the principle sources of law, custom and treaties (the ‘strata’ of the law as he describes them), 
but they ‘may foster the evolution of’ the law.96 
 
Other authors have identified an increase in the emphasis on humanity in the development of 
international law, and IHL in particular. Theodor Meron pointed out that the law of war has 
always been concerned about the ‘protection of persons’ as well as the rights of states, that is, 
it has always had a ‘humanizing strand’ but it was the influence of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other post-Charter human rights treaties and declarations that ‘explain the 
focus of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols on individuals and populations’.97 
Robert Kolb traces four epochs of modern IHL, the latter two of which he describes as ‘(1949-
1993): the humanitarian age of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ and ‘(1993 to date): a phase 
of progressive ‘humanisation of IHL but also loss of autonomy’.98 The year 1993 was chosen as 
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the start of the fourth epoch due to the establishment of the ICTY, ‘a rebirth of international 
criminal law’.99  
 
Ruti Teitel describes the instability of the international system following the collapse of 
communism as leading to the increasing significance of human security and the development 
of ‘humanity’s law’:  
 
In an unstable and insecure world, the law of humanity—a framework that spans the 
law of war, international human rights law, and international criminal justice—
reshapes the discourse of international relations.100 
 
Teitel identified a trend whereby courts and tribunals faced with ‘interpreting and elaborating 
the law of humanity’ have had to address conflicts and gaps in the sources of this law and in so 
doing have ‘expanded rights and responsibilities to encompass wider and wider circles of 
conduct, and additional actors within conflicts’. Teitel also notes a trend of ‘less deference to 
the to the traditional sovereign prerogatives of states, where doing so would interfere with the 
overriding goal of protecting persons and peoples.’101 
 
Given all the above opinion as to the role of ‘humanity’ in the development of the law, the 
next section considers the relationship of humanity to another fundamental principle of the 
laws governing war: military necessity. 
 
 
Humanity and military necessity 
 
Yoram Dinstein describes ‘military necessity’ and ‘humanitarian considerations’ as the two 
opposing ‘driving forces energizing the motion of’ the law of international armed conflict.102 To 
Dinstein, this law ‘is, and must be, predicated on a subtle equilibrium between the two 
diametrically opposed stimulants of military necessity and humanitarian considerations’.103 
Dinstein uses the term ‘humanitarian considerations’ as opposed to ‘principle(s) of humanity’ 
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purposefully as he does not consider there to be a ‘principle of humanity’ that is a binding legal 
norm or obligation as opposed to an ‘extra-legal consideration’.104  
 
Dinstein singles out the Kupreškić et al. judgment of the ICTY for criticism and, in particular, 
Judges Cassese, May and Ndepele Mwackande Mumba’s suggestion as to the potential use of 
the ‘principles of humanity’ and ‘dictates of public conscience’ which form part of the Martens 
Clause.105 These judges in this case suggested that although the ‘principles of humanity’ and 
‘dictates of public conscience’ incorporated in the Martens Clause were not independent 
sources of international law they could, for example, be utilised in an assessment of 
cumulative attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians; where each 
attack was potentially lawful but where the ‘cumulative effects’ might not be in keeping with 
the overall principles of humanity such attacks may breach international law.106 
 
One point that other writers have taken up, however, is that it is far from clear that military 
necessity and humanity are in fact diametrically opposed concepts. Yishai Beer argues that 
necessity and humanity are not polar opposites.107 Military necessity, in his view could 
complement humanitarian purposes through its power to ‘restrict brutality in the exercise of 
military force’ given that ‘[e]xcessive use of force is not a professional requirement of a 
military; the mere fact that it happens in many wars does not mean that it has any military 
substance or basis.’108 
 
As mentioned in the Overview above, David Luban describes two different interpretive 
communities who have, on the whole, adopted an adversarial position to each other: those in 
the military who start from the viewpoint of military necessity (LOAC version) and those 
humanitarian lawyers who start from the viewpoint of the principle of humanity (IHL 
version).109 In his view these two viewpoints reflect a potential indeterminacy in the law 
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itself.110 In Luban’s view the international tribunals have given ‘visible structure and focus’ to a 
broader change in how the laws of war are seen by society, that ‘public scrutiny and 
accountability are a fact of life, and at bottom they represent a larger truth…: the civilian world 
has staked a claim to the laws of war that is not going to go away, and that should not go 
away. The laws of war are now common property…. To the degree that the IHL version of the 
laws of war articulates concern about civilians that the LOAC version downplays, the IHL 
version sets the legal standard, not only the political standard.’111  
 
Luban argues in conclusion, however, that  
 
properly understood, military necessity itself requires taking civilian interests into 
account…. the indeterminacy may not be as complete as I suggested. To the extent the 
LOAC version treats military necessity as a strictly technical limit on humanitarian 
concerns, it misunderstands military necessity; and, understanding it correctly, the 
possibility exists for convergence between the two cultures.112 
 
Luban’s idea of the possibility of ‘convergence between the two cultures’ is striking given the 
results of this research. As is discussed in Chapter 3 (Law), the judges have seemed to be on 
the IHL side of the line by prioritising the viewpoint of the ICRC, however, they have also had 
serious regard for the views of the military practitioners appearing as witnesses before them 
(as will be highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5 (Evidence I and II)).  
 
The next section will introduce the mechanism by which questions of judicial creativity became 
particularly relevant to the law of targeting, namely through the role given to the international 
customary law governing criminal breaches of the laws and customs of war. 
 
 
Judicial creativity and the law of targeting 
 
As Darcy highlights, it is in relation to the violations of the laws and customs of war (Article 3) 
rather than grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 2) that there has been the 
more significant judicial creativity, leading to the ‘expansion of the scope of the law of war 
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crimes and the identification of new offences not previously established in positive 
international law’.113  
 
A key point regarding Article 3 of the ICTY Statute was that it was drafted so as to be a non- 
exhaustive list. This gave the OTP the chance to bring charges for and the judges the 
opportunity to consider alleged breaches of other laws and customs of war incurring individual 
criminal responsibility. Darcy describes this as an ‘interpretative licence’114 for the judges and 
as he states, although omitting to mention the key role of the OTP: 
 
The law of war crimes is arguably where the ad hoc Tribunals have made their most 
significant and far-reaching contribution to the development of international criminal 
law. While the Security Council-created statutory instruments provided a platform for 
the Tribunals’ judges to address violations of the laws of armed conflict, it was the 
judiciary itself which expanded the scope of the concept of war crimes and expounded 
on the meaning and content of numerous individual crimes of war.115 
 
This opportunity to develop (or exercise judicial creativity in relation to) the law of targeting 
was dependent on the identification of laws and customs of war (not enumerated in Article 3 
of the ICTY Statute) that were binding on the parties to the conflict at the time of the offences 
alleged. The Appeals Chamber in their Tadić Jurisdiction Decision held that the conditions that 
must be satisfied for a violation of international humanitarian law not listed within Article 3 to 
be subject to that article and therefore capable of being prosecuted before the ICTY were: 116 
 
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law;  
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required 
conditions must be met...; 
(iii) the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule 
protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the 
victim... 
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. 
 
The key opening for the ‘interpretive licence’ was the very nature of customary international 
law. It is difficult to set out the precise contents of the rules of customary law at any given time 
given that it is a law that can evolve based on the practice and opinion of all the states in the 
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world. Its contents cannot be fixed as it can change as state practice and opinion ebb and flow. 
The customary law relevant to the law of targeting is discussed in detail in Chapter [3] (Law). 
 
Robert Kolb gives an idea of the nature of customary international law in describing its role in 
the innovative work of the judges of the ICTY: 
 
The overall assessment of the tribunal's work has to be that it did a pioneering task; 
that it affirmed, shaped and developed the law on many aspects, for example with the 
creation of a category of war crimes in non-international armed conflicts, through the 
somewhat benevolent lens of mobile customary international law norms; and that it 
did justice in many individual cases.117 
 
This study sought to identify the influences on the work of the judges, testing Kolb and others’ 
assessments, in the particular context of the law of targeting. That is, it looked to questions of 
judicial creativity and the application of the principle of humanity in the judges’ definitions of 
the law, use of the evidence and findings of criminal responsibility or innocence. In finding a 
strong role for the principle of humanity, it also found the means by which the military 
viewpoint (although not military necessity as such) was applied by the judges. 
 





This study attempts to bring a social scientific approach to the legal analysis and investigation 
of how the judges were applying the law of targeting, to try to capture a broader range of 
factors than a standard legal analysis. The judges’ decisions and decision making were, by the 
very fact of the absence of clear answers in existing law to all the questions asked of them, 
influenced by many factors and the broader social science outside traditional legal analysis can 
facilitate the study of such activity. 
 
This research is based on the acceptance that judicial creativity has played a significant role at 
the ICTY and therefore does not subscribe to a formal positivist view. It sees that the judges 
have an interpretive role in situations where the law is unclear; this means that at times there 
will be room for influences other than the law itself on their decisions. In using a qualitative 
                                                          





content analysis approach the intention is to make explicit what is usually done 
implicitly/unconsciously in legal case analysis. It is also seen as a means through which the role 
of the judges in developing the law can be described as well as the factors playing a role in this 
identified.  
 
This research used a method combining traditional legal analysis with a broader qualitative 
analytic research method which is described below. Through adopting this approach certain 
themes arose which were not pre-planned and the nuances of the witnesses and their 
testimony came to the fore. The witnesses, through their testimony and in its incorporation 
into the judgments, were key to this research. The witnesses and their testimony before the 
judges of the ICTY are therefore introduced in detail in Chapter 4 (Evidence I: The witnesses). 
 
The questions raised by this research were answered through a detailed consideration of 
materials arising from three cases brought before the judges at the ICTY, namely those of 
Blaškić,118 Galić119 and Gotovina et al.120 These judgments were selected as the basis for this 
study as they cover a range of the complex legal issues faced by those asked to judge certain 
conduct that has taken place on the battlefield. They arise from different geographical areas of 
the conflict and from contrasting military operations but all three include charges against 
soldiers for the way in which they had conducted military operations. In particular, the concept 
of ‘unlawful attacks’ arises in all three judgments and therefore the law of targeting that is the 
focus of this study.  
 
This research makes use of the unusually open, easily accessible and large online record of the 
work of the ICTY, described by one historian as a ‘vast, incredibly rich archive’.121 In particular, 
it has utilised the publicly available witness testimony in these cases. The recorded testimony 
of even a small fraction of the witnesses of the Yugoslav conflict gives a vivid insight into that 
conflict and the lives and deaths of the people that these cases are ultimately about. The 
transcription of the varied proceedings in the courtroom gives an idea of the challenges of the 
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day to day existence of the ICTY as a functioning court; the problems addressed by the judges 
and the relationships between the participants.  
 
To answer the research question the relevant parts of the trial and appeal judgements and 
transcripts of hearings from each case were analysed. This involved a textual analysis using 
pre-set codes of themes linked to various aspects of the law of targeting to code the text in 
NVivo. During this process new ideas and concepts arose and were incorporated into new 
codes and investigated further. The perceived dichotomy of the principles of ‘humanity’ and 
those of the ‘military’ was an initial guiding framework although, as became apparent, it was 
not as stark as might have been imagined. 
 





The overarching research question of this project was how had the judges in certain cases at 
the ICTY implemented the law of targeting and, given this, could any factor(s) be identified as 
having influenced the many decisions on law, evidence and responsibility they had to make in 
reaching their judgments? In order to answer this question, the following questions based on 




1. What legal decisions did the judges make in relation to the law of targeting? 
2. How was the law identified? 
3. How did these decisions reflect a development of the law of targeting, if any? 
4. Can any factors be identified as influencing or driving these decisions? In particular, 
has the role of the principle of humanity, discussed in the literature, been a factor in 





5. How did the judges apply the law to the facts before them? 











7. What exactly was the role of those charged and found responsible, or not, for 
targeting offences? That is, what were they found to have – or not to have done – 
exactly? 
8. Were there any key factors that led to findings of guilt or innocence in relation to their 
conduct? 
 
Questions 1. to 4. form the basis of Chapter 3 on Law, questions 5. and 6. form the basis of 




A note on language and documents at the ICTY 
 
The Tribunal worked in several different languages with various requirements for 
interpretation and translation. The Conference and Language Service Section (‘CLSS’) was 
responsible for all interpretation and translation. The CLSS also employed the court reporters 
to take transcripts of the hearings.122 Interpreters worked in real time as an integral part of the 
courtroom with the proceedings being heard in at least 3 languages (Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian 
(‘BCS’), Albanian or Macedonian, French and English).123 Translators translated documents for 
presentation of evidence before and alongside the cases. 
 
The judges (as well as the many others involved) were not necessarily working in their native 
languages in the courtroom or in their judgements. Many of the judges were multilingual, for 
example, all of the trial judges in Galić could speak and read both English and French as well as 
their native languages, but none could read or speak B/S/C. This has to be borne in mind when 
analysing the transcripts and judgements themselves. This is particularly relevant to any 
detailed consideration of the construction of the language – which would, among other things, 
need to look into translation/language correlation across different languages.124  
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The judgments themselves are directed by the various judges but written and produced by a 
team, which includes judges’ assistants, rather than a single judge. As Lawrence Solan points 
out, the presentation of a decision in a judgment may not always fully reflect the difficulty of 
the decision itself or even the actual main reasons for the decision.125 Judges are under 
pressure to ‘speak decisively’ and to rely upon the relevant existing body of law (also described 
by Solan as following ‘legitimate process’), leading to the potential in difficult cases for the 
reporting of their reasons ‘less than fully and openly’.126  
 
The transcripts of the hearings are not full representations of the trials. Some parts are heard 
in complete secrecy, usually for reasons of witness protection, and although there may be 
some reference to these witnesses and/or their evidence in the judgements, their places in the 
transcript remain blank.127  
 
The level of consideration of language required by a linguistics based study is outside the 
scope of this research but these points have to be noted and this research will aim to interpret 
what has been written and said bearing in mind these caveats, reading the words on the 
paper, at relative face value, to be those intended by the judges. 
 
 
Approach from social science – qualitative content analysis 
 
It appears that although the mechanics and effects of the legal system and its legislation have 
often been analysed from a social science perspective, the practice of legal analysis from case 
law has not – even though this form of legal research can itself be seen as a qualitative 
research process. As Lisa Webley states, ‘[m]any common law practitioners are unaware that 
they undertake qualitative empirical legal research on a regular basis – the case-based method 
of establishing the law through analysis of precedent is in fact a form of qualitative research 
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using documents as source material’ she does not elaborate on this and goes on to look to 
qualitative research of other elements of the legal system.128 
 
Documents are commonly used as sources of qualitative research.129 The precise form which 
analysis of these documents takes is, however, much harder to specify. Discourse Analysis and 
Grounded Theory are specific strategies of analysis commonly linked to qualitative research 
based on documentary sources but neither is a good match for the type of research that is 
proposed here. Discourse Analysis requires much more emphasis on understanding the nature 
and construction of language than would have fit this study. Grounded Theory requires the use 
of a very specific approach and technically involves a starting point clear of any pre-existing 
theoretical framework, which is not the case here.130 The best fit for this project was seen as a 
more general qualitative analytic approach best described as qualitative content analysis.  
 
Margrit Schreier describes qualitative content analysis as ‘a method for systematically 
describing the meaning of qualitative data’. She states that ‘[t]hree features characterize the 
method: qualitative content analysis reduces data, it is systematic, and it is flexible.’131 In terms 
of its flexibility as an approach, Schreier describes qualitative content analysis as ‘typically’ 
combining both concept-driven and data-driven categories in its coding frame; the data-driven 
categories ensure that the coding frame ‘provides a valid description of the material’.132  
 
This approach of qualitative content analysis is to be distinguished from quantitative content 
analysis although Schreier is of the view that there is no sharp dividing line between the 
two.133 Webley describes a content analysis ‘inclined towards’ qualitative interpretation using 
‘purposive sampling, less quantification and more interpretation in their development of codes 
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and their treatment of those codes’.134 It is the emphasis on the interpretation and judgement 
of the interpreter in selecting samples and selecting, developing and analysing the codes that 
distinguishes this from a quantitative approach, even when using computer software such as 
NVivo to carry out the research. Given the interpretive nature of this type of enquiry, the 
sampling method and validity of the coding will require more justification than other forms of 
qualitative research.135 
 
The qualitative content analysis approach was chosen as a slightly different approach to legal 
analysis through providing a more explicit breakdown of the information contained in the 
judgments rather than a radical departure from legal case analysis. It is hoped that it will 
provide a more detailed case analysis than has previously been provided for these selected 
judgments.  
 
Schreier sets out that the ‘heart’ of the qualitative content analysis method is the ‘coding 
frame’; building this coding frame involves ‘selecting material; structuring and generating 
categories; defining categories; revising and expanding the frame.’136 The next sections set out 
how material was selected and coding carried out for the purposes of this study. 
 
 
Identification of specific relevant material for analysis 
 
The cases forming the core of this research have been selected as they are those heard before 
the ICTY that most directly address the law relating to targeting, in particular due to the 
positions of the defendants within their respective militaries as well as the questions the 
charges against them raised relating to the use of the troops and weaponry available to them. 
The legal cases that were made against each accused are described in more detail in Chapters 
2 and 6 (Framework and Responsibility); what follows is a short introduction to the factual 
basis of each case: 
 
• Tihomir Blaškić was a professional soldier and commander of the armed forces 
headquarters in central Bosnia of the Croatian Defence Council (‘HVO’) of the Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna (‘HZ-HB’). According to the prosecution, he was ‘a career 
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military officer who graduated from the Military Academy in Belgrade in 1983 and 
formerly served as a Captain First Class in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)’.137 He was 
prosecuted for his alleged role in serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed against Bosnian Muslims from May 1992 to January 1994 by members of the 
armed forces of the HVO in the Lašva Valley region of central Bosnia against the 
background of an ongoing armed conflict between the HVO and the Bosnian Muslim 
Army.138 A key part of this aspect of the conflict was a military struggle for control of the 
strategic Lašva Valley and surrounding areas,139 but this was intertwined with the ‘political’ 
objective of removal of the Bosnian Muslims from the area, that is, their ethnic 
cleansing.140 
 
• Stanislav Galić was prosecuted for his role in the internationally publicised and condemned 
siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb Army (‘VRS’).141 Galić too was a professional soldier, 
appointed commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (‘SRK’) on 7 September 1992, 
taking up the position on 10 September 1992 and being promoted to the rank of Major 
General in November 1992. He remained in this position until 10 August 1994.142 Galić 
reported directly to the Chief of Staff of the VRS, General Ratko Mladić.  The prosecution 
case was not that the ‘siege’ itself was unlawful but that alongside a legitimate military 
operation there was also an unlawful campaign of shelling and sniping unlawfully directed 
against the civilian population.143   
 
• Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markač and Ivan Čermak were prosecuted for their part in 
Operation Storm, the military campaign launched by the Croatian government in order to 
re-take control of the area the Croatian Serbs had declared as being the Serbian 
Autonomous District of Krajina, and later the Republic of Serbian (Srpska) Krajina (‘RSK’), 
from the RSK military force known as the Srpska Vojska Krajine (Serbian Army of Krajina or 
‘SVK’). The Trial Chamber found that at the time of the acts referred to in the indictment, 
Gotovina held the rank of Colonel General in the Armed Forces of Croatia, the Hrvatska 
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Vojska (‘HV’) and was the Commander of the Split Military District.144 It is not specified in 
the indictment or judgment what he was doing between his time in the French Foreign 
Legion (from 1 February 1973 to 1 February 1978) and returning to Croatia in June 1991.145 
Operation Storm was, on the whole, seen within and outside Croatia as a well organised 
military campaign to restore the control of the government of Croatia over its own 
territory.146 
 
These cases cover three different elements of the conflict and differing roles for attack and 
targeting within them. The judges considered a variety of scenarios of potential unlawful 
targeting within these cases with some overlap in the relevant legal principles (such as 
questions of the legal principle of proportionality in attack) and therefore some room for 
comparison between them and, in particular, between scenarios in the cases of Galić and 
Gotovina.  
 
The cases selected here are not representative of the overall cases at the ICTY, in terms of the 
ethnic backgrounds of the defendants or of the charges brought. This is because of the 
emphasis of this study on breaches of IHL/LOAC in military attacks which was not in question 
in all cases before the ICTY.  
 
Analysis of the decisions in these cases has been undertaken on the basis of detailed 
examination of the text of the judgments (including the references included in the footnotes) 
relevant to targeting law backed up by transcripts of witness testimony from the hearings. This 
encompasses consideration of the evidence and arguments presented to the judges. Given the 
volume of material available for each of the cases, the study has focused on the reasoning and 
evidence highlighted by the judges in their decisions. This means that the Prosecution and 
Defence cases have not been analysed in their entirety but simply where relied on or 
otherwise discussed by the judges. 
 
In reviewing witness testimony in these three cases, two different approaches were adopted in 
establishing which witnesses on which to concentrate analysis due, in the main part to time 
limitations. The first approach was to read sequentially each prosecution witness who 
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appeared before the judges, concentrating on the prosecution case (as opposed to the cross 
examination of the witnesses) unless they had given evidence that was particularly relevant to 
this study. This was adopted for the Galić case where it became evident that there was not 
sufficient time to read all testimony given in these three trials, particularly in any depth. The 
second approach was therefore to focus only on the witnesses specifically relied on in the 
judgement. This was adopted for the Blaškić and Gotovina cases – and was made easier for 
these cases by the fact that there was a list of witnesses for the Blaškić case and a fully 
organised witness table had been created by the time of the Gotovina case.  
 
 
Use of NVivo and coding 
 
The selected judgments (trial and appeal) and witness testimony have all been uploaded into 
NVivo for analysis. The witness testimony in each trial was heard over several years and even 
with selecting the testimony of witnesses likely to be relevant to the research 
questions/targeting matters the files uploaded into NVivo run to hundreds of thousands of 
words. 
 
The judgments (as they relate to the law on targeting) and certain key testimonies have been 
manually coded in full. Given the scale of the data, the whole database has been subjected to 
key word searches for certain key terms. Some codes were established before coding 
commenced as relevant to answering the research questions, others have arisen on review of 
the documents. Two nodes of particular interest that were created during the course of coding 
the documents to address topics which were not foreseen were one that was needed to cover 
what seemed to be important non-technical witness evidence in relation to technical matters 
(such as the source of fire) and one for evidence that kept arising linking military commanders 
to the political background of the conflict. 
 
As both Graham Gibbs and Douglas Ezzy point out, computer programmes such as NVivo can 
only ‘facilitate’, not carry out, analysis.147 As well as being a means to record and easily access 
the manual coding of large amounts of data, the power of NVivo has also been used here to 
follow up on new themes/specific details and possible lines of enquiry raised through manual 
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coding by searching for particular words or phrases in the entirety of the data uploaded to 
NVivo. These search results form part of the detailed qualitative analysis by helping to give an 
idea of the scale of and patterns within the evidence, through and between the cases.  
 
In coding the text in NVivo the following points were taken into account: 
 
• What explicit rules and rulings have the judges provided? 
• What is implicit in the judges’ rulings? 
• What words or phrases are repeated and what patterns of language use can be found. 
What is the significance or importance of these words/phrases to the judges – 
whether conscious or unconscious? 
• Note irregularities/unusual occurrences and their treatment by the judges 
• Any particular “concepts” arising (Bryman and Burgess refer to as ‘generation of 
concepts’ aspect of qualitative data analysis)? ‘Analytic categories ... grounded in the 
data and wider literature, categories which go beyond simple story-telling.’148 
• Using some ‘word counting’ to give an idea of scale and context of the qualitative work 
 
NVivo has also been used to provide a means of categorising the sources of the results and 
using these categorisations for further analysis. As a result of preliminary findings 
demonstrating the range of witnesses proving valuable evidence in relation to the targeting 
charges, witness cases were created in NVivo and given attributes to demonstrate the range of 
witnesses who testified in relation to targeting matters. The testimony of these witnesses was 
coded to their specific case.  
 
In total, 148 witness cases have been created from the testimonies of witnesses in the three 
cases. This includes victim witnesses, witnesses from various military organisations (both from 
within and outside the Former Yugoslavia) and expert witnesses. Each case has been provided 
with attributes to identify whether they were a soldier or civilian at the time of the incidents 
they described, whether if they were not a soldier at that time they had previous military 
experience, whether they were a national of the Former Yugoslavia or not and who they were 
giving evidence for, in which case and whether they were an expert witness. The cases were 
also set up to note if a witness was referred to by a judge in relation to one of three specific 
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incidents in the case of Galić or in relation to the shelling of Knin in the case of Gotovina. This 
means that alongside individual coding of their testimony analysis can be run on the evidence 
provided by witnesses with particular characteristics. More detail of witnesses before the ICTY 




Contribution from Judge Ķinis 
 
As the focus of this research moved towards practical questions of the assessment of witness 
testimony and other evidence by the judges, and therefore the role of the trial judges in 
particular, it was decided to investigate whether the trial judges from the case of Gotovina 
(being the most recent case, with all judges still traceable) would be willing to give their views 
on questions relevant to this study (albeit in a very general sense and not expecting disclosure 
of any sensitive matters). Judge Orie was approached but politely declined to assist due to the 
nature of the study. Judge Ķinis, now Associate Professor Dr. iur. Ķinis in the Faculty of Law at 
Rīga Stradiņš University, however, was particularly helpful. Although, having discussed my 
approach to him with Judge Orie, he did not think an interview was appropriate, he responded 
to those of a set of written questions (developed through an e-mail correspondence) that he 
felt that he was professionally able to answer. His answers are incorporated in Chapters 2 (The 
framework for the demarcation of the law of targeting at the ICTY) and 4 (Evidence I: The 
witnesses) of this thesis. Judge Gwaunza was approached by e-mail to see if she would answer 
a similar set of questions but although willing to help did not have the time to do so. 
 
Some of the other judges who worked at the ICTY have written of their experience and views. 
This includes Judge Patricia Wald whose knowledge and thoughts have also been of great use 











Assessing quality of research 
 
In contrast to quantitative research studies, there are no long-established principles that form 
the basis for assessing the quality of qualitative research.149 Schreier mentions ‘consistency (to 
assess reliability) and validity’ as quality criteria for qualitative content analysis. She states that 
although these criteria have been ‘derived’ from quantitative content analysis ‘they are often 
applied less strictly.’150 
 
Carl Auerback and Louise Silverstein suggest that the qualitative concepts of justifiability of 
interpretations and transferability of theoretical constructs be used instead of the quantitative 
concepts of reliability and validity and generalizability respectively.151 They posit transparency, 
communicability, and coherence as criteria for distinguishing between justifiable and 
unjustifiable ways of using subjectivity to interpret data152 and use the term transferable to 
describe theoretical constructs that can be extended beyond a particular sample in place of 
the term generalizable.153 Uwe Flick places particular emphasis on the ‘transparency’ of 
research and, in particular, how the research process as a whole must be made clear to its 
audience so that they are able to assess the quality of that particular research.154 
 
Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey explain that documents are ‘social facts… produced, shared 
and used in socially organised ways’ but also warn that they are not ‘transparent 
representations of organisational routines, decision-making processes, or professional 
practices’.155 This highlights that documents are important data for social research and have to 
be evaluated for implicit as well as explicit meaning.  
 
                                                          
149 See, for example, Chapter 2 in Uwe Flick, Managing Quality in Qualitative Research (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2007); Jude Spiers et al., ‘Reflection/Commentary on a Past Article: “Verification Strategies 
for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’, International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods 17, no. 1 (2018) and David L. Altheide and John M. Johnson, ‘Chapter 35: Reflections on 
Interpretive Adequacy in Qualitative Research’, in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th 
Edition, eds. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA; London: SAGE, 2011).  
150 Schreier, ‘Chapter 12: Qualitative Content Analysis’, 173. 
151 Carl F. Auerbach and Louise B. Silverstein, Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis 
(New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), 78 onwards. 
152 Auerbach and Silverstein, Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis, 83-84. 
153 Auerbach and Silverstein, Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis, 87. 
154 Chapter 10 in Flick, Managing Quality in Qualitative Research. 
155 Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey, ‘Analysing Documentary Realities’, in Qualitative Research: 




Without the time to carry out a detailed analysis of all possibly relevant material, this study has 
tried to be as thorough as possible within a limited selection of source material. The ICTY Court 
Records Database and NVivo were used to search for certain key terms to ensure that the 
most relevant witness transcripts and other material were selected and suitably investigated. 
Through reading and coding of these selected sources, the study has identified re-occurring 
concepts and confirmed certain themes. It endeavours to make a coherent case of its findings, 
as summarised in the thesis statement above, and not just provide extracts or examples in a 
vacuum. As Flick points out, a researcher must make sure they are analysing the material, not 
just providing ‘illustrations’.156  
 
 
Summary of research method 
 
It is clear that there was more happening in the cases under examination than the judges 
simply applying an existing set of rules to a clear set of facts. This study therefore uses the 
research method described here to investigate the central questions of this thesis, namely, 
what has influenced the judges in their demarcation of the line between lawful and unlawful 
conduct of targeting activities.  
 
Ideas of qualitative analysis of documents in the broader social sciences have been instructive 
in the detailed analysis that has been conducted – highlighting the need to consider how the 
authors of the text seek to persuade their readers of the authority of their arguments and 
decisions, requiring an in depth analysis of how these arguments are formed (as well as what is 
left unsaid) and the assumptions within this.157  
 
This study has utilised the computer software NVivo to make manageable the large amounts of 
data that potentially contained material relevant to this study. It has enabled a systematic and 
relatively thorough approach through an ability to search the whole of the data for key words 
and terms.  
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In presenting the results of the research, the aim has been to attempt to demonstrate the 
main findings in a way that is true to the underlying judgments and testimonies. It has tried to 
adhere to ‘transparency, communicability, and coherence’ as posited as an indication of 





The next chapter (Chapter 2 (The framework for the demarcation of the law of targeting at the 
ICTY)) introduces the framework within the law of targeting was applied at the ICTY. This 
includes the targeting related charges brought in each case, the relevant law of war crimes and 
criminal responsibility and the rules of procedure and evidence applied by the judges. 
 
Chapter 3 (Law) sets out how the judges defined the crimes and established that certain crimes 
had been committed. It is here that consideration of whether the ICTY has had a role in the 
development of the law and, if so, what exactly this has been is carried out. It considers how 
the law was established and what factors were involved in this process. It does this through 
the application of the key IHL concepts of ‘Distinction’, ‘Civilian’ and ‘Civilian 
Population’/’Military objectives’ and ‘Proportionality’ in the cases of Blaškić, Galić and 
Gotovina. It is here that role of the rules in API and ICRC guidance, and through this, the 
principle of humanity, come to the fore.  
 
Chapter 4 (Evidence I: The witnesses) introduces the witnesses who provided the testimony 
used as evidence in relation to the law of targeting. It is intended that this chapter should 
show something of the relationship between judges and the witnesses before them, that is the 
interrelationship between judging and testifying at the ICTY. This relationship is key to the 
findings that will be brought out in Chapters 5 (Evidence II) and 6 (Responsibility) as to the 
nature of the witness evidence that the judges relied on in reaching their judgments. 
 
Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent) sets out how the judges applied the law to the 
evidence before them. It considers how the judges utilised the military viewpoint as well as 
that of civilian (including victim) witnesses in assessing the legality of alleged unlawful attacks 




taking of Knin in Croatia to consider the implications for the factors relevant to the 
demarcation of the law in relation to charges of unlawful attack. 
 
Chapter 6 (Responsibility) looks to the final stage of the demarcation of the law of targeting, 
namely the judicial attribution of individual criminal liability or innocence. It considers the role 
of command as well as the judges’ treatment of the law of command responsibility as it relates 
to the law of targeting and individual criminal responsibility for matters of targeting. It is here 
that the lack of use of superior responsibility as a mode of liability becomes apparent. This 
chapter looks at the questions around the evidence of orders given (or not given) and the 
influences on the judges’ decisions here, which included evidence relating to the agreement of 
the accused with alleged broader criminal projects underlying the conduct of the conflict. 
 
Chapter 7 (Conclusion) sets out the conclusions of the study, describing how while looking for 
the influence of the concept of humanity and confirming its importance, particularly in the 
judges’ relationships with the witnesses and demarcation of the law, it also found the 
influence of something that is described here as the ‘military viewpoint’. The military 
viewpoint is not necessarily in clear distinction to the principle of humanity but seems to 
reflect a desire on the part of the judges to create a functioning legal framework that is 











In order to investigate what findings were made by the judges in relation to the law of 
targeting in the cases of Galić, Blaškić and Gotovina and whether any factors could be 
identified as influencing these decisions, it was necessary to establish the framework within 
which the judges were working. This framework was set within the war crimes jurisdiction of 
the ICTY pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY statute. It was constructed from the relevant charges 
brought against the accused and substantive law (including that of criminal responsibility) 
applicable to these charges.  
 
In the context of a trial, however, the applicable substantive law cannot by itself guide the 
conduct of the proceedings. The ICTY judges had to apply the law within the rules set out in 
the ICTY Statute and the rules of evidence and procedure drafted and adopted by the ICTY 
judges in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’). This framework was also therefore 
composed of the law of procedure and evidence which sets out what evidence could be 
provided to the judges and by what means. 
 
This chapter starts by setting out the war crimes jurisdiction of the ICTY and the targeting 
related charges brought in each of the cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina. It then provides an 
introduction to the relevant law of war crimes and criminal responsibility applied by the 
judges. It then introduces the rules of procedure and evidence under which the witnesses, 
whose experience of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia forms the basis for much of this 
research, provided their testimony.  
 
 
War crimes jurisdiction of the ICTY: Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
 
In his report that led to the establishment of the ICTY, the then Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, gave his view that in order to ensure the respect of the 




doubt’ customary law at the time of the acts the accused were alleged to have committed. This 
would avoid the problem that not all states were parties to the relevant treaties/conventions.1 
 
In the Secretary-General’s view, the part of conventional international humanitarian law which 
met these requirements was made up of: 
 
• The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; 
• The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 
Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; 
• The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948; and  
• The Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 (the ‘Nuremberg 
Charter’ or ‘London Charter’).2 
 
On this understanding, he recommended that grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
be included within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. He also recommended that there should be 
jurisdiction over certain elements of the Hague Regulations as well as the war crimes defined 
in Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter, both as interpreted and applied by the Nuremberg 
IMT.3 The grave breaches were included in Article 2 of the ICTY Statute (Grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949) and the other war crimes considered to have customary status 
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (Violations of the laws or customs of war).  
 
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute covering the ‘Violations of the laws or customs of war’ provided 
that: 
 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the 
laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:   
 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering;   
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified 
by military necessity;   
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, 
villages, dwellings, or buildings;   
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and 
works of art and science;   
(e) plunder of public or private property.    
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This list by the Secretary-General of the components of customary international humanitarian 
law of war crimes gave no indication of a rule prohibiting attacks on civilians as such during the 
conduct of hostilities. It did not mention any of the provisions of the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 (‘API’). 
 
The list of war crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY was, however, non-exhaustive (stating 
‘violations shall include, but not be limited to’ those explicitly set out) and was utilised as such 
by the OTP.4 For the purposes of this research, it is the use by the OTP of this open ended 
provision to bring charges of ‘unlawful attacks on civilians’ that is most relevant and which is 
now considered in the context of each of the cases. It should be noted that this study does not 
consider the law as it relates to internal armed conflicts. 
 
In addition to the provisions regarding Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(Article 2 ICTY Statute) and Violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3 ICTY Statute), the 
ICTY was also given jurisdiction over crimes of Genocide (Article 4 ICTY Statute) and Crimes 
against humanity (Article 5 ICTY Statute). The provisions of the ICTY Statute regarding crimes 
against humanity are relevant to this study because of Article 5(h). This provides that the ICTY 
has the jurisdiction to prosecute those persons responsible for ‘persecutions on political, racial 
and religious grounds’. As will be discussed below, this became another means by which the 
legality of the conduct of attacks carried out by armed forces could be considered by the 
judges of the ICTY. 
 
Article 7 of the ICTY Statute sets out the rules governing individual criminal responsibility 
relevant to all of the substantive crimes covered by Articles 2 to 5. It provided for direct 
responsibility, including via modes of liability for acts less than commission such as ‘ordering’ 
and ‘aiding and abetting’, in Article 7(1)) as well as indirect responsibility through superior or 
command responsibility in Article 7(3). Questions regarding individual criminal responsibility of 
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commanders are addressed in Chapter 6 (Responsibility) but they are also relevant to the 
charges brought in the cases discussed in the next section. 
 
 
The charges brought in the cases 
 
This section sets out the charges brought against the accused in the three cases under 
discussion that were most relevant to questions of targeting. It shows how the OTP introduced 
charges of ‘unlawful attack’ and how the offence was developed. It also includes a description 
of how unlawful attacks were incorporated as an element of persecution as a crime against 
humanity by the judges in Blaškić and then charged by the OTP as such in Gotovina. 
 
General Tihomir Blaškić was charged on the basis of individual and superior responsibility 
pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) with twenty counts made up of charges of crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches and violations of the laws and customs of war for his alleged role in 
the crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims by members of the armed forces of the HVO in 
the Lašva Valley region of central Bosnia.5 These were broken down under the headings 
Persecution (Count 1), Unlawful Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Objects (Counts 2-4),6 Wilful 
Killing and Causing Serious Injury (Counts 5-10), Destruction and Plunder of Property (Counts 
11-13), Destruction of Institutions Dedicated to Religion or Education (Count 14), Inhumane 
Treatment, the Taking of Hostages and the Use of Human Shields (Counts 15-20). 
 
Blaškić was charged with responsibility for attacks against the villages of through two different 
means: 
 
Count 2: a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Articles 3 





Count 3: an unenumerated VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as 
recognised by Articles 3, 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal and customary 
                                                          
5 Blaškić Second Amended Indictment of 25 April 1997. 
6 The Prosecutor withdrew count 2 of the indictment which had charged devastation not justified by 
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Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 6 referring to Summary of the Prosecutor’s Final Brief, 22 July 1999 




law, Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II 
(unlawful attack on civilians). 
 
It is the charge contained in Count 3 that is of specific interest to this study with its reference 
to ‘unlawful attack on civilians’.  
 
Blaškić was initially found guilty on all counts except for those relating to the shelling of Zenica 
(Count 2 having been withdrawn by the Prosecutor). He was found guilty by the Trial Chamber 
of having ordered a crime against humanity in the form of persecutions against the Muslim 
civilians of Bosnia, including through attacks on towns and villages, and was found guilty of 
having ordered unlawful attacks on civilians.  
 
The Appeals Chamber reversed all the findings of the Trial Chamber except for some of those 
relating to the treatment of detainees. All findings of guilt related to unlawful attacks against 
civilians were reversed. 
 
Major-General Stanislav Galić was charged (on the basis of individual and superior 
responsibility pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3)) with offences under three main headings, 
namely ‘Infliction of Terror’, ‘Sniping’ and ‘Shelling’ for his role in what became known as the 
siege of Sarajevo.7 Under the heading ‘Infliction of Terror’, the prosecution charged Galić with 
‘Violations of the Laws or Customs of War (unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians as set 
forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949) punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal’ (Count 1). 
Under the heading ‘Sniping’ the prosecution charged Galić with two counts of Crimes Against 
Humanity (murder and inhumane acts other than murder, punishable under Article 5(a) and 
Article 5(i) of the Statute of the Tribunal respectively) and one count of Violations of the Laws 
or Customs of War (attacks on civilians as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and 
Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under 
Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal) (Counts 2-4). Under the ‘Shelling’ heading, the 
prosecution charged the same two counts of Crimes Against Humanity and the same count of 
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War (Counts 5-7). 
 
                                                          





Galić was found guilty at trial pursuant to Article 7(1) on counts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 with the effect 
that the charges of attacks on civilians as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and 
Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in counts 4 and 7 were 
dismissed. These convictions were all upheld on appeal. The charges of unlawful attack against 
Galić were similar to those used in Blaškić but did not refer to customary law.  
 
General Ante Gotovina was charged pursuant to Article 7(1) on the basis of his individual 
responsibility as well as through participation in a joint criminal enterprise and under Article 
7(3) with committing nine counts of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or 
customs of war for his part in Operation Storm in Croatia. These charges were broken down 
under the headings Persecutions (Count 1) (the key element of which was the charge that 
Gotovina had carried out unlawful attacks),8 Deportation and Forcible Transfer (Counts 2 and 
3), Plunder of Public or Private Property (Count 4), Wanton Destruction (Count 5), Murder 
(Counts 6 and 7) and Inhumane Acts and Cruel Treatment (Counts 8 and 9).9  
 
Mladen Markač’s case was joined to that of Gotovina and he was tried alongside Gotovina for 
his role in Operation Storm. The prosecution described Markač as being the Assistant Minister 
of the Interior and Commander of the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republic of Croatia at the time of Operation Storm. As such, it was alleged that he 
‘…participated in various structures of power and responsibility and possessed effective 
control over all members of the Special Police who were involved in Operation Storm….[and] 
possessed effective control over all members of the HV rocket and artillery units attached to 
his forces or subordinated to his command during Operation Storm and the continuing related 
operations and/or actions’.10 The joinder indictment charged Markač with the same nine 
counts through the same means of responsibility as it did Gotovina. 
 
Gotovina and Markač were both found guilty at trial of all counts against them except for 
count 3 on the basis of their participation in a joint criminal enterprise. Both were 
subsequently fully acquitted by the Appeals Chamber. 
 
                                                          
8 See conclusions in relation to Knin in Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraphs 1912-1913.  
9 Gotovina Indictment as contained in the Corrected corrigendum to prosecutions notice of filing of 
amended joinder indictment of 12 March 2008. 
10 See Gotovina Indictment as contained in the Corrected corrigendum to prosecutions notice of filing of 




One key point to note from the indictments considered here is that as well as 'unlawful attack' 
charges being brought pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (Violations of the laws or 
customs of war) they were also, in the case of Blaškić, incorporated as an element of a charge 
of persecution pursuant to Article 5 of the ICTY Statute (Crimes Against Humanity) and, in the 
case of Gotovina, exclusively brought under Article 5 persecution charges.  
 
In the Blaškić indictment the prosecution alleged under Count 1 (Persecution) that the 
‘persecution was perpetrated through’ acts including: 
 
Attacks on Cities, Towns and Villages: 
6.1. The widespread and systematic attack of cities, towns and villages, inhabited by 
Bosnian Muslims, in the municipalities of Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Zenica.11 
 
As the Appeal Chamber pointed out, however, the Trial Chamber in Blaškić made no explicit 
finding that attacks may constitute an act of persecution, the first reference to this being 
found to be the case being in the Disposition where it found Blaškić guilty ‘of having ordered a 
crime against humanity, namely persecutions against the Muslim civilians of Bosnia… for the 
following acts: - attacks on towns and villages….’. 12 
 
In deciding that attacks can be an act of persecution (specifically, the Appeals Chamber held 
that 'attacks in which civilians are targeted, as well as indiscriminate attacks on cities, towns, 
and villages, may constitute persecutions as a crime against humanity')13 and in defining these 
attacks, the Appeals Chamber looks straight to the Additional Protocols and the Fourth Hague 
Convention of 1907 and the customary status of the relevant laws of war, with no mention of 
any crime against humanity specific definition.14 At footnote 330 the Blaškić Appeal judges 
appear to give a further reference for this, however, it in fact leads to authority that appears to 
be for the following paragraph stating that such crimes have to be of the same severity or 
gravity as the elements listed in Article 5 itself.15  
 
There is even less consideration in the Blaškić case of the definition of an ‘unlawful attack’ as a 
war crime. The Trial Chamber in Blaškić provide no reference for their definition of an 
'unlawful attack against civilians' as charged pursuant to Article 3 except for ' As proposed by 
                                                          
11 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Second Amended Indictment of 25 April 1997.  
12 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 156. 
13 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 159. 
14 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 156-159. 




the Prosecution...' with a footnote reference to the Prosecutor's Summary which is not publicly 
available.16 The Appeals Chamber made no separate legal statements about the charges 
brought under Article 3 and overturned the convictions based on Article 3 having found that 
Blaškić had no criminal responsibility for the attacks.17 Despite this lack of consideration, there 
was no question that the crime of unlawfully attacking civilians was found to be within the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY.  
 
In the Blaškić Trial Judgement no distinction is made as to whether the facts fit one or both of 
the types of charges. The judges seem to intermingle discussions of both and in fact find that 
certain of the attacks that occurred formed part of a persecution as well as being unlawful 
pursuant to Article 3. This may well be because the approach taken by the Prosecutor's office 
(as we can infer from Fenrick's article 'The prosecution of unlawful attack cases before the 
ICTY')18 was that to be an attack that would qualify as a crime against humanity of persecution 
(which requires an attack against a civilian population to have occurred as an overarching pre-
condition) it first would have to be unlawful pursuant to the laws of war. This is not enunciated 
as such by the trial chamber and it may well be that the detail is given in the Prosecutor's 
Summary, referred to in their footnotes. Unfortunately this remains confidential.  
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges stated that 
 
An attack on civilians or civilian objects in the context of crimes against humanity is to 
be understood as acts of violence deliberately launched against civilians or civilian 
objects, although with no requirement of a particular result caused by the attack, as 
well as indiscriminate attacks on cities, towns, and villages.  
 
An attack on civilians and civilian objects, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and 
for which the general elements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled, constitutes the 
crime of persecution.19 
 
The main difference between these two forms of charging unlawful attack in the conduct of 
hostilities for the purposes of the Gotovina case arises from the appeal judgement in the case 
of Kordić and Čerkez. Here the Appeals Chamber held (in December 2004) that there was no 
                                                          
16 Blaškić Trial Judgement, footnote 341.  
17 Blaškić Appeal Judgement at Parts VII – X. 
18 William J. Fenrick, ‘The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases before the ICTY’, Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 7 (2004), 157. 
19 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraphs 1831-1842 citing at footnote 929, Blaškić Appeal Judgement, 
paragraph 159; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 47, 57, 105 and at footnote 930 





requirement for proof of death or injury in the case of attacks as a form of persecution. This 
has not gone without criticism externally but remained the ICTY position.20  
 
The Gotovina indictment did not initially mention unlawful attack and did not through several 
iterations until an amended joinder indictment of 17 May 2007 when it was included as one of 
the forms of persecution alleged under Count 1. In Count 1 of the final Gotovina indictment 
the prosecution charged persecution through ‘other inhumane acts, including the shelling of 
civilians’ as well as through unlawful attacks as such. The judges, however, preferred to 
consider the charges relating to the shelling of civilians as unlawful attacks against civilians as 
the crime against humanity of persecution and not as inhumane acts and cruel treatment.21 
The indictment also separately charged inhumane acts (as a crime against humanity in Count 
8) and cruel treatment (as a violation of the laws or customs of war in Count 9) including 
through ‘firing upon (including by aerial attack)’ civilians and those taking no part in hostilities 
but the judges did not make any findings as to the use of artillery under this heading. 
 
The next section of this chapter provides a background to the substantive law applicable to the 
charges of unlawful attack (whether charged under Article 3 or 5 of the ICTY Statute) brought 
at the ICTY. It sets out the law as it was at the time that the ICTY judges began their work in 
order that later chapters can demonstrate how the judges worked with the law they were 
presented with.  
 
 
Introduction to customary and conventional law relevant to targeting charges 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction) the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence contained no rules as to the relevant sources of law that could be used by the judges 
in reaching their decisions, although the Secretary-General intended that rules that were 
beyond doubt part of customary international law would be applied. This meant that the 
judges had to adopt their own approaches to establishing the existence or otherwise – and 




                                                          
20 William J. Fenrick, ‘Gold or Double Standard’, Unpublished Article: 8. 




In discussing the role of IHL treaties, the Galić Appeal Judges set out that   
 
in most cases, treaty provisions will only provide for the prohibition of a certain 
conduct, not for its criminalisation, or the treaty provision itself will not sufficiently 
define the elements of the prohibition they criminalise and customary international 
law must be looked at for the definition of those elements…22 
 
The Galić Appeal Judges were pointing out the fact that international treaties, even those such 
as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, were not designed as criminal codes and did not contain 
all the details necessary to establish what was required to find an individual criminally 
responsible for particular conduct. This, taken together with the guidance of the Secretary-
General, meant that the judges looked to customary international law to fill the gaps. 
 
As also mentioned in the introduction, however, the particular contents of customary law at 
any particular moment is hard to ascertain due to its evolutionary nature and basis on the 
actions and motivations of states. To some extent the difficulty to set out the specific contents 
of customary international law in this field is also because the development of customary law 
cannot be disentangled from the treaty development through the 20th Century, one building 
on the other over this time.  
 
The judges in the early cases at the ICTY had very little in terms of customary international law 
precedent and discussion regarding any of the crimes set out by the Secretary General and 
even less specifically relating to the law of targeting. The major study of the ICRC into 
customary international humanitarian law commenced in 1996 and was published in 2005, too 
late to guide the establishment of the applicable law by the judges in the early cases before 
the ICTY.23  
 
The main judicial precedent for the ICTY, the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (‘Nuremberg IMT’), was of limited use in 
providing detail of the laws the ICTY was to apply.24 Kevin Jon Heller states that the Nuremberg 
                                                          
22 Galić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 83. 
23 https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0 (last accessed 
13.05.2019): Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Geneva; Cambridge: International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 2 Volumes.  
24 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is rarely mentioned in this context, perhaps 
because it is less well known, has been seen to be secondary to the Nuremberg IMT or because of its 
mainly negative reputation (whether deserved or undeserved). See Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The 




IMT judgment contained ‘remarkably little criminal law’ and says its ‘discussion of the crimes 
themselves is relatively cursory and unsystematic’.25 Heller sets out how the twelve 
subsequent trials brought by the United States and conducted before military tribunals in 
Nuremberg pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 (the ‘subsequent Nuremberg trials’) 
considered the law in much more detail although even then he describes the approach in 
these judgments to have varied from ‘misguided’ to, more often, ‘very progressive’ leaving 
elements of contradiction within their legacy.26  
 
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) opined that the ‘cardinal’ principles of 
humanitarian law contained in the relevant treaties were; firstly, the principle that distinction 
must be made between combatants and non-combatants and that therefore states ‘must 
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets’ and secondly, the principle 
that ‘it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants’ so that ‘States do not have 
unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use’.27 They also confirmed that 
‘these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law.’28  
 
The ICJ judges in fact cite the Report of the Secretary General where he sets out what he 
considers the ‘part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt 
become part of international customary law’.29 In relation to API, the ICJ opinion states 
‘Additional Protocol 1 in no way replaced the general customary rules applicable to all means 
and methods of combat’.30 
 
In the Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ was not giving an opinion on international criminal law, 
but on the law applicable to states. This was, however, a rare occasion on which judges were 
asked to consider the contents of IHL and the extremes of its application. Questions more 
directly relevant to targeting in conventional warfare had been raised in the decades leading 
                                                          
25 Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. 
26 Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law, 3, 5. 
27 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 
p. 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion’), Paragraph 78. 
28 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Paragraph 79. 
29 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Paragraph 81. 




up to the establishment of the ICTY, in particular by the 1980-1988 Iran/Iraq war and the first 
Gulf War, but there was no judicial forum to establish authoritative answers.31  
 
Within the treaties developed to set the limits of warfare between states, civilians were not a 
main concern until Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of 12 August 1949. The Hague field of rules (such as the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land) hardly touched on civilians.32 The 
Additional Protocols are special in this regard in that they are a mixture of Hague and Geneva 
traditions and specifically link the protection of civilians and the very manner in which 
hostilities are conducted.33  
 
As set out earlier in this chapter, the OTP selected Article 51(2) of API (and, in the case of 
Blaškić, also specifically citing its customary law equivalent) as the most relevant to bring a 
charge of intentionally attacking/targeting civilians. Through this selection and the judges’ 
acceptance of it, Article 51 API became central to the work of the ICTY in its handling of the 
law relating to targeting. This is despite the fact that it was not mentioned in the Report of the 
Secretary General or the ICTY Statute and that the provisions of Article 51, and in particular for 
the purposes of this study, the definition of ‘military advantage’ and ‘military objective’, were 
not even accepted by all states parties to API without reservation.34  
 
Article 51 API forms part of the section of API entitled ‘Part IV: Civilian population - Section I -- 
General protection against effects of hostilities’. Article 51(2) API states the fundamental rule 
that ‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack’.  
 
                                                          
31 See, for example, Ige F. Dekker and Harry H. G. Post, eds., The Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq 
War in International Legal Perspective (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf 
Conflict’, in The Gulf War 1990/91 in International and English law, ed. Peter Rowe (Abingdon: 
Routledge 1993) and Judith G. Gardam Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International 
Humanitarian Law (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 1993). 
32 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 67 (for the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land) and 59-153 (regarding the Hague body of law more generally). 
33 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Paragraph 75, Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of 
War, 420. 
34 See Julie Gaudreau, ‘The reservations to the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions for the 




Article 51 API contains other important principles. These are the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks contained in Article 51(4) and the provision in Article 51(5)(b) that ‘an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated’ is to be considered indiscriminate (and therefore 
prohibited). This provision in Article 51(5)(b) is seen as one expression of the principle of 
‘proportionality’ and is repeated in Article 57(2). The key words here are ‘anticipated’, 
‘excessive’ and ‘concrete and direct military advantage’. Their interpretation is key to the level 
of protection given to civilian populations. Schmitt highlights that the relevant ‘standard is 
“excessive” (a comparative concept), not “extensive” (an absolute concept)’.35 
 
The ICRC notes in its commentary to API that paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 51 API in particular 
were criticised at the Diplomatic Conference for their ‘imprecise wording and terminology’ and 
accepts that such criticisms are to a certain extent justified.36 It particularly notes that  
 
Putting these provisions into practice, or, for that matter, any others in Part IV, will 
require complete good faith on the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to 
conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population.37 
 
From the perspective of those applying the law in the 1990s to present, it can be seen clearly 
that the provisions of API regarding the protection of civilians from direct and indirect attacks 
represented a crystallisation of a change in the law since the Second World War (or at least a 
settling of a dispute over its contents) and that this is a reason for a lack of case law and 
customary law regarding the targeting of civilians in an attack up to this point.38 Fenrick goes 
further and says that there was really no applicable case law for the ICTY to apply in relation to 
the targeting charges given that the WWII cases were about those in occupied territory or 
                                                          
35 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the 
Red Cross 87, no. 859 (2005): 457. 
36 Paragraphs 1977 - 1978. 
37 Paragraph 1978. 
38 The examples Heller gives of misguided decisions by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals includes some 
that were particularly of their time and probably not that controversial to the Allies given what they had 
judged acceptable in their own bombing campaigns; the Einsatzgruppen tribunal concluded that 
international law permitted the morale bombings of civilians, even with atomic weapons, and the 
Hostage tribunal held that it was permissible in certain situations to execute innocent civilians in 
reprisal. Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law 




under control of the occupying forces.39 The Blaškić Trial Judges really did have something of a 
blank canvas to start from when asked to hear evidence and then judge on unlawful attack 
charges; the Galić Trial Judges had only a very little more guidance. 
 
The charge against Blaškić40 for unlawful attack against civilians mentions both customary law 
and API/APII which were, and are now even more, difficult to separate from each other in 
substance as they relate to attacks on civilians. The API/APII provisions relating to the 
protection of civilians are treaty law but are in part considered declaratory of customary law. 
Schmitt puts it that the ‘contemporary form’ of the customary international law principle of 
distinction has been ‘codified’ in Article 48 of API with Articles 51(2) and 52(1) providing 
‘granularity to the general principle’, prohibiting attacks on civilians and civilian objects 
respectively.41 Customary law could in turn be seen to have built on the existence of these 
provisions of API/APII.  
 
It is clear from the rules set out in Article 51 API and the customary international law that 
surrounds them, that the concepts of distinction, civilian/civilian population and military 
objectives and proportionality are key to the rules governing attacks. The next chapter 
(Chapter 3 (Law)) is a detailed consideration of how the judges at the ICTY approached the 
definition of these concepts and then applied them.  
 
The ICTY was a criminal court and therefore establishing the contents of the law of targeting 
was not the end of their work. The judges also had to establish where individual criminal 
responsibility would be incurred for its breach. The next section of this chapter sets out a brief 
introduction to the concept of individual criminal responsibility for breaches of certain 




                                                          
39 William J. Fenrick, ‘Commentary: A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: 
Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor V. Tihomir Blaškic.’ Leiden Journal of 
International Law 13, no. 04 (2000): 931. 
40 The Galić indictment only mentions API/APII, not customary law. 
41 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’, in Testing the Boundaries of International 
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Criminal responsibility for breaches of the law 
 
The criminal prosecution of individuals for the commission of war crimes was not an initial 
priority of the international law governing armed conflict developed around the turn of the 
19th into the 20th century. Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
The Hague, 18 October 1907, for example, provided for a regime of compensation between 
states for the acts of individuals within their armed forces: 
 
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.42 
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs and the subsequent Nuremberg trials were an important step 
in confirming that individuals could be held criminally responsible under international law.43 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 took a separate step towards providing for the liability of 
individuals, requiring the contracting states to impose a regime of criminal liability for the 
breach of certain of their provisions, described as ‘Grave Breaches’.44   
                                                          
42 NB Article 91 of API (Responsibility) also provides that ‘A Party to the conflict which violates the 
provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces.’ 
43 Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 4 
(September 2006): 837-838, Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of 
International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
44 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 
1949, for example, provided that: 
 
Art. 146. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. 
 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to 
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, 
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial 
to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made 
out a prima facie case.  
... 
Art. 147. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of 
the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present 
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of 





API continued and supplemented the Grave Breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
with its own criminal regime set out in Article 85 API (Repression of breaches of this Protocol). 
Most relevant to this study, it included certain breaches of its rules protecting civilians as grave 
breaches (and war crimes), ‘when committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of 
this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health’. It specifically made war 
crimes of:  
 
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; and 
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian 
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii).45 
 
Despite these developments, the lack of any international prosecutions after those arising 
from the Second World War meant that the international law of individual criminal 
responsibility was not developed further. In addition, although it may be a deeply rooted 
concept,46 ‘command responsibility’ or ‘superior responsibility’ (terms used interchangeably in 
this study), the criminal legal responsibility of commanders for the actions of their 
subordinates, was not clearly defined in international law ready for the ICTY simply to apply. 
There was very little case law, and even the well known cases arising from the prosecution of 
conduct in the Second World War were not necessarily clear on what exactly command 
responsibility entailed and how far it could reach. The exact meaning of the result in United 
States v. Yamashita, for example, was only the start of a discussion as to what was required to 
find commanders liable through their omissions. This case did not provide much guidance on 
the level of control a superior must possess over the actions of their subordinates for 
command responsibility to apply. It also left the question of what mental standard had been 
applied to find General Yamashita guilty (strict liability, an inference of actual knowledge from 
the circumstantial evidence or a ‘should have known’ standard) open to debate.47  
                                                                                                                                                                          
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly. 
 
45 API Article 85(3) and 85(5). 
46 See, for example, Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff and Natalie L. Reid, International Criminal Law 
Practitioner Library Volume 1: Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145-148. 
47 Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff and Natalie L. Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library 




API provides for potential ‘penal or disciplinary’ responsibility of commanders for the acts of 
their subordinates under the heading ‘Failure to Act’.48 In addition, it sets out the duties of 
commanders to ‘prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent 
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol’.49 This was again a regime 
directed at states whose role it was to ensure compliance. 
 
The Report of the Secretary General does not include any discussion of what the contents of 
the rule of superior responsibility are and how these should be included in the ICTY Statute. It 
is possible the Secretary General was referring to Nuremberg case law in this regard, however, 
this is not entirely clear from the manner in which the relevant paragraphs are constructed.50 
The Secretary General included the principle of superior responsibility in the statute in the 
terms set out in Article 7(3): 
 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if 
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or 
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.   
 
Although the Secretary General does not mention the provisions of API, Article 7(3) does not 
seem completely dissimilar to the combined requirements of Article 86(2) and Article 87(3). 
This combination, as Darryl Robinson points out, ignores the difference between the two 
articles reflecting the different roles of humanitarian law procedural duty and criminal 
responsibility; the effect of this is to remove a causal requirement for criminal responsibility in 
the case of findings of responsibility for failure to punish.51 
 
Given the lack of a detailed criminal code or international precedent, the contents and scope 
of the law of the criminal responsibility of those in command, as for other areas in the ICTY 
Statute, had to be ‘found’ in customary international law by the judges. The approaches of the 
judges to the identification of criminal responsibility in the cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina 
are set out in detail in Chapter 6 (Responsibility). This includes looking in some detail at what 
constitutes criminal intention on the part of commanders and the role of criminal liability 
pursuant to the Article 7(1) mode of ordering. In considering the factors that might have had 
                                                          
48 API Article 86. 
49 API Article 87(1). 
50 Report of the Secretary General at paragraphs 55-56. 
51 See Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, Leiden Journal of International 




an influence on the judges’ decisions as to criminal responsibility (or innocence), Chapter 6 
includes a description of the role in the judges’ determinations of a particular commander’s 
alignment with the broader political ambitions of their side to the conflict.  
 
The next section of this chapter introduces another fundamental part of the framework within 
which the judges at the ICTY were working, the rules of procedure and evidence. Although 
they may seem far removed from the law of targeting, these governed what and how evidence 
was presented to the judges. This in turn dictated what information the judges had before 
them when they had to make their decisions as to whether there had been criminal breaches 
of the law of targeting. 
 
 
Rules of procedure and evidence at the ICTY 
 
Although there were the precedents of the IMTs and subsequent proceedings of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (which were applying international law, although not 
international tribunals themselves),52 at the time of the hearing of the cases of Blaškić and 
Galić there could not be said to be such a thing as ‘international criminal procedure’. Kevin Jon 
Heller points out that the IMT Judgment contained ‘nothing on evidence and procedure; 
almost nothing on modes of participation, defenses, or sentencing’ and although the 
subsequent proceedings of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals did, however, cover these areas 
in more detail they were not always consistent precedents.53  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction), the first judges appointed to the ICTY had to draw 
up and adopt their own rules of procedure and evidence (‘RPE’).54 The judges who drafted 
these rules, who included in their number Antonio Cassese, one of the foremost international 
legal scholars at the time,55 gave themselves and the other ICTY judges broad powers 
regarding the treatment of evidence. Rule 89 of the RPE provided that  
 
 
                                                          
52 See Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chapter 5. 
53 Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law, 3. 
54 See paragraph 83, Report of the Secretary General. 






(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of 
evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are 
consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.   
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative 
value.   
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the need to ensure a fair trial.   
…. 
 
The broad powers under RPE 89(C) extended to the admission of hearsay and circumstantial 
evidence.56 Provided with permissive rules of evidence, the judges at the ICTY had, as in many 
other areas, to tread a new path in deciding the limits of documentary and witness testimony 
to be admitted. The standard to which the OTP had to prove their case was, however, well 
known; the standard of proof of guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Rule 87(A) RPE declared  
 
A finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied 
that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.   
 
Marieke Wierda starts her article on international criminal evidence with the observation that 
the ‘evidentiary challenges faced by international criminal courts do not resemble those faced 
by ordinary criminal courts’.57 On the face of it this is clearly correct. Wierda refers in particular 
to the scarcity of evidence as to individual guilt alongside huge volumes of other evidence 
because of the massive scale of the crimes. To this, and specifically relevant to this research, 
could be added having to find and assess evidence of certain actions of armed forces in 
fighting their wars.  
 
It could also be said, however, that certain evidentiary challenges are exactly the same as 
those faced by criminal courts in national jurisdictions. Matters such as assessing the credibility 
of witnesses, the value of documentary evidence and the criminal intent of the accused are 
every day work for these courts.  
 
                                                          
56 For hearsay, see, for example, Appeals Chamber Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of 
Evidence of 16 February 1999 in Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, paragraph 
15. 
For the treatment of circumstantial evidence see, for example, Appeal Judgement of 23 October 2001 in 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, paragraph 303. 
57 Marieke Wierda, ‘International Criminal Evidence: New Directions’, Law and Practice of International 




When asked ‘What did you find to be the biggest difference between working as a judge for 
the ICTY and working in your own jurisdiction?’, Professor Ķinis answered that it was the legal 
framework (Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence) and the scale of the crimes. He also 
replied that in Latvia they do not have cross-examination. He specifically pointed out, 
however, that both Latvian national and ICTY proceedings were based on the same principles 
of ‘legality, equality of parties, an efficiency of justice and human rights’ and went on to say 
 
Irrespective of differences between both legal systems, elements of the crime (corpus 
delicti) is the same - actus reus and mens rea. I am a judge. The main task for every 
judge is to adjudicate a case, verify and weigh evidence, and establish the truth and to 
make a judgment. 
 
In addition to confirming that he considered the assessment of evidence to be a constant of 
the judges’ role in both national and international settings, it is interesting that Professor Ķinis 
linked the rules of procedure and evidence governing a trial to the fundamental principles 
underlying a criminal justice system. Discussion of and compliance with the procedural and 
evidential rules may not usually be the exciting part of a trial but they are important to make 
sure the trial meets the standards required by the fundamental principles each legal system 
has decided are necessary for criminal justice to be done, such as those Professor Professor 
Ķinis lists as applying in Latvia and at the ICTY. 
 
Peter Murphy, a former trial and appellate defence counsel at the ICTY and a Circuit Judge on 
the South Eastern Circuit (England and Wales) at the time of writing his article, points out the 
dangers of the system adopted by the ICTY. He is of the view that given the ICTY has adopted a 
basically adversarial approach, it should have taken more notice of the common law rules of 
evidence developed from the experience that ‘the judicious use of rules of evidence, to keep 
the proceedings within reasonable bounds and to prevent abuses by the parties, creates the 
most favourable environment for a correct adjudication to emerge’.58 He warns that it is not 
possible for even the best of judges to avoid the risk of the trial becoming contaminated by 
evidence that should not have been admitted; leaving the question of the probity of the 
evidence to a later point means potentially false or misleading evidence being built around and 
upon, making it difficult to extricate from the final picture.59 
 
                                                          
58 Peter Murphy, ‘No Free Lunch, no Free Proof’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, no. 2 (2010), 
551. 




Murphy’s view highlights the heavy responsibility placed upon the judges of the ICTY by the 
RPE to assess a huge amount of evidence of varying quality. How the judges assessed the 
evidence presented in relation to targeting charges and a consideration of what factors 





This chapter has introduced the framework within which the judges carried out the 
demarcation of the law of targeting at the ICTY; that is, the war crimes jurisdiction of the ICTY 
and relevant charges brought in each of the cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina, the 
substantive law of targeting and criminal responsibility and the basic rules of procedure and 
evidence applicable at the ICTY.  
 
The charges that are most relevant to this study of the law of targeting are those charging the 
accused with having carried out an unlawful attack against civilians, whether pursuant to 
Article 3 (War Crimes) or Article 5 (Crimes against Humanity). As framed by the OTP, this 
charge brought Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I (‘The civilian population as such, as well 
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.’) as well as customary law regarding the 
protection of civilians to the consideration of the judges.  
 
The international law relating to the protection of civilians at the time of the establishment of 
the ICTY was perhaps best described as inchoate. Additional Protocol I had been adopted but 
not by all states. Some of its provisions were accepted as reflective of customary international 
law but there had been no international judicial determination on what these provisions or 
customary law meant in practice. The judges at the ICTY were not given explicit jurisdiction 
over crimes of attacking civilians. This was one area where they would go on to clarify and 
develop the law; how they did and the influences on them in doing so forms the basis of the 
next chapter, Chapter 3 (Law).  
 
Individual criminal responsibility was also an underdeveloped concept in international law with 
little clear precedent as to its application. It was clear, however, given the contents of Article 
7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, that those who had not physically committed the crimes but 




This included those who had ordered the commission of crimes. Chapter 6 (Responsibility) 
considers how the ICTY judges applied this concept of individual criminal responsibility of 
commanders.  
 
The rules of procedure and evidence governing what evidence could be presented to the 
judges and how were fundamental to the work of the ICTY, as they are to any court. The 
permissive nature of the rules governing the admission of evidence meant that the judges 
carried a heavy burden in assessing the value to be attributed to the masses of evidence 
before them. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the witness evidence that was so fundamental to the 
work of the ICTY in general and in relation to the application of the law of targeting, before 
considering how the judges approached this evidence and what influenced their decisions on 
it. 
 
As mentioned above, the next chapter, Chapter 3 (Law), identifies how the judges of the ICTY 
developed the law of targeting and the influences underlying this development in the three 
cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina. It does this through a consideration of how the judges 
approached certain key legal definitions of the law of targeting that were mentioned in 
relation to Article 51 API in this chapter. These are i) the principle of distinction, the concept 
that those carrying out military operations must always distinguish between civilian 
populations and objects and combatants/military objectives; ii) the definitions of Civilian and 
Civilian Population as well as that of Military objectives and iii) the principle of Proportionality, 
the rule that even a military objective should not be attacked if the expected harm to civilians 











This research set out to consider how the judges in certain cases at the ICTY had implemented 
the law of targeting and, given this, whether any factor(s) could be identified as influencing the 
many decisions on law, evidence and responsibility they had to make in reaching their 
judgments. It asked if it was the idea of humanity, broadly defined as a regard for the need to 
protect the innocent from the effects of war, that most influenced the judges in their 
demarcation of the law of targeting. The first element of the research question was how had 
the judges approached the law; to what extent did humanity, or any other concept or factors, 
influence the findings of the judges as regards the law of targeting? That is, where they were 
required to define the law and make legal findings as regards targeting were there any 
identifiable influences on the work of the judges? 
 
This chapter will consider how the judges in each of the trials of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina 
(and, where relevant, at appeal) defined and applied certain key concepts of the law of 
targeting. The law of targeting is defined here as the law governing what can and cannot be 
lawfully attacked; and if it can be attacked under what circumstances and conditions this may 
take place. In doing this it demonstrates that the judges of the ICTY developed the law of 
targeting and that there were certain identifiable key influences on this development.  
 
This chapter makes the case for the conclusion that the ICTY has developed the law of 
targeting in line with the precedence of the principle of humanity and a worldview strongly 
guided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’). In affirming that the 
provisions of Additional Protocol I relating to targeting can be the basis for a conviction, the 
judges have rendered certain earlier provisions incorporating ‘military necessity’ (although not 
the broader principle itself) potentially obsolete in this context. It also seeks to demonstrate 
that the ICTY judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint in interpreting the law and they 
considered that their judgments were always supported by a body of military opinion – even if 





This chapter therefore sets out a detailed consideration of the approach taken in each of the 
cases to three key elements of the law of targeting arising from the charges brought against 
the accused and the law this invoked as discussed in Chapter 2 (The framework for the 
demarcation of the law of targeting at the ICTY). These three elements are the principle of 
distinction, the definitions of civilian and civilian population/military objectives and the 





The case of Blaškić was critical to the law of targeting at the ICTY due to the judges’ acceptance 
and incorporation of the offence of unlawfully attacking civilians. The Blaškić Trial Judges 
accepted that this offence was within their jurisdiction despite the fact that it was not 
specifically included in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The Blaškić Trial Judges could have refused 
to accept this innovation on the part of the OTP. The trial judgement also, however, contained 
a telling sentence that can be seen to demonstrate a shift that had taken place in the law since 
the Second World War and was confirmed by the work of the ICTY. This sentence was: 
 
Targeting civilians or civilian property is an offence when not justified by military 
necessity.1 
 
The response to this statement demonstrated that the system of precedent adopted by the 
ICTY was fully functional.2 It was quickly distinguished by the Galić Trial Judges3 and clearly 
corrected by the Appeals Chamber to reflect the fact that the law was now understood to be 
that targeting civilians could not be justified for any reason.4 More importantly for the content 
of the law of targeting, it also demonstrated the level of the change in the rules governing the 
protection of civilians which was fully accepted by the ICTY judges and promoted by the work 
of the ICTY.  
 
                                                          
1 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 180. 
2 The concept of ‘precedent’ between the judgements of the various ICTY chambers was not mentioned 
either in the ICTY Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski 
found that a ‘proper construction of the Statute’ required that appeal decisions bind the trial chambers, 
however, the Appeals Chamber could, in exceptional circumstances depart from its own decisions. (Case 
No. IT-95-14/1, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber Judgement of 24 March 2000 
(‘Aleksovski Appeal Judgement’), paragraphs 92-113.) Trial chambers were not bound by decisions of 
other trial chambers. (Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paragraph 114). 
3 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 44. 




Hector Olásolo sees this Blaškić statement incorrectly incorporating a military necessity 
justification as evidence of the 'abusive use' of the crime of wanton destruction not justified by 
military necessity. In his mind, this misuse arises from the fact that attacks against civilians and 
disproportionate attacks are not specifically included in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. 5   
 
Looking at the judgement itself, that this statement was ever made can be explained by a 
confusion or intermixing of the application of the principles relating to attacks on civilians and 
indiscriminate attacks (as set forth in API) with the crimes specifically included in Article 3 of 
the Statute, namely: 
 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity; and 
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings. 
 
The trial judges' approach can be seen in paragraph 170.6 In stating that 'The specific 
provisions of Article 3 of the Statute satisfactorily cover the provision of the said Protocol 
relating to unlawful attacks upon civilian targets' they circumvent any detailed consideration of 
the relevant provisions of API.7 
 
In doing this, when they get to setting out the elements of the offence of an attack against 
civilians and civilian property in paragraph 180, they are using words (probably in part from 
the Prosecutor's Summary)8 that seem to reflect concepts belonging to API (for example, 'The 
parties to the conflict are obliged to attempt to distinguish between military targets and 
                                                          
5 Hector Olasolo, Unlawful Attacks in Combat Situations: From the ICTY’s Case Law to the Rome Statute 
(Boston: BRILL, 2007), 69-71. 
6 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 170: 
Taking into account the effect of the application of the fundamental principles of Article 3 of 
the Statute in this case, the Trial Chamber considers that it should not be necessary to rule on 
the applicability of Protocol I. The specific provisions of Article 3 of the Statute satisfactorily 
cover the provision of the said Protocol relating to unlawful attacks upon civilian targets. The 
specific provisions of Common Article 3 also satisfactorily cover the prohibition on attacks 
against civilians as provided for by Protocols I and II. 
 
7 Although the judges do, although not considering it necessary, state that they find the Additional 
Protocols are applicable (Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 172) they do not, however, go on to 
specifically mention breaches of the Additional Protocol incurring individual criminal liability, although it 
may be possible to read it into the relevant paragraph (Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 176). 
8 See W. J. Fenrick, ‘Commentary: A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: 
Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor V. Tihomir Blaškic’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 13, no. 04 (2000): 938-939. It appears he is setting out here what the prosecution did 




civilian persons or property')9 but trying to force them to fit the crimes specifically set out in 
Article 3 that they have already referred to - and which are not actually the same crimes. 
 
Those writing this paragraph would not be the first non-practitioners of IHL to have made the 
mistake (post adoption of the Additional Protocols) of getting confused in considering how to 
articulate that collateral damage is permitted in the conduct of warfare. This raises interesting 
questions of the process of drafting a judgement - who actually drafted this paragraph, who 
checked it and was the person checking it sufficiently aware of the consequences of what was 
being said? Patricia Wald, a former judge at the ICTY, comments that the drafting of judgments 
at the ICTY was very different to that of a single judge drafting their own opinion; although a 
necessity given the large scale of the judgements involved. She points out that the judges’ role 
of supervising the production of a judgment ‘becomes monumental’ when the judgment may 
be produced in a language that not all the judges can understand and by legal assistants who 
are not allocated to individual judges.10 
 
On a more abstract level, it is clear in retrospect that the ICTY confirmed a fundamental shift in 
the approach to crimes related to civilian casualties in the midst of conflict through a 
preference for the API rules of distinction to those older rules citing ‘military necessity’. The 
previous position can be seen in the judgments of the subsequent Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals whose judges allowed a broad reading of military necessity if it was included as a 
specific exception to the relevant Hague Regulations or if it was argued in relation to conduct 
that was not specifically covered by the Hague Regulations.11 This led, for example, in the High 
Command case, to the tribunal acquitting von Leeb of charges relating to the siege of 
Leningrad (including using artillery to fire towards civilians trying to leave to force them back 
into the city) as it could be justified by military necessity given, as the tribunal found, that the 
Hague Regulations did not prohibit starvation as a weapon of war. The Einsatzgruppen 
tribunal, drawn into a discussion of the actions of the US, found that the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be fully justified by military necessity as ‘morale bombing’ was 
not prohibited by the laws of war.12  
                                                          
9 Although the use of the term military 'targets' is also not quite right. It may also be a statement of the 
customary international law principle of distinction rather than the API version of this. 
10 Patricia M. Wald, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some 
Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court’, Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy 5 (2001): 93-94. 
11 Kevin Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 308-311. 





Olásolo points out the clear incompatibility between the rules regulating the principle of 
distinction in the Additional Protocols (based on the concept of 'military objectives' and the 
proportionality rule) and the rules in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and its Annexed Regulations 
(based on the concept of 'military necessity') on which the original provisions of Article 3 of the 
Statute were based.13 Daniel Thürer notes in relation to military necessity that ‘[s]ome say that 
it no longer has any significance of its own, having been absorbed by the principle of 
proportionality.’ He also notes, however, that the term is still used in practice.14 
 
The ICTY has added weight to the approach of the Additional Protocols and in doing so made 
‘military necessity’ irrelevant in the specific context of directly targeting civilians and civilian 
objects. The judges were willing to go much further than the Secretary General in assessing 
current customary law.  
 
In contrast to the Blaškić Trial Judgement, in the Galić Trial Judgement the judges state that 
they understand the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 51 API to be the basis of 
the charges of attack on civilians in Counts 4 and 7 - they describe it as the first part of Article 
51(2).15 This sentence is that 'The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall 
not be the object of attack.'  
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges state that ‘Since there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of 
civilians and civilian objects in customary international law all attacks on civilians and civilian 
objects are unlawful’ and base this on the Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 109; Kordić 
and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paragraph 54, with corrigendum of 26 January 2005 and Galić 
Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 130 and 190.16 This demonstrates quite how conclusively this 
rule had become part of the jurisprudence of the ICTY, with no perceived need to return to the 





                                                          
13 Olasolo, Unlawful Attacks in Combat Situations: From the ICTY’s Case Law to the Rome Statute, 68. 
14 Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (The Hague: Hague Academy 
of International Law, 2011), 71. 
15 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 41. 






As stated in the Galić Appeal Judgement, 'No mention is made of indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attacks as the basis for conviction.'17 The Trial Chamber did, however, find 
that certain indiscriminate attacks could qualify as direct attacks against civilians and this was 
upheld by the Appeals Chamber: 
 
The Appeals Chamber finds that the impugned finding does not conflate the two 
crimes but rather supports the view that a direct attack can be inferred from the 
indiscriminate character of the weapon used. 
 …. 
In principle, the Trial Chamber was entitled to determine on a case-by-case basis that 
the indiscriminate character of an attack can assist it in determining whether the 
attack was directed against the civilian population.18  
 
William Fenrick gives a potential clue to how this approach was adopted. In discussing the 
Blaškić case he states: 
 
It should also be noted that the prosecution argued that the occurrence of an attack 
wilfully directed against civilians could be established in a variety of ways: a) proof that 
only civilians were killed…. b) proof that combatants and civilians were killed without 
distinction; or c) proof that the number of civilians killed was excessive. The 
prosecution adopted this approach, notwithstanding the fact Art. 51(4) and (5) of 
Protocol I explicitly refer to indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, for two 
reasons: a) Protocol II does not explicitly refer to indiscriminate or disproportionate 
attacks and there was a desire to have a common offence for all conflicts, and b) it was 
the view of the prosecution that indiscriminate attacks, including attacks resulting in 
excessive civilian casualties, were, in substance, attacks directed against the civilian 
population.19 
 
It seems that much of the evidence given in the cases of Galić and Gotovina fit the definition of 
indiscriminate attacks as set out in Articles 51(4) and (5) API. The section of the Galić Trial 
Judgement on control over shelling activity includes description by soldiers of the 
indiscriminate use of weapons. The Gotovina trial also included discussion of the types of 
weapons used. For example, in Leslie’s testimony he highlights the use of ‘area’ weapons 
systems and when questioned as to whether these systems were capable of distinguishing 
                                                          
17 Galić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 134. 
18 Galić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 132. 
19 Fenrick, ‘Commentary: A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: Comments on 




between military targets and the civilian structures that surround them, he replies 
‘simplistically, no’.20 
 
The Galić Trial Judgement refers to Henneberry having ‘visited artillery emplacements and 
observed the weaponry being indiscriminately fired into the city’.21 Henneberry’s testimony 
that led to this statement is a view into what the trial chamber had in mind when making 
findings relating to ‘indiscriminate’ targeting in the context of Sarajevo. It is worth describing in 
some detail as a key instance of eyewitness testimony as to the actions of those soldiers firing 
artillery into Sarajevo. Henneberry testified that his view was formed from observing: 
 
numerous times soldiers firing weapons, indirect weapons, artillery and whatnot, 
without aiming, firing while they were intoxicated, moving some of the weapons by 
hand without aiming, firing what is called over open sites for an indirect weapon, 
which is not the proper procedure, and in discussions with the soldiers themselves.22 
 
He was then asked to expand and explain some of these points, during which he gave evidence 
of soldiers simply not caring where mortars were aimed, including simply kicking a weapon 
into place before firing it wherever it stopped: 
 
Q. ….  When you say, "moving some of the weapons by hand without aiming," what 
exactly do you mean? 
A. If I may use an example of a mortar, for instance.  It is a tube that points towards 
the sky and there should be a number of wheels and sights, optical sights with wheels, 
to which you move the barrel minutely by varying degrees.  That is the only way a 
mortar can be fired accurately to the target it was intended, not a pinpoint target.  I 
personally witnessed several times the soldiers moving it by hand or them by hand 
without checking their sights, without knowing where the round would land when 
fired, and in some cases, they actually just kicked the weapon. Whenever it stopped 
was fine, and they would fire that way. 
 
He also explained how he had seen artillery pieces being fired without any use of the 
mechanisms by which they can produce relatively accurate fire: 
 
Q. Taking you back to your earlier explanation as to your observations which led you to 
your view, you also said that you observed what is called "over open sites," firing over 
open sites for an indirect weapon.  Could you explain that to us? 
A. Yes, sir.  Similar to not using the optical sights to be precise on an indirect weapon, 
such as a mortar, artillery pieces use the same principal of a series of gears and sights 
fairly precise.  On numerous occasions, I observed the soldiers simply looking with 
their naked eye down the barrel, moving it slightly, and firing that way, moving it by 
                                                          
20 Gotovina Trial Testimony, 22 April 2008, page 1984. 
21 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 669. 




hand slightly without the use of the correct gears, and estimating where it would land, 
and firing the rounds. 
 
And perhaps most importantly, Henneberry also testified as to being told ‘frequently’ by the 
soldiers: 
 
that they would just fire because they wanted to, at no particular target, on occasion.  
They were also or, rather, they also told me that sometimes they would fire in the case 
of another position just by the time of day in the general area of a target.  And, again, 
with an indirect weapon, the method in which they moved them, it meant that there 
was no accuracy to it.23 
 
‘Indiscriminate’ in the sense of Henneberry’s testimony clearly means that the soldiers firing 
the weapons did not have a military objective in firing the shots and did not care where the 
shots landed; they were not using the means provided to fire the weapons at a particular 
location while at the same time clearly firing into a city with a significant civilian population. 
This is a case of not even aiming at a target – military or otherwise – and it was clearly done 
with the intention of harming civilians or, at the very least, with not caring if they were harmed 
or not.  
 
This evidence from Henneberry is a rare example of the view from where the shots are being 
fired. The majority of the assessment of the state of mind of those firing the shots was 
produced from the effects produced. The idea that the ‘wilfulness’ of an intended target of an 
attack could be established from its effects is problematic, as Fenrick and the prosecution 
team well knew. How the judges approached this is discussed in Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding 
criminal intent). 
 
Despite the Appeals Chamber upholding the idea that indiscriminate attacks can amount to 
direct attacks while they are still also separate concepts there has clearly been some conflation 
or overlapping of direct and indiscriminate attacks. Jens Ohlin makes the point in relation to 
the targeting cases at the ICTY that ‘surely at least some of these scenarios involve attacks that 
were not intentionally directed at civilians, and ought to be analysed under the … rubric of 
proportionality’.24 Ohlin’s theory is discussed further below in the section on proportionality. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Galić Trial Transcript, 16 May 2002, pages 8551-8554. 





Definitions of Civilian, Civilian Population and Military Objectives  
 
The situation regarding the civilian status or otherwise of those in Sarajevo and in Bosnia in 
general, as well as in Croatia, was not always straightforward. Various civil protection or 
territorial defence groups were established, some were, or became military organisations, 
some were not or did not. Certain police forces were civilian, others were military in nature. 
There was also often a question of the intermingling of the civilian population and the military. 
This section looks at the evidence presented to the judges as to the nature of the populations 
under consideration and their decisions based on this. 
 
The fighting in the Yugoslav war took place in cities, towns and villages with significant civilian 
populations still present. Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Watters, a British soldier, second in 
command of the 1st Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment stationed in Vitez at the time of the 
events in question, summed up the nature of the difficulty in assessing the civilian nature or 
otherwise of occupation of houses where fighting was taking place in the Lašva Valley while 
describing the situation of one particular village: 
 
The target for the artillery was the village itself. The fact that the village was holding 
out obviously meant it was being defended. I believed that the model that we had 
seen in the other villages in the Lasva Valley was being applied to Kruscica, and that 
was to ethnically cleanse it, but it was obviously being able to defend itself far better 
than other than people had, because it was more of a defended locality. I cannot say 
that the specific civilian houses were being targeted, other than military positions, 
because those civilian houses may well have been military positions, but we did not 
believe there was any other reason for attacking it other than the reasons they had 
attacked the other villages in the Lasva Valley, which was to remove the population.25 
 
This highlights that because the village was being defended, presumably by some form of a 
military presence, questions could be asked as to what military objectives were present and 
what remained civilian in nature. The fact that a village was the target for the attack because 
of a desire on the part of the attackers to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from the 
area was also highly relevant, although legal logic dictates that an attack in a combat situation 
has to be unlawful pursuant to the laws of war before it can be considered as a crime against 
humanity or any other offence.26 
 
                                                          
25 Blaškić Trial Transcript, 10 November 1997, pages 3397-3398. 
26 William J. Fenrick, ‘Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal Standards for Combat 




To demonstrate just one aspect of the potential intermingling of the civilian and military in 
Sarajavo that the judges had to contend with, questions were raised as to the nature of the 
Civil Defence/Protection in Sarajevo and its relationship with the ABiH. It is clear from the 
testimony of Ismet Hadžić, Commander of the Dobrinja Brigade of the ABiH, that although the 
Civil Defence was a separate organisation to the army, there were elements of overlap 
between them. Hadžić testified in relation to the Civil Defence organisation that 
 
It was separate. It wasn't under the military command. So I repeat, it had a separate 
command.  We didn't have command over it, but we did help them. Because they had 
a lot of duties, so when they lacked the manpower, we would provide our manpower 
for them, so they could accomplish the tasks that they were supposed to accomplish.27 
 
There was clearly the possibility that soldiers were working next to civilians, that there might 
not be a clear line between military and civilian activities within the city.  
 
 
Civilian and Civilian Population 
 
The Blaškić Trial Judges state that civilians 'within the meaning of Article 3 are persons who are 
not, or no longer, members of the armed forces'. They do not give any authority for this 
statement and it is not clear if the Article 3 is a reference to Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions or Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.28 It also contrasts with the more detailed 
consideration given to the definition of a civilian population for the purposes of charges of 
crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute and in which the judges cite 
previous ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence relying on Article 50(3) of API in defining the civilian 
population.29 Article 50(3) states that: 
 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within 
the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. 
 
Again in the context of the charges of crimes against humanity, the Blaškić Appeal Judges 
confirmed the relevance of the definition of civilians and civilian populations in Article 50 API, 
stating that ’the provisions in this article may largely be viewed as reflecting customary law’.30 
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They also confirmed the relevance of Article 50(3) API and cited the ICRC Commentary as to 
the specifics of its application.31  
 
This cross-over of definition also occurred in the Gotovina Trial Judgement.32 Gotovina was 
charged with carrying out unlawful attacks as one of the underlying acts of persecution, that is, 
within a charge of crimes against humanity. The judges stated that 'Since there is an absolute 
prohibition on the targeting of civilians and civilian objects in customary international law all 
attacks on civilians and civilian objects are unlawful'.33 They defined the term 'civilian' for the 
purposes of the definition of unlawful attacks as an underlying act of persecution (as a crime 
against humanity) by reference to chapters 5.2.1 and 5.5.1 - that is, to their statements of the 
law applicable to crimes against humanity (Article 5 of the ICTY Statute) for the term 'civilian' 
and the law applicable to 'Wanton Destruction' charged as a violation of the laws or customs 
of war (Article 3(b) of the ICTY Statute) for 'civilian objects'.34 In both cases, the definitions are 
those given in Additional Protocol I - Article 50 and Articles 52(1) and (2) respectively.35 In 
using Article 50 API to define 'civilian' the judges state that they are following Appeals 
Chamber jurisprudence and give references to the Blaškić, Kordić and Čerkez, Galić and Martić 
Appeal Judgements.36 
 
The Gotovina judges also mention that they had 'considered' the evidence given by the expert 
witnesses Konings and Corn as regarded 'the military or civilian nature of the objects fired at in 
Knin' with a footnote that they were at this point considering 'primarily whether firing at the 
objects offered a definite military advantage’ and not pronouncing ‘on the proportionality of 
these attacks in view of the risk of incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to 
civilian objects'.37 That is, they are again using some of the specific language of API. 
 
It is difficult from these cases alone to establish whether 'civilian' and 'civilian population' are 
to be considered as the same concept with exactly the same definitions under the law relating 
to war crimes and the law relating to crimes against humanity. Within the broader 
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jurisprudence of the ICTY, Gideon Boas, James Bischoff and Natalie Reid point out that despite 
the appellate jurisprudence applying the same definition of ‘civilian’ for both war crimes and 
crimes against humanity,38 this approach of applying Article 50(1) API to define a civilian for 
the purposes of crimes against humanity has not gone completely unchallenged by the ICTY 
trial chambers (who have in some cases applied a broader definition based on Common Article 
3). They highlight the 2005 Limaj Judgment which stated that ‘the definition of “civilian” 
employed in the laws of war cannot be imported wholesale into discussions of crimes against 
humanity’, recalling the Tadić Trial Judgement’s statement that the provisions of Common 
Article 3, Additional Protocol I and the commentary to Geneva Convention IV ‘can only be 
applied by analogy’.39 They also point out that Article 50(1) is a narrower provision than that in 
Common Article 3 because it is part of an approach specific to the new approach taken by API 
(compared to the 1949 Geneva Conventions themselves) to identify who can and cannot be 
‘targets of military action’.40 This again confuses matters for the charges of unlawful attack as 
persecution/crimes against humanity where the rules on targeting are of particular relevance. 
It can perhaps be concluded that as far as the unlawful attack charges that were brought under 
persecution headings in Blaškić and Gotovina are concerned, the definition of civilians and 
civilian populations were treated the same as if it had been brought as a war crimes charge 
and API has been confirmed as providing the relevant definitions. 
 
Having found that attacking civilians is a crime that exists under both customary and 
conventional law, the Galić Trial Judgement sets out in some detail the provisions of API as 
they apply to the definition of civilians and civilian populations in the specific context of 
defining the crime of an attack on civilians charged under Article 3 (War Crimes).41 As well as 
considering the effect on the civilian population of the presence of combatants, another detail 
mentioned here is the loss of protection for individual civilians for any time that they directly 
participate in hostilities.42 The judges cite paragraph 1944 of the ICRC Commentary for their 
proposition that to ‘take a “direct” part in the hostilities means acts of war which by their 
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nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or matériel of the enemy 
armed forces’.43  
 
In relation to the definition of a civilian population, the Galić Appeal Judges set out that 
although the statement in the Trial Judgement that 'The presence of individual combatants 
within the population does not change its civilian character'44 did not properly reflect ICTY 
jurisprudence (which was that it 'does not necessarily' change its character), given their 
reference in the related footnote to the ICRC Commentary,45 the trial judges had in fact 
appreciated the nuances of the law.46 This definition of a civilian population is key to the Galić 
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45 Galić Trial Judgement footnote 91: 
See Article 50(3) of Additional Protocol I. The Commentary to this paragraph notes that: “[i]n 
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46 Galić Appeal Judgement at paragraphs 136-138. 
 
136. The Appeals Chamber observes that there is nothing in the Defence Appeal Brief that 
identifies what in particular the Trial Chamber purportedly interpreted erroneously or 
“onesidedly”. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, the seemingly absolute nature with which 
the Trial Chamber asserted that the presence of combatants within the civilian population 
“does not” change its otherwise civilian character.416 The Appeals Chamber finds that the 
jurisprudence of the International Tribunal in this regard is clear: the presence of individual 
combatants within the population attacked does not necessarily change the fact that the 
ultimate character of the population remains, for legal purposes, a civilian one. If the 
population is indeed a “civilian population”, then the presence of combatants within that 
population does not change that characterisation. In the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, 
the Appeals Chamber stated:  
The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians and the presence within 
the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians 
does not deprive the population of its civilian character.  
The Appeals Chamber considers that Article 50 of Additional Protocol I contains a definition of 
civilians and civilian populations, and the provisions in this article may largely be viewed as 
reflecting customary law.  
 
137. If, however, one is discussing whether a population is civilian based on the proportion of 
civilians and combatants within it, that is, the status of the population has yet to be determined 
or may be changing due to the flow of civilians and military personnel, then the conclusion is 
slightly different. The Blaškić Appeal Judgement qualified the general proposition of the Kordić 
and Čerkez Appeal Judgement with an important addendum. It states, quoting the ICRC 
Commentary, that “in wartime conditions it is inevitable that individuals belonging to the 
category of combatants become intermingled with the civilian population, for example, soldiers 
on leave visiting their families. However, provided that these are not regular units with fairly 
large numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of a population.” As such, 
the Appeals Chamber in Blaškić found that “in order to determine whether the presence of 
soldiers within a civilian population deprives the population of its civilian character, the number 




case given that there were a large number of soldiers mixed in with the general population 
throughout the conflict. In relation to the shelling of the football match, seemingly in the 
context of establishing that the crowd present did not constitute a military objective, the trial 
judges state that the majority 'understands the evidence to show that there were soldiers 
present at the parking lot, who were off-duty, unarmed and not engaged in any military 
activity. It finds that, although soldiers were present at the improvised football pitch, the 
crowd gathered there was carrying out a civilian activity, i.e., playing football'.47 This seems to 
be highlighting that the civilians present were not taking part in any hostilities at the time so 
there was no way they could have lost their protection pursuant to Article 51(3) API.  
 
Further on, the Galić Trial Judges also, however, consider what the position would have been if 
the SRK had been intending to target the soldiers. They find that given the composition of the 
crowd, any such attack would have been disproportionate.48 This implies that there could have 
been a composition of the crowd for which the attack would not have been disproportionate.  
 
The application of the principle of proportionality is discussed further below, but there is also a 
question left as to what this means for the purpose of the definition of the civilian population. 
In this regard there is an interesting distinction made in the Galić Appeal Judgement between 
the presence of combatants in what has already been established as a ‘civilian population’ and 
a situation where ‘one is discussing whether a population is civilian based on the proportion of 
civilians and combatants within it, that is, the status of the population has yet to be 
determined or may be changing due to the flow of civilians and military personnel’. This 
supports the idea that there is a proportionality calculation to be made in defining a civilian 
population where there is an intermingling of civilians and military personnel.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
138. The strict test apparently posited by the Trial Chamber, namely that the presence of 
combatants within the civilian population “does not” change its status, may seem to depart 
from the above finding of the Appeals Chamber. However, in footnote 91 of the Trial 
Judgement, the Trial Chamber acknowledged the nuances of its position by referring to the 
above quotation of the ICRC Commentary, as referred to in the Blaškić Appeal Judgement. The 
Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber was correct in its interpretation of the 
law in paragraphs 50 and 51 as it recognised the variable considerations with respect to 
determining the characterisation of a given population. Galić’s argument is accordingly 
dismissed. 
 
47 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 386. 




The Galić Appeal Judges go on to mention the finding in the Blaškić Appeal Judgement that ‘in 
order to determine whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives the 
population of its civilian character, the number of soldiers, as well as whether they are on 
leave, must be examined’, which they noted that in turn was based on the ICRC Commentary 
that ‘in wartime conditions it is inevitable that individuals belonging to the category of 
combatants become intermingled with the civilian population, for example, soldiers on leave 
visiting their families. However, provided that these are not regular units with fairly large 
numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of a population.’ 49 As the 
judges seem to be acknowledging, this implies something other than a strict proportionality 
calculation given that the activities of the soldiers present, rather than simply their status, are 
brought into consideration.  
 
Commander Jacques Kolp gave a description illustrating the point that the presence of some 
soldiers would not have made the Markale Marketplace into a military objective: 
 
Q. When you say, "there was no specific military objective at that particular point," 
what point are you referring to? 
A. Well, the Markale market is a market like you see everywhere in the world. I say it is 
a place where everybody knows exactly that there is a lot -- there are a lot of the 
people and that is a place you could find some food or something of everything. There 
was really this and that. And every day the market was overbrimming with people. 
That doesn't mean that there wasn't a person here or there wearing military clothes or 
who had gone out to do some shopping. As I said, everyone who was young enough, 
even young people who could wear the uniform was in the army.50 
 
As, before him, the ICRC Commentary and, after him, the Blaškić and Galić Appeal Judges 
highlighted, Kolp is describing a civilian purpose behind any presence of soldiers that should 
not be taken to mean that those in the market were not a civilian population. 
 
Based on an analysis of the testimony in the Galić and D. Milošević cases, Claire Garbett 
concludes that in fact, and in contrast to the neutral although negative IHL definition of a 
civilian found in API, social characteristics such as age or sex are applied in the ‘construction of 
the legal recognition (or not) of civilian persons’.51 She particularly had in mind the status of 
young men in Sarajevo who were to a certain extent presumed to be engaged in military 
activities. She also identified patterns within the civilians’ descriptions of their own status that 
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could form elements of a positive identification alongside the fact that they did not contribute 
to any military activity; there was an emphasis on protecting themselves and their families, on 
simply trying to survive in a besieged city. A key point she draws from this was that there were 
those who made an active choice to be a civilian, they did not simply just not happen to 
participate in military activities.52 Garbett’s analysis of testimony and judgements in these 
cases is interesting as it shows that the apparently neutral definitions employed in API are not 
necessarily capable of neutral application in the adjudication process. The judges in the cases 
at hand did not, however, seek to question the API definition on this level for their definitional 
purposes. 
 
The Blaškić Trial Judges, however, appear to have gone one step further than the judges in the 
other cases or the accepted IHL position in their definition of a civilian population. Fenrick 
identifies a ‘tendency to regard ad hoc ill equipped resistance to an attack as equivalent to no 
resistance’.53 Olásolo describes this as ‘equating the existence of a weak defence with the non-
existence of defence’ and points out that any organised defence, no matter how ineffective, 
constitutes active participation in hostilities removing the civilian status of those taking part, 
criticising the judgements that have failed to sufficiently take this distinction into account.54  
 
Olásolo states that the exception to the loss of civilian status in these circumstances is when 
force is used as an ‘isolated act of self-defence’.55 Fenrick considers that ‘the question is one of 
degree’ as to whether civilians would lose their protection in these circumstances, even given 
the lack of authority on this point.56 What the judges’ tendency in Blaškić shows, at the least, is 
the difficulty in applying a conduct of hostilities definition to what was ultimately, in the 
context of the ethnic cleansing of the villages in the Lašva Valley, violence directed against 
civilians. Elvir Ahmić testified as to what his father, who had been one of the residents of the 
village carrying out armed patrols, had told him of the day of the Ahmići massacre:  
 
He moved from the mosque in the direction of our house but he could not, because 
they were shooting at him, so he tried a round about way to reach our house and he 
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could not, and then these people who were fleeing established some kind of a 
position, and they stayed there until they had no more ammunition left.57 
 
Given the implications of this short insight, Elvir Ahmić’s father unable to reach his family, 
doing what he could together with the three other men with him, but unable to substantially 
alter the course of what was happening around them, the judges’ approach was perhaps an 
application of the broader principle of ‘humanity’ in a grey area between individual self-





Although the Blaškić Trial Judges do not define ‘military objective’ they do use the term. In 
considering whether the attacks launched against Ahmići, Šantići, Pirići and Nadioci on 16 April 
1993 were an attack against the Muslim civilian population, the Trial Judges find an absence of 
military objectives to justify the attacks.58 In relation to the ‘booby-trapped lorry of 18 April 
1993’ the judges cite Colonel Watters who stated that ‘certainly it was not a legitimate act of 
war in pursuit of military objectives’.59 
 
In contrast, in relation to the villages Donja Večeriska, Gaćice and Grbavica the Blaškić judges 
found that there were legitimate military reasons for the HVO to attack these villages. They 
state that these villages ‘could have represented a military interest such as to justify their 
being the target of an attack’.60 In the case of Donja Večeriska and Gaćice, two villages on 
either side of a weapons factory already in the control of the HVO, this was due to ‘evidence of 
a noteworthy ABiH presence’.61 The judges found that the Grbavica hill ‘had a certain strategic 
importance, which enabled the ABiH, if it occupied it, to block the HVO and the Croatian 
civilians’ access to the main Travnik-Busovača road’ and that ‘the ABiH was occupying certain 
private houses and that, consequently, those dwellings became legitimate military targets’.62 
 
The Blaškić Appeal judges also do not define ‘military objective’ while continuing to discuss its 
application by the Trial Judges, in particular in regard to the finding of a lack of a military 
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objective to justify certain orders given by Blaškić in relation to the attack on Ahmići and 
surrounding villages. They find that there was in fact a ‘military justification’ for Blaškić’s 
actions, namely ‘there was a Muslim military presence in Ahmići and the neighbouring villages, 
and that the Appellant had reason to believe that the ABiH intended to launch an attack along 
the Ahmići-Santići-Dubravica axis’.63 
 
As can be seen from these references, the Blaškić judges are all using a mixture of terms such 
as ‘military objective’, ‘military target’ and ‘military reason’ interchangeably. In the Blaškić 
Appeal Judgement, the judges do use provisions of API which refer to military objectives for 
definitional purposes (for example, in setting out the API definition of indiscriminate attacks in 
Articles 51(3), (4) and (5) API)64 but not to define a military objective itself. The witnesses 
testifying before the judges, such as Colonel Watters, also used such a mixture of terms and it 
is perhaps their language the judges have adopted. The use of ‘military target’ by the 
witnesses and judges is also evident in the other cases under discussion as can be seen below. 
 
In contrast, the Galić Trial Judges set out that ‘a widely accepted definition of military 
objectives’ is that contained in Article 52(2) API.65 Other than setting out the provision of 
Article 52(3), however, the judges did not enquire any further into this definition.  
 
Individual witnesses, with military experience/training or not, were asked about ‘military 
activity’ in the city in general or in the vicinity of shelling events they had witnessed. This was 
not premised on any particular definition of such military activity, it was for the judges to 
assess what was relevant from the information they were provided with. For example, Richard 
Mole, a former Senior Military Observer for Sarajevo (holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 
the British army at the time he was in Sarajevo) told the court of his understanding of the 
potential legitimate military targets in the city: 
 
Clearly, any activity around front lines, any activity around known headquarters, any 
activity around logistics elements, I would consider military targets. The remainder 
definitely wasn't.66   
 
In further testimony, however, the picture became less clear as Mole set out in more detail the 
potential location of the various military targets he had identified: 
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Q. ….Witness, yesterday you spoke about a distance of 500 to 600 yards when you 
talked about the depth of the front. Do you remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. You told us that behind this first, so to speak, technical zone, there was 
a logistical zone and then a command zone after that one. Do you remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us what the depth was of these two rear zones, that is, the logistical 
one and the command zone? 
A. No.  That is applying an exact science to something that isn't that exact. 
Q. I fully agree with you.  But can you just give us an idea? 
A. The resupply of the front line within the city would, of course, use many routes to 
fulfill their task. You would be unable to be specific in terms of a zone or an area for 
resupply. 
Q. Very well.  Let me ask you the following question: To the extent that these rear 
zones were used for logistical or command purposes, was it -- could these zones be 
identified as zones of a military character? Could that constitute a military target? 
A. They would not be zones of a military character. They would be supplies, items 
required on the front line, passing through them.67 
 
This demonstrated that there were, at the least, military supply routes running through 
otherwise non-military areas. 
 
It was also made clear to the judges that a military objective was not necessarily simply an 
object to be attacked or destroyed. For example, an SRK Intelligence Officer, Milorad Bukva, 
testified as to the SRK’s objective of dividing the territorial possession the city of Sarajevo 
along the existing confrontation lines:  
 
A. Yes, yes.  Most of the members of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and most of the 
command personnel, they knew what the war objective of the SRK was. It was defined 
by the assembly decision which practically confirmed the situation on the ground 
which was the division of the city. 
Q. You say the actual situation on the ground and the division of the city. Are you 
referring to the lines that were established between the Territorial Defence on the 
Serbian side and members of the organised Muslims units on the other side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your opinion, was that the objective that had been set? 
A. Yes, and I'd like to repeat that that was the decision taken by the assembly.68 
 
Tucker highlighted an additional element to the consideration of military objectives, namely 
that of precautions in attack. In the context of the potential use of civilian vehicles for military 
purposes there was the following exchange:  
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Q. …Therefore, such a [civilian] vehicle, would you then consider it as a military target, 
if this vehicle is transporting military personnel? 
A. I would consider it, as a military officer, to be a military target, but I would also have 
to take into account the risk of my being wrong and it not being a military target 
before I personally decided to shoot at it.69 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges did not define military objectives as such, but they did discuss a list 
of potential military objectives in some detail. They also mention the guidance they were given 
by the expert opinion they had heard on the subject. They found that ‘the opinion of the 
expert as to whether, and why, he considers a target to be a legitimate military objective, 
although ultimately to be determined by the Trial Chamber, may assist it in making decisions in 
relation to the criminal liability of the accused’.70 The Defence expert Professor Geoffrey Corn 
mentioned the rules in Additional Protocol I through his testimony, although never referring to 
the actual definition of military objective provided therein.71   
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges also heard significant evidence as to restrictions on attacking military 
objectives. Andrew Leslie, Chief of Staff of Sector South of the UN Protection Force’s Croatia 
Command, located in Knin, at the time, with significant artillery experience and who at the 
time of testifying was the Chief of Land Staff in the Canadian Armed Forces, for example, gave 
evidence as to what was a ‘legitimate military target’:  
 
A legitimate military target is one which is deemed by an attacking commander to 
have a significant military value, one in which its neutralisation or destruction will 
provide a significant advantage to the attacking force, and one which has military 
utility which is current. There are other criteria, but I would have to refer to notes to 
get more specific.72 
 
But then, when asked ‘[o]nce a legitimate military target… is identified, does that mean that it 
can then be shelled?’ he answered: 
 
No, sir, most absolutely not. Identifying a legitimate military target is merely the first 
step in a process. The second step is determining its current military relevance, it's 
utility, the possibility of collateral damage to innocent lives or civilian structure, the 
military utility of prosecuting that target commensurate with the rules of law, what 
type of weapon system you have to engage that target to avoid the potential of 
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collateral damage, and then finally, of course, the gut check to see whether or not you 
think it's the right thing to do considering all the factors.73 
 
This examination of Leslie led to an interesting exchange with Judge Orie which shows some of 
Judge Orie’s thoughts as regards the value of this sort of evidence: 
 
Q. Let me direct your attention to the residential areas to which you saw corrected fire 
being directed.  What if, for example, a significant military figure lived in one of the 
apartment buildings located within that residential area, would that mean that the 
corrected fire you saw being directed into the residential neighbourhood, therefore, 
be permissible and would that render your conclusions drawn in the August 12th 
statement -- report wrong? 
A.   Sir, I will offer you my opinion based on a variety of years of experience in these 
matters -- 
JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe. 
MR. KEHOE:  He's offering his opinion; he's not an expert. 
JUDGE ORIE:  Well, as I said before and as is found in the Chamber's decision, that 
sometimes it's not easy to distinguish, especially when you have professionals 
testifying. 
Mr. Tieger, what I notice at this moment is the following:  That you started asking the 
witness about what he considers to be a military target, a legitimate military target. I 
had already some doubts at this moment, but at the same time, I thought it might be 
good to know whether this witness understands this, to be whether that's correct or 
not. And then what was done is that we actually moved from what a legitimate 
military target is into the process of decision-making on whether or not to attack a 
certain target. For example, the type of weaponry used is not -- is, of course, a 
consideration which may be of importance; at the same time, it does not change the 
target as a legitimate military target automatically. Let's try to focus at this moment, 
first of all, on facts, because your question was of a high hypothetical nature, at least 
you have chosen to make it a hypothetical question.  I could imagine that a similar 
question in a less hypothetical way would be put to the witness, but let's try not to 
lose ourselves in hypothesis.74 
 
Judge Orie was not opposed as such to a witness who is not designated an ‘expert’ giving his 
opinion on matters in which he has significant knowledge and experience. He wanted to see 
what the witness’ understanding of the situation was. The judge was, however, more 
concerned with establishing facts than going through hypothetical situations with a witness. 
What is also interesting is that Judge Orie has in his mind the presence of a ‘legitimate military 
target’ but also the relevance of the means by which it may be attacked – that is ‘the type of 
weaponry used’.  
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In the trial judgement, the judges did rely on Leslie’s testimony, among others, in identifying 
the military objectives that were present in Knin and that appeared to have been targeted.75 
This included the statement: 
 
With these two exceptions and according to Leslie’s observations, the legitimate 
military targets in Knin were not hit in any significant manner.76 
 
It is clear that in defining the concepts of civilian and civilian population that the rules of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are the key sources used by the judges. 
Where a definition was provided for ‘military objective’ this too was from the provisions of 





Although it was not specifically mentioned in the indictment, as a scheduled shelling incident 
or otherwise, the Galić Trial Chamber decided to make a finding on the evidence they had 
heard regarding the Koševo hospital. This is interesting as, given the evidence showed that the 
grounds of the hospital had been used by the ABiH to launch attacks against the SRK as well as 
that the hospital had been the subject of attacks, they were therefore pronouncing on one of 
the most difficult areas of targeting law, namely, when can an object that is ordinarily clearly 
protected by IHL become a military objective for the purpose of a particular attack? 
 
The Trial Chamber used witness Harding's conclusions as well as those of Mole, Senior UNMO 
from September to December 1992, Jacques Kolp, UNPROFOR Liaison Officer with the ABiH 
from March 1993 to November 1994 and Morten Hvaal, a Norwegian photojournalist who 
lived close to the Koševo Hospital, in setting out findings that although there was some 
outgoing fire from the hospital grounds that did draw return fire, the SRK were at times in fact 
targeting the hospital as such and not simply trying to counter-attack against those firing at 
them. 77  
 
It is implicit in their conclusion that 'nevertheless' there was also fire that 'was certainly not 
aimed at any possible military target ' that they did not consider return fire towards the 
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hospital as unlawful.78 They, however, used quite detailed consideration of the types of attacks 
against the hospital to show that it was at times the hospital as such that was being targeted, 
not those using its grounds to launch an attack.  
 
The Galić Appeal Judgement covers the law applying to the use of hospital grounds at the 
Koševo Hospital by the ABiH for launching attacks at the SRK forces in detail, partially 
overturning the Trial chamber's findings.79 The Appeals Chamber states that the Trial 
Chamber's 'conclusion that the firing on the Koševo hospital buildings “was certainly not aimed 
at any possible military target” is partially incorrect'.80 This does not feel completely honest 
when compared to the Trial Chamber's full sentence and their conclusions as a whole. The Trial 
Chamber, having found that ABiH mortars were fired from the hospital grounds or its vicinity, 
stated that 'Nevertheless, the evidence does reveal that, on occasions, the Koševo hospital 
buildings themselves were directly targeted, resulting in civilian casualties, and that this fire 
was certainly not aimed at any possible military target'.81 
 
Given that both the Trial and Appeals Chambers conclude that some of the attacks on the 
hospital were not attacks on a legitimate military target, the Appeals Chamber seems to have 
had reservations about how the Trial Chamber came to this conclusion rather than the 
conclusion itself. They set out in some detail the basis on which a hospital would lose its 
protected status. The Appeals Chamber states that 'If the hospital, whether the building or the 
grounds, was used as a base to fire at SRK forces, then the hospital was, at least temporarily, a 
military target.'82 The Appeal Judgement sets out that for a certain time the hospital as a whole 
will become a legitimate military target - so it is the timing of the attacks that is most relevant, 
rather than what was being fired at. They also specify that the attack must be targeting the 
military objects themselves 'so only weaponry reasonably necessary for that purpose can be 
used'.83 The Trial Chamber appears to have looked more closely at what was actually being 
attacked, for example it considered the third floor of a hospital building being hit by 122m 
artillery and 40m anti-aircraft artillery to clearly not be aimed at any possible military target.84  
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In setting out the relevant law, the Appeals Chamber looks to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
its two Additional Protocols and the ICRC Commentary.85 It mentions that in addition, and 
specifically stating that it did not change the legal analysis, the parties had agreed to similar 
provisions in their agreement of 22 May.86  
 
The Appeals Chamber sets out the provisions of API and APII that specify that loss of 
protection for medical facilities in the circumstances under discussion is not instantaneous and 
a warning period is required while noting the equivalent effect of Article 19 of Geneva 
Convention (IV) in a footnote.87 These provisions do not, however, seem to have had any effect 
on the actual findings of the judges who concentrate on the fact that there were attacks 
against the hospital that were clearly against the protected facility itself. It is interesting that 
the Appeals Judges felt it necessary to set out this law, again emphasising the role of the 
Additional Protocols in this area of law, although perhaps something of a missed chance to set 





The principle of ‘proportionality’ as it applies to the conduct of warfare is now considered one 
of the more certain principles of customary international law despite the complexities of 
actually putting it into practise. As late as 1997, however, Fenrick acknowledged that there 
was some debate about its existence.88 Fenrick’s view, however, was that debate as to its 
existence or otherwise was 
 
… pointless as, whether or not proportionality is formally embedded in customary law, it 
is a logically necessary part of any decision-making process which attempts to reconcile 
humanitarian imperatives and military requirements during armed conflict.89 
 
The ICJ opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Case mentions a principle of proportionality only in its 
guise as a restriction on the right of states to act in self-defence.90 Judge Higgins, in her 
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dissenting opinion, however, discusses the principle of proportionality in the IHL sense.91 To 
her there is no question of the existence of this principle ‘reflected in many provisions of 
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ and it means that ‘even a legitimate 
target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the 
specific military gain from the attack’.92 
 
Fenrick goes on to point out that the principle is incorporated in API in the form of 51(5)(b) and 
57(2)(a)(iii), although as he, Watkins and others have highlighted, the word ‘proportionality’ is 
not in fact used in API. The provisions of Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of AP I require 
instead an assessment of whether a loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property during 
the conduct of hostilities is ‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’.93  
 
By 2012, William H. Boothby wrote ‘There is clearly a customary rule of proportionality along 
the lines of that set out in API’. He goes on to point out that Rule 14 of the ICRC Customary 
Law Study sets out a customary rule in the exact terms of Article 51(5)(b) of API.94 The Practice 
section of the ICRC’s Customary IHL Database includes mention of the ICTY jurisprudence 
referring to the principle of proportionality, including the Galić Trial and Appeal Judgements.95  
 
Although as a concept it is not difficult to understand, the application of the principle of 
proportionality is clearly more difficult. There are no agreed values or standards to allocate to 
civilian or military lives or to any military advantage to be gained. If any armed force has its 
own accepted examples or ratios, it is not something that they make public.96 Michael Newton 
and Larry May highlight the importance of the context of a proportionality assessment – it is 
not just a case of comparing two values, it is a case of comparing two ‘incommensurables’ in 
the particular situation in which they are placed, together with an assessment of the 
probability of what is anticipated to result from a particular action.97 
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One of the most important elements of the three cases under investigation here was the fact 
that the judges, to varying degrees, did consider questions of proportionality in attack based 
on actual events. The judges’ approach to proportionality is discussed in detail below. 
 
The Trial Chamber in Blaškić use the concept of proportionality in relation to attacks four times 
in their judgment without giving any definition or source of the law they are applying. We are 
left to infer what they understand this term to mean and from where they derived it. For 
example, when they state: 
 
By advocating the vigorous use of heavy weapons to seize villages inhabited mainly by 
civilians, General Blaškić gave orders which had consequences out of all proportion to 
military necessity and knew that many civilians would inevitably be killed and their 
homes destroyed.98 
 
this seems to be a reference to pre-API customary rules.  
 
The Galić Trial Chamber explicitly considers the legal concept of proportionality in attack. 
Having defined the crime of 'attack on civilians',99 they state i) that they agree with previous 
Trial Chambers that indiscriminate attacks may qualify as direct attacks against civilians;100 and 
ii) that 'One type of indiscriminate attack violates the principle of proportionality'.101 The 
inclusion of disproportionate attacks as a subset of indiscriminate attacks follows the structure 
of Article 51 of API (and therefore the definition put forward by the Prosecution). 
 
The authority cited for the discussion of proportionality at first glance looks fairly substantial, 
however, in effect it is a discussion of the provisions of Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) 
API, Statements of Understanding made by state parties to API regarding these provisions and 
the associated ICRC Commentary (including mention of the travaux préparatoires). The 
exceptions to this are i) a mention that the principle of proportionality 'may be inferred, inter 
alia, from Articles 15 and 22 of the Lieber Code and from Article 24 of the 1924 Hague Air 
Warfare Rules ',102 ii) one European Commission and Court of Human Rights case103 and iii) 
military manuals from Canada, Australia and New Zealand (all parties to API) with a 'see also' 
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reference to the Yugoslav Regulation on the Application of international Laws of War in the 
Armed Forces of the SRFY, para. 72 (1988).104 
 
This reliance on Articles 51(5) and 57(2) API is interesting given that the Trial Chamber had 
already stated that their legal analysis of the crime of attacking civilians was based solely on 
the first sentence of Article 51(2) (as already mentioned above). They state in footnote 104 in 
relation to the principle of proportionality 'inferred, inter alia' from the Lieber Code and the 
1924 Hague Air Warfare Rules that 'This principle was codified in Article 51(5)(b) and Article 
57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) of Additional Protocol I'. The judges seem to be using the principle of 
proportionality as set out in these provisions of API (and in various states’ interpretations of 
them) as a guide to what the modern principle of proportionality entails and requires in the 
absence of any detailed customary international law, having accepted that indiscriminate 
attacks including disproportionate attacks may constitute a direct attack against civilians.  
 
The Trial Chamber concludes105 that 'certain apparently disproportionate attacks may give rise 
to the inference that civilians were actually the object of attack. This is to be determined on a 
case by-case basis in light of the available evidence'. This approach can be criticised as 
conflating two different calculations in the minds of commanders. Ohlin goes further and 
argues that crimes of direct and indirect harm to civilians have been conflated by the ICTY 
through a broad definition of the required intention.106 He states that 
 
Consequently, a military commander who launches an attack, and foresees the 
possibility of civilian casualties, has thereby intentionally directed an attack against 
civilians… No analysis of proportionality is required because the attack was 
‘intentional’ in the sense in which civil lawyers understand the concept.107 
 
Ohlin’s argument does not, however, in fact do justice to the jurisprudence that has been 
created by the ICTY. There is no suggestion that if a military commander said that they had 
been targeting a particular military objective that their actions would not be judged by the sort 
of proportionality assessment envisaged in API. The type of ‘indiscriminate’ firing brought 
within the directly targeting civilians framework was a different matter, where no specific 
military objective could be discerned or where there was evidence (such as in the testimony 
described above) that those firing the guns simply did not care where they landed. 
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That is not to say that the approach of the judges is beyond any critical appraisal. The 
discussion of the football tournament below sets out in more detail the approach taken by the 
Galić judges. The Gotovina trial judges saw that there was a proportionality calculation to be 
made in relation to the targeting of the military commander Milan Martić which is also 
discussed below. Otherwise in the case of Gotovina, if a military objective was identified as a 
potential intended target no further questions were asked of any shots that landed within 
200m of the target which the trial judges had considered to give a reasonable margin for 
accuracy (this 200m distance and the criticism of it is discussed fully in Chapter 5 (Evidence II: 
Finding criminal intent). 
 
Given that the charges of attacks against civilians are ultimately subsumed under the 'crime of 
terror', the Trial Chamber's discussion of proportionality is not ultimately determinative of the 
crimes that Galić was found responsible for committing. It does, however, inform their 
consideration of the first scheduled shelling incident where many of those attending and 
watching a football tournament were killed or injured by two shells. 
 
 
Shelling of football tournament 
 
As Fenrick points out, although various military institutions and their legal advisors will 
presumably have ‘developed a body of knowledge and opinions on targeting issues which has 
a substantial impact on targeting decisions’,108 there is no accepted formula for calculating the 
relative value of military and civilian lives or damage to military or civilian infrastructure, or 
even much knowledgeable public discussion of what a proportionate balance could or should 
be in any particular circumstance and even less relevant case law. This meant that the Galić 
Trial Judges had little guidance to look to when seeking to rely on a proportionality calculation. 
It also means that their findings here had the potential to be a significant precedent. 
 
The Trial Chamber found that '[a]lthough the number of soldiers present at the game was 
significant, an attack on a crowd of approximately 200 people, including numerous children, 
would clearly be expected to cause incidental loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive in 
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relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.'109 On first look, this finding 
seems to be an extremely rare example of a proportionality calculation (apparently in 
accordance with Article 51(5)(b) API) being applied by a court to an actual set of facts. What 
this sentence does, however, is in fact sidestep a proportionality judgement based on the 
known figures and look to what the proportionality calculation would have been in the mind of 
the attacker, as is required by the law, but which leaves open what the actual calculation 
would have been or what the judges thought the attacker would have known and calculated 
(had the attacker in fact been considering the proportionality of their attack).  
 
Rogier Bartels is of the view that it was unnecessary for the judges to make their 
proportionality observation. The SRK forces were unable to distinguish between civilians and 
soldiers at all because 1) ‘they could not see the location that was being targeted’ and 2) 
‘because of the means used’ to target it; the group was therefore targeted as a whole and the 
attack was indiscriminate ‘irrespective of the anticipated incidental damage’.110 The judges had 
in fact thought along these lines as they also stated that had ‘the SRK forces launched two 
shells into a residential neighbourhood at random, without taking feasible precautions to 
verify the target of the attack, they would have unlawfully shelled a civilian area'.111  
 
What was, however, in the mind of the attacker here is not at all clear, given in particular that 
there was no evidence provided as to whether the attacker knew that something out of the 
ordinary was happening at the time they launched their attack. The judges note that 'there is 
no evidence on the Trial Record that suggests that the SRK was informed of the event taking 
place in the parking lot'.112  
 
Given this, it seems that the judges’ proportionality calculation statement was included to 
counter the argument that the attacker could have been firing the two shells at a legitimate 
military target, namely ABiH soldiers, and it was therefore not an attack against civilians. Going 
as far as carrying out a proportionality analysis therefore seems a way of making sure they are 
giving the defendant some benefit of the doubt in this situation - that is, working on the basis 
that the attackers knew that there was a concentration of soldiers and were attacking them, 
rather than civilians. The judges go on to say that 'had the SRK troops been informed of this 
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gathering and of the presence of ABiH soldiers there, and had intended to target these 
soldiers, this attack would nevertheless be unlawful'113 and therefore an example of 
indiscriminate shelling of a civilian area114 because it did not meet the requirements of 
proportionality.  
 
There is something about the lack of knowledge of what the attacker knew and what potential 
calculation they could have made that is problematic here.  The assessment is not made on the 
basis of the actual effects of the attack, but it is also not made on the basis of any actual 
knowledge of what the attacker knew or intended. The proportionality calculation is 
something for an attacker to consider in advance of the attack and to conclude at that point 
that it is not going to be 'an attack which may be expected to cause' disproportionate civilian 
harm and/or damage. If the attacker in this case knew there were soldiers present, what 
information did he have about the number of soldiers and number of civilians? The judges did 
not set out what percentage of these 200 people they were presuming the attacker to be 
considering to be soldiers for the purpose of this calculation. They may have had in mind the 
evidence they had heard that up to about half of the casualties were soldiers, although they 
made no specific finding on this point,115 and it would not have been relevant as such in any 
event to the calculation of what was in the mind of the attacker when launching the attack.  
 
The judges also did not explain what military advantage would be anticipated from killing the 
enemy's soldiers in this situation. In a conflict where the advantage to the ABiH was in their 
greater troop numbers, they did not explain whether killing and wounding any number of their 
soldiers would be be a direct and concrete military advantage or what then would be 
considered excessive harm to the civilian population. The question of what did in fact inform 
the judges' calculation is left open, perhaps intentionally so to avoid leaving hostages to future 
analysis by those further from the findings of fact. There is no mention of proportionality or 
'excessive' incidental loss in the testimony of Ismet Hadžić, a resident of Dobrinja and former 
commander of the ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade (he considered there to be an 
approximately 50-50 proportion of civilians to military personnel who were casualties)116 nor in 
that of the international military who testified in relation to the football match shelling; 
Commandant John Hamill, a member of the Irish Defence Forces and a military observer for 
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UNPROFOR at the relevant time; Richard Higgs, an expert on mortars and formerly of the 
British Army; and Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Bergeron, a member of the Canadian Armed 
Forces, chef de cabinet of the commander of the Sarajevo Sector of UNPROFOR at the time 





The Gotovina Trial Judges considered the application of the principle of proportionality in 
relation to two attacks aimed at Milan Martić, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
and leader of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (‘SVK’) as the presiding member of 
the Supreme Defence Council of the Republic of Serbian Krajina,117 who was in Knin at the time 
of Operation Storm. There is, however, no explicit consideration of the legal definition of what 
constitutes 'proportionality' in attack within the judgement, only a footnote in which they 
state that their 'analysis in respect of the proportionality of the attack is informed by the 
relevant testimony of experts Konings and Corn and Additional Protocol I, Art. 51'.118 They do 
not go on to make any findings relating to the proportionality of the HV’s use of artillery 
against other targets in Knin.119  
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The footnotes leading up to this were as follows: 
 
931 At this stage, the Trial Chamber considers primarily whether firing at the objects offered a 
definite military advantage and does not pronounce on the proportionality of these attacks in 
view of the risk of incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects. 
 
932 The Trial Chamber notes that had these impacts which were at a distance of up to 700 
metres from artillery targets been the result of the inaccuracy of the artillery weapons used, 
that would require a further consideration of whether such inaccurate weaponry can be used in 
the context of an artillery attack on specific targets within a town. 
 
934 The Trial Chamber’s analysis in respect of the proportionality of the attack is informed by 
the relevant testimony of experts Konings and Corn and Additional Protocol I, Art. 51.  
 
935 The Trial Chamber has considered the targeting of the two locations where the HV believed 
Martić to have been present as an indicative example of a disproportionate attack during the 
shelling of Knin. The Trial Chamber does not pronounce on the proportionality of the HV’s use 





Even expert witnesses are not there to inform the judges on the law, however, there is a 
strange overlap of law and facts in the Gotovina judges’ discussions of the conduct of 
hostilities. Konings was by any measure an expert in the use of artillery by the Dutch and 
NATO. Within this, however, he was not an expert on IHL or ICL. Konings did not hold himself 
out to be an expert in the law, he seems to have been offered as an expert witness in 
targeting, able to say what those using artillery can and do consider, what the processes of 
target selection involve given the capabilities of the weaponry to hand. His discussion of what 
a military commander should have done in the situation of Knin tended to describe NATO 
practice, not minimum lawful practice. The defence expert Corn saw a confusion between 
rules of engagement (voluntarily adopted) and the binding law itself in Konings evidence.120 
Corn was the only witness selected for this research who specifically mentions the Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in his testimony.  
 
The expert witnesses Konings and Corn did not agree on the approach taken by Gotovina in 
attacking Knin. One of the main points of contention was Konings’ view that artillery should 
not have been used against military objectives in civilian areas in the manner it had been due 
to the inherent risk to the civilian population, a position that tended to advocate for as many 
civilian casualties to be avoided as possible. Corn disagreed with this approach, as can be seen 
when he was asked to comment on Konings’ statement that ‘[a]rtillery assets can only be used 
in case of the safe distance between the expected impacts and the civilian population is big 
enough to avoid casualties’:  
 
Well, once again I think I understood the general idea that he was trying to convey, but 
it was an imprecise and potentially dangerous imprecise articulation of the rule. What 
he essentially is saying is that you are only permitted to use artillery assets when you 
know that they will not cause civilian casualties. If that were it the rule in the Law on 
Armed Conflict we wouldn't have a proportionality rule. Because a proportionality rule 
is in effect an acknowledgement in the law that commanders conducting operations 
will inevitably have to make a judgement as to whether an attack that they know is 
probably going to cause civilian casualties may or may not be conducted. And that 
judgement is based on the assessment of the anticipated collateral damage or 
incidental injury and a comparison of that damage to the anticipated military 
advantage, and a determination as to whether or not that anticipated civilian harm will 
be excessive.121 
 
During Leslie’s testimony for the prosecution Leslie had made it clear that he did not think 
Gotovina’s forces had the technological capability to hit pinpoint targets ‘without a significant 
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risk of collateral damage’. Gotovina’s defence’s questioning on this point led Judge Orie to 
intervene: 
 
JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, let's -- I let you go for a while and I do not mind if you think 
it's of great importance to analyse what happened in attacks by other armed forces 
elsewhere in the world, but I'd very much like to focus on this case. 
One of the problems is that if you're talking about attacks by the armed forces of 
country X against a city in country Y, that would first have to receive all the 
information relevant for that and then we could only further make sensible use of this 
information, but not in general terms.  Some of the questions, of course, whether if 
collateral damage occurs, whether that's always wrong, I think that we have sufficient 
case law already alone in this Tribunal that collateral damage should be avoided by the 
weaponry you choose, et cetera, et cetera, but these kind of sweeping statements, 
and that's of course the problems with your questions at this moment is that they are 
of a very nature, whereas usually decisions to be taken depend on five, six, seven, ten, 
fifteen relevant aspects of the situation we're dealing with. 
Therefore, again, the monocausal sweeping statement approach does not always 
assist the Chamber.122 
 
From this it can be seen that Judge Orie clearly understands that collateral damage is a 
complicated matter but that also the approach of the defence questioning at this point is not 
assisting the chamber, tending towards generalities and not specific to the situation in 
question. 
 
Having decided that Martić’s residence constituted a 'military target' given his position within 
the RSK and SVK and that 'firing at his residence could disrupt his ability to move, 
communicate, and command and so offered a definite military advantage',123 the judges go on 
to hold that firing on Martić’s apartment and 'the area marked R on P2337' was, however, 
collectively (the judges did not consider the two locations separately for the purpose of their 
actual finding)124 a disproportionate attack.125  
 
The judges' exact words were 'The Trial Chamber considers that this risk [a significant risk of a 
high number of civilian casualties and injuries, as well as of damage to civilian objects] was 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of firing at the two locations where 
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the HV believed Martić to have been present',126 clearly using concepts from Article 51(5)(b) 
API, although not its exact phrasing. They have omitted the words 'concrete and direct' in 
relation to military advantage. The use of the word 'risk' is also interesting. They did not use 
the term 'may be expected to cause' as in Article 51(5)(b) instead referring to a 'significant risk 
of'. Do these terms have the same meaning? In any event it seems strange that they could not 
use the exact phrasing of Article 51(5)(b) given that they have said they are specifically relying 
on Article 51. 
 
The factors that are stated to have led to this decision set out in the key paragraph 1910 can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1. number and type of shells fired, their accuracy (including distance they were fired 
from) and effects; 
2. the type of military advantage offered: i.e. that firing at Martić’s apartment could 
disrupt his ability to move, communicate, and command with only a slight chance of 
hitting or injuring Martić; 
3. the location of the target: i.e. his apartment was 'in an otherwise civilian apartment 
building' and 'both the apartment and the area marked R on P2337 were in otherwise 
predominantly civilian residential areas';  
4. times of firing: when 'civilians could have reasonably been expected to be present on 
the streets of Knin near Martić’s apartment and in the area marked R on P2337'; and 
therefore 
5. 'a significant risk of a high number of civilian casualties and injuries, as well as of 
damage to civilian objects '. 
 
As mentioned above the judges state in a footnote to this paragraph 1910 that their 'analysis 
in respect of the proportionality of the attack is informed by the relevant testimony of experts 
Konings and Corn and Additional Protocol I, Art. 51'.127 As is typical with this judgement, there 
are no specific references at this point to where the information relied upon can be found. It is 
up to the reader to examine the rest of the judgement to see where these points were 
previously discussed.  
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Much earlier in the judgement, the judges set out a summary of the evidence Konings and 
Corn provided (both in person and in their expert reports) in relation to the use of artillery.128 
This seems to be a factual findings section, but does in fact also, although not explicitly, 
provide some of the most detailed legal consideration of the attacks, specifically in how the 
experts considered the relevant law applied to a commander's decisions relating to the use of 
artillery. An example of this is the use of Corn's evidence regarding a commander's decision as 
to whether to use rocket or cannon artillery (in itself arising out of questions regarding Rajcic's 
testimony on inappropriateness of use of multiple barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) to attack 
Martić’s residence) where, as well as stating that the commander is obliged to assess the 
anticipated collateral damage and incidental injury, Corn also sets out certain factors that 
would be taken into account.129 Another example is Corn's evidence regarding the use of 
artillery observers in relation to assessing and mitigating potential collateral damage.130 
 
At paragraphs 1174 and 1175, the judges summarise some of the evidence provided by 
Konings and Corn relating to potential targets within Knin albeit on the basis of assumed facts 
(given the difference in view between prosecution and defence as to what the actual factual 
situation in Knin was). This included in relation to attacks aimed at Martić. The judges set out 
that Konings' evidence that the presence of the commander-in-chief 'could' make his residence 
                                                          
128 In section 4.4, under the heading 4.4.2 'General considerations', from paragraph 1163 to 1175. 
Section 4.4 - crimes committed/ Unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects - seems to be section 
setting out evidence heard and facts found by judges but some mention of legal elements. Section 5 is 
legal findings. NB Section 4.4 Unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects is not mirrored in Section 
5 - it comes under 5.8 Persecution; 5.8.1 Applicable law; 5.8.2 Legal findings instead. 
129 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 1166: 
1166. ... Corn testified that any commander considering the use of rocket artillery in a civilian 
area is obliged to assess the anticipated collateral damage and incidental injury. Rocket artillery 
is not necessarily the most indiscriminate option of attack when compared to cannon artillery: 
the comparison depends on the location of the civilian population (indoors or outdoors), the 
timing of the attack, the protection afforded to civilians by hardened structures, and the 
potential comparative impact of cannon and rocket rounds. Depending on these factors, Corn 
considered it conceivable that a commander could make a good faith determination that rocket 
artillery is better suited to achieve the desired effect. 
 
130 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 1171: 
1171......Corn testified that artillery observers can be used to correct fire and better control the 
effects of the attack and mitigate the risk of collateral damage or incidental injury to civilians. 
However, observed indirect fire is not always an option: when firing artillery at long range, 
commanders might not be willing or able to place observers in close proximity to long range 
targets, especially in areas under significant enemy control. Unobserved indirect fire is based 
on intelligence indicating the location of proposed targets and indirect fire direction 
calculations. Thus commanders should engage in a proportionality analysis, considering the 
location of the target and possible collateral damage, to decide whether using artillery 





a 'military target' and that the HV artillery attack would have had a suppressing effect on a 
commander in Knin (preventing him moving about freely) even if it was unlikely to have been 
able to kill him.131 They also set out Corn's view that Martić, as commander in chief, was a 
'lawful military objective' and that 'although the probability of killing or disabling Martić by 
artillery attack was limited, if Gotovina believed Martić to be an important component in SVK 
decision-making, the potential operational advantage in disrupting the SVK command and 
control structure would be substantial'.132 
 
This finding has been criticised for failing to give a detailed consideration of the factors 
involved in making the decision to fire on Martić's location, including Martić’s importance as a 
military objective, and for applying a proportionality principle using post-attack effects.133 The 
Appeals Chamber criticised this decision but did not set out what the correct conclusion or 





The judges in the three cases of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina significantly developed the law of 
targeting through their findings as to the definitions of crimes of unlawful attack against 
civilians in international law (as a war crime and crime against humanity). In setting out the 
existence and definition of these crimes the judges of the ICTY could not rely on a simple 
reading of pre-existing texts and had to make a choice as to what would guide their decision 
(and law) making. In defining unlawful attacks, civilians and civilian populations, military 
objectives and the principle of proportionality the judges looked mainly to the 1977 Additional 
Protocols and ICRC Commentary thereon together with the guidance they had received from 
the testimony of expert witnesses and those with military experience. 
 
                                                          
131 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 1174. 
132 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 1175.  
133 See, for example, Laurie R. Blank, ‘Operational Law Experts Roundtable on the Gotovina Judgment: 
Military Operations, Battlefield Reality and the Judgment’s Impact on Effective Implementation and 
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’, Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 12-186 of 28 
January 2012, 6-7. See also Rogier Bartels, ‘Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed 
Conflict in Retrospect: The Application of the Principle in International Criminal Trials’, Israel Law Review 
46, no. 2 (2013): 291-292 for a different perspective on the military significance of Martić. 




Launching an attack against civilians was not specifically included in the list of crimes over 
which the ICTY was to have jurisdiction.135 The Blaškić Trial Judgement was therefore critical 
for the law of targeting. The trial judges did not provide the most detailed explanation of the 
law of war or always portray the firmest grasp of its provisions. What they did do, however, 
was confirm that the judges at the ICTY were willing to work with the OTP’s initiative and find 
an offence of unlawfully attacking civilians to exist within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. This was 
a first step in incorporating the humanitarian developments in the law governing armed 
conflict that had taken place since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War into the 
work of the ICTY. 
 
In these first steps the Blaškić Trial Judges considered what gave an individual protected status 
and what military objectives there could have been in the conflict that took place in the area of 
Central Bosnia under Blaškić’s command. They were also willing to consider the application of 
concepts such as distinction and proportionality although without defining them. In the Galić 
Trial Judgement and Blaškić Appeal Judgement, the judges of the ICTY confirmed the primacy 
of the provisions found in API as regards unlawful attacks against civilians, restricting the role 
of provisions with ‘military necessity’ justifications. In doing this, the ICTY judges looked almost 
solely to the Additional Protocols and the accompanying ICRC guidance, finding that 
international criminal customary law reflected these provisions or vice versa. In Gotovina the 
judges again used definitions provided by API but also explicitly placed reliance on the 
testimony provided by their expert witnesses, in particular, in relation to the principle of 
proportionality.  
 
What can be hidden looking back on what was achieved is that the use of the provisions of API 
as they related to the law on targeting was not the only possible route for the ICTY to take. 
Although they were given what was a potentially out of date instruction in Article 3 of the 
Statute, it was one the judges could have worked with and not elaborated on if they did not 
have the desire to do so. It is clear, however, that they and the OTP believed that to do justice 
for the victims of the crimes forming the basis of these cases required the use of the law 
reflected in API. This law had been designed to promote the protection of civilians in a 
balancing act of humanity and military necessity; but with more consideration of the role of 
civilians caught up in a conflict, more of a tilt to humanity, than had previously been seen in 
such treaties. The judges used the developments in international law that were the precursor 
                                                          




to and accompanied the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols to set out a modern 
international criminal law that prioritised the protection of the civilian even in conduct of 
hostilities situations and, in this context, therefore gave prominence to the ICRC guidance and 
the application of the principle of humanity over that of military necessity. 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 4 (Evidence I: The witnesses)) introduces the witnesses and their 
testimony that forms the basis of much of the analysis of the judges’ assessment of the 
evidence in Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent). It discusses the different types of 
witnesses and the rules governing their testimony as well as the evidence they provided in 
relation to matters of targeting. In doing this it introduces the themes of the value of military 
and civilian experience to the decisions made by the judges in relation to the evidence in the 












The witnesses who appeared before the ICTY were vital to the work of the institution; Patricia 
Wald, a former judge at the ICTY, describes witnesses as ‘the lifeblood of ICTY trials’.1 Witness 
testimony, as for many other of the charges brought at the ICTY, was the main source of 
evidence for charges of unlawful targeting and therefore another key element in the 
framework of this study.  
 
There is a fairly small body of literature regarding the witnesses at the ICTY. This literature 
includes that of studies that set out to try to understand how the process of testifying affects 
the witnesses.2 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, based on research into 
testimony given in the Krstić hearings, have questioned what role victim-witnesses in 
particular should have in a criminal trial of this nature. Dembour and Haslam specifically set 
out to ‘challenge the assumption that victim-witnesses' testimonies are essential to war crimes 
trials’.3 Their findings suggested that the victim witnesses were being needlessly required to 
testify given that the evidence they gave was so far removed from demonstrating the 
command responsibility of Krstić.4 The thoughts and findings of Dembour and Haslam’s study 
of the transcripts of the Krstić case are considered in some detail in this chapter as it is one of 
very few to have considered the contribution that witnesses make to the findings of a case in 
any depth. 
 
                                                          
1 Patricia M. Wald, ‘Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 5, no.1 (2002): 219. 
2 See, for example, Kimi King, James Meernik and Melissa McKay, ‘Bearing Witness: The Impact of 
Testifying at War Crimes Tribunals’, Paper for delivery at the 2016 International Studies Association and 
Central and East European International Studies Association Joint International Conference in Ljubljana, 
Slovenia June 22-26 2016; Kimi King and James Meernik, The Witness Experience: Testimony at the ICTY 
and its Impact (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) – based on research made possible due to 
the involvement of the ICTY Victim and Witnesses Unit (See 
http://www.icty.org/en/about/registry/witnesses/echoes-of-testimonies--a-unique-research-project 
last accessed 02.05.2019) and Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The 
Hague (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).  
3 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes 
Trials’, European Journal of International Law 15, no. 1 (2004), 155.  




In considering some of the questions facing those who wish to critique international criminal 
law, Michelle Farrell highlights the problem of the relationship between the critical academic 
and the victims with whom this law to a large degree is concerned. She admits to unease in her 
position underpinned by ‘the very uncertainty of how to speak about the victims/the ‘other’ of 
international criminal law/the excluded/the (un)represented or the otherwise invested’. 5 
Although this study is not of the same critical school, the centrality of the witnesses has raised 
questions as to their representation within these pages. Although the research arises from the 
contents of an archive, it is still based on the testimony of people who have experienced 
and/or witnessed atrocity in its truest sense. Their voices, together with those of the judges 
and lawyers of the ICTY, formed the basis of this research. This research is intended to show, at 
the least, the fullest respect to those victims and witnesses of crimes whose testimonies have 
been analysed and otherwise included in the study while also appreciating that it has by no 
means found the answer to the question posed by Farrell.  
 
This chapter introduces the witnesses whose testimony, alongside the analysis of the 
judgements, forms the backbone of this research. It is intended to lay the basis for the next 
chapter, Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent) by setting out the procedural rules 
under which witness testimony was given and demonstrating the range of witness testimony 
analysed for the purposes of this study. In doing this it highlights some of the themes that 
arose from the research into the contents of the witness testimony and that are explored 
throughout this project. This chapter concludes with a brief consideration of the relationship 
between the judges and the witnesses in the courtroom; a sometimes awkward, but very 
human, series of interactions over the course of years of trial hearings. This relationship is key 
to the findings as to what in fact influenced the judges in their decision making as regards the 
law of targeting, be it the principle of humanity or otherwise. 
 
 
The witnesses’ evidence at the ICTY 
 
A significant amount of witness evidence was presented relating to matters of targeting and 
the firing of artillery (mortars, guns, howitzers and rockets). The rules governing the manner in 
which this evidence was presented and therefore what could be produced before the judges is 
                                                          
5 Michelle Farrell, ‘Complicity, Critique and I’ in Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An 




set out in this section which acts as an introduction to the testimony which underlies the 
transcripts which form the basis of this research. 
 
There were two broad categories of witness who presented evidence to the judges, witnesses 
of fact and expert witnesses. The general flexibility of the RPE and the background of the 
witnesses who gave evidence in relation to targeting matters, however, meant that there was 
some blurring of the boundaries; professional soldiers presented as witnesses of fact were, for 
example, at times permitted to give their opinion (usually only permitted in the case of expert 
witnesses).  
 
All the witnesses whose testimony was studied were further categorised for the purposes of 
this study into their civilian or military status at the time of the events they were testifying to. 
This further categorisation is discussed in the next section (The Witnesses presenting evidence 
relating to Firing of Artillery).  
 
 
Live testimony and use of witness statements 
 
As Robert Cryer summarises the position, ‘The use of witness evidence is beset by difficulties’, 
including questions of interpretation and translation as well as memory and credibility, but 
that does not mean it cannot be valuable evidence.6 The first version of the RPE provided that 
witnesses ‘shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers.’7 There was, however, 
provision for a Chamber to order that the witness’ evidence be taken by means of a deposition 
if it was ‘not possible to secure the presence of a witness’.8  
 
Some of the amendments made through the fifty revisions of the RPE over the life of the ICTY 
were directly related to attempts to speed up or secure witness testimony.9 By the time the 
Galić trial started, the initial rule that witnesses were ‘in principle’ to be heard directly by the 
Chamber was removed and there was provision for the submission of written evidence, on the 
condition that it was not intended to provide proof of ‘the acts and conduct of the accused as 
                                                          
6 Robert Cryer, ‘Witness Evidence before the International Criminal Tribunals’, Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 2, no. 3 (2003), 438 and generally. 
7 Rule 90(A). 
8 Rule 90(A). 
9 See http://www.icty.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-evidence (last accessed 11.03.2019) and 




charged in the indictment.’10 There was also, for some time, and as was used in the Galić trial 
hearing, provision to take evidence via video link.11  
 
By the time the Gotovina case was being heard witness statements were being accepted as 
evidence of ‘acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment’ on the conditions 
that:  
 
(i) the witness is present in court;   
(ii) the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning by the Judges; 
and   
(iii) the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately reflects that 
witness’ declaration and what the witness would say if examined.12   
 
This provision is considerably less detailed than that providing for statements that do not go to 
the heart of the charges against the accused as its use is completely dependent on the witness 
being available for cross examination and therefore that the accused has their chance to 
challenge the witness’ evidence. In the Gotovina hearing, the majority of witness testimony 
examined for the purposes of this study proceeded along the lines of the witnesses confirming 
their statement and giving brief further information to the prosecutor during examination-in-
chief before being cross examined by the defence teams.  
 
The consequence of the greater use of witness statements was that the testimony provided in 
court provided less of a coherent narrative of the witnesses’ experience and became harder to 
follow among references to statements and documents. Short summaries of the evidence to 
be presented by each witness were being given just before the start of the testimony in order 
to give the public an idea of what the testimony was about – something that would not always 
be very clear without having read the statement in advance.13  
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges specifically mentioned in their judgment that they ‘always took into 
account the witnesses’ credibility and reliability, which sometimes varied for different portions 
                                                          
10 Rule 92 bis. 
11 Rule 71 bis. Note also the short-lived Rule 94 ter on affidavit evidence – seen, for example, in Revision 
16, but this had been removed by the time of Galić. 
12 Rule 92 ter. 
13 See Gotovina Trial Transcript, 16 December 2008, page 13804 where Judge Orie explains this process 




of their evidence’.14 In this assessment of the credibility of the witness testimony, the judges 
stated that they considered the 
 
• demeanour of witnesses;  
• individual circumstances of a witness, including his or her possible involvement 
in the events and fear of self-incrimination, the witness’s relationship with any 
of the Accused, and whether the witness would have an underlying motive 
which could affect the witness’s credibility and reliability.  
• internal consistency of each witness’s testimony and other features of his or 
her evidence, as well as whether there was corroborating or contradicting 
evidence.15 
 
In answer to the question ‘What do you think in general – or, in particular, in the type of cases 
before the ICTY – of the value of live testimony compared to the submission of written 
statements in any form?’, Professor Ķinis (formerly a trial judge in the case of Gotovina) 
answered that although he could not judge in general: 
 
In our case, we verified witness statements through video conferences in the 
courtroom and in leu. All testimonies were verified during cross-examination. I did not 
find that use of this methods would somehow create any prejudice for evaluation.  
 
While pointing out that ‘all live testimony carries with it the possibility of distortion as to what 
really occurred’,16 Wald agrees that cross-examination is a critical tool in assessing the 
accuracy of evidence provided in witness testimony and witness statements: 
 
Cross-examination of a live witness serves to sort out the accuracy of a written record 
of eyewitness testimony compiled years before trial as compared to current 
recollection of the same event.  
…. 
Whatever the inherent difficulties of live witness testimony, additional inaccuracies 
brought about by the passage of time and confrontation with other sources are far 
more likely to be ferreted out in live cross-examined testimony than by a judge reading 
a written statement. Cross-examination, unavailable in the absence of live witness 
testimony, may be the most effective method of determining the value of that 
testimony.17 
 
Dembour and Haslam ask, however, if the testimony of victim-witnesses (where testifying is 
putting them through a further ordeal) is really the only way that the facts of what they went 
                                                          
14 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraph 31. 
15 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraph 31. Patricia Wald sets out some of the difficulties in actually 
carrying out this assessment in the context of the work of the ICTY in Wald, ‘Dealing with Witnesses in 
War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 235-238. 
16 Wald, ‘Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 226. 




through can be established in cases such as that of Krstić.18 The extensive use of victim-
witnesses seemed particularly problematic to them given the apparent lack of direct relevance 
of their testimony to the criminal responsibility of Krstić. 19 The witnesses that Dembour and 
Haslam are discussing were those who provided testimony as to what had happened during 
the genocide carried out at Srebrenica but their evidence did not link this to Krstić’s role in 
what happened. Given that the contents of such testimony was not often challenged by the 
defence they consider that more care should be taken as to whether such witnesses are 
required to testify and alternative means found to establish the facts of the crimes. 
 
Following a short consideration of the role of expert witness evidence, this chapter will start to 
lay the foundations of the findings of this study (somewhat contrary to the findings of 
Dembour and Haslam in their research) that the testimony of civilian (including victim) 
witnesses was of significant use in proving charges of unlawful targeting. It will do this by 
describing the witnesses and some of what they contributed in their testimonies under the 
heading ‘The Witnesses presenting evidence relating to Firing of Artillery’. 
 
 
Expert witness evidence 
 
In the Blaškić Trial Judgement there is no reference to the use of expert witnesses as such at 
all, although it does refer twice to certain witnesses as being ‘military experts’.20 Some 
witnesses were, however, referred to as expert witnesses in the hearings. This included 
witnesses as varied as the prosecution witness Munib Kajmovic offered as an expert in 
demographic changes in the Vitez Municipality and defence witness Slobodan Janković called 
as an expert in ballistics. In the Galić and Gotovina Trial Judgements there is, however, explicit 
use of expert witness evidence.  
 
This increased prominence of expert witnesses was reflected in the development of the RPE. 
The original RPE had no specific provision for expert witness statements, reports or testimony 
although it did envisage that there would be expert witnesses; it mentions that expert 
witnesses are excluded from the general rule that witnesses that have not yet testified should 
                                                          
18 Dembour and Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 168. 
19 Dembour and Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 168.  




not be present for the testimony of other witnesses.21 At the start of the Blaškić hearing this 
remained the position, however, a specific provision relating to expert witnesses was adopted 
before this hearing was completed and applied for the start of the Galić hearing.22  
 
This provision in Rule 94 bis provided a timeframe for the disclosure of expert statements to 
the opposite party (specifically not required in the case of the Blaškić witnesses)23 and gave the 
possibility that a witness statement of the expert could be admitted into evidence without the 
expert having to testify in person – if the opposite party accepted their statement. By the time 
of the Gotovina hearing this rule had been amended to add reference to an expert statement 
‘and/or report’ and that the opposing party had to indicate in advance if it challenged the 
qualifications of the witness or the relevance of all or parts of their statement and/or report.24 
 
Expert witnesses played a significant role in the Galić trial and are explicitly referred to in the 
Galić Trial Judgement. In the procedural history at the end of the Galić Trial Judgement, the 
judges have a specific section on Expert Witnesses. They set out that 16 expert witness 
statements were submitted by the parties of which 15 were admitted. They also set out that 
the parties in most cases challenged the qualification of the witness to act as an expert witness 
and all expert witnesses were cross-examined, that is none of their reports were accepted 
without challenge.25 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges heard evidence from 14 expert witnesses.26 In the Gotovina Trial 
Judgement, the judges explicitly set out their approach to the appraisal and use of expert 
evidence.27 Based on this the judges in the Gotovina Trial Judgement appear to have gone a 
                                                          
21 Original RPE of 11 February 1994, Rule 90(C). 
22 Rule 94 bis Testimony of Expert Witnesses adopted on 10 July 1998 in RPE Rev.13. 
23 See Blaškić Trial Transcript, 19 January 1998, page 5643. 
24 RPE Rev.41 of 28 February 2008. 
25 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 792-794. 
26 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 23. 
27 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraphs 35 and 36: 
 
35. In assessing and weighing the testimony of expert witnesses, the Trial Chamber considered 
factors such as the professional competence of the expert, the material at his disposal, the 
methodologies used, the credibility of the findings made in light of these factors and other 
evidence, the position or positions held by the expert, and the limits of the expertise of each 
witness.  
 
36. On one occasion, the Trial Chamber was seised of a Gotovina Defence motion requesting it 
to issue an order precluding the Prosecution from introducing testimony through proposed 




step further than the judges in the other cases examined here, explicitly stating that hearing 
what a particular expert considered to be a legitimate military objective 'may' help in their 
own decision making.28 They also found, however, that they were not assisted by 'purely legal 
matters' in an expert's report.29 This issue of ‘legal matters’ in expert reports was raised in 
Gotovina in particular in relation to the Expert Witness Corn who was of a different nature to 
other experts in these cases; he was a military lawyer and legal scholar, rather than purely a 
military expert. His contribution and the judges’ use of it will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter (Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent)). 
 
 
The witnesses presenting evidence relating to firing of artillery 
 
The witness evidence relied upon by the judges in relation to charges relating to the law on 
targeting ranged from victim witness evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the attack 
and their experience of it to expert testimony regarding the trajectory of artillery projectiles. 
The use of artillery here refers to any bombs or shells fired from mortars, guns, howitzers or 
rockets. 
 
As set out in the Method section of Chapter 1 (Introduction), the testimony for investigation 
was selected based on the judges’ reliance on it in relation to targeting matters. Not all 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Storm were legitimate military targets. The Trial Chamber held that it is not bound by the 
conclusions of the expert. However, the opinion of the expert as to whether, and why, he 
considers a target to be a legitimate military objective, although ultimately to be determined by 
the Trial Chamber, may assist it in making decisions in relation to the criminal liability of the 
accused. In a decision regarding a Defence expert witness, the Trial Chamber held that parts of 
an expert report that dealt with purely legal matters are of no assistance to the Trial Chamber. 
However, the Trial Chamber found that other parts of the report would assist it in 
understanding matters at the intersection between the laws of war and technical aspects of the 
conduct of military operations. Although fully aware of where to draw the lines between these 
matters, the Trial Chamber admitted the expert report into evidence in its entirety, declining to 
attempt to disentangle and only admit the relevant parts of the report. On another occasion, 
the Trial Chamber held that there is no obligation under the Rules for the Defence to disclose to 
the Prosecution any information it provided to the expert, any communications between the 
expert and the Defence, or any draft reports circulated between the expert and the Defence. It 
further ruled that such matters could be explored with the expert in cross-examination, but 
also stated that the sources and methodology used for an expert report must be clearly 
indicated and accessible, so as to give the parties and the Trial Chamber the possibility to test 
or challenge the factual basis and the methodology relied upon, in order to assess the 
probative value of the report.  
 
28 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 36. 




possible testimony could, however, be included due to time constraints. Witnesses relied on in 
relation to certain events were, therefore, selected as being representative and comparable 
across the cases. In the case of Blaškić this meant those witnesses testifying in relation to the 
attacks on Ahmići, Vitez and Stari Vitez and Zenica. In Galić it meant those testifying in relation 
to the First, Second and Fifth Scheduled Shelling incidents (the shelling of a football match 
being played in Dobrinja on 1 June 1993, of those queuing for water at a well in Dobrinja on 12 
July 1993 and of Markale Market on 5 February 1994 respectively) and the shelling of Koševo 
Hospital throughout the indictment period. In Gotovina it was those testifying in relation to 
the shelling of Knin. Witnesses were also selected if they were relied on in relation to the 
establishment of the responsibility of the accused in general, separately from any particular 
incident. 
 
Within NVivo cases were created for each witness so selected and certain attributes of that 
witness were recorded. These attributes were selected based on themes that had been 
considered before analysis started and that arose during analysis; namely whether the witness 
was a soldier or civilian or had previous military experience, whether they were from the 
Former Yugoslavia or not, who they were testifying for and whether they were an expert 
witness.  
 
As mentioned in the Method section of Chapter 1 (Introduction), 148 witness cases have been 
created and each case has been provided with attributes to identify whether they were a 
soldier or civilian at the time of the incidents they described (and within this whether they 
were from the Former Yugoslavia or not), whether if they were not a soldier at that time they 
had previous military experience, who they were giving evidence for, in which case and 
whether they were an expert witness. Being from the Former Yugoslavia is a reference to 
being from any of the states that constituted the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, 
although the witnesses forming part of this research tended to be from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia. 
 
The witnesses referred to in the judgments in relation to the First, Second and Fifth Scheduled 
Shelling incidents in the case of Galić (the shelling of the football match, water queue and 
Markale Market) and the shelling of Knin in the case of Gotovina were also selected for further 
analysis and their case details reflected that they had testified in relation to these events. This 




Role of civilian or military status of the witnesses 
 
The witnesses giving evidence in relation to the ‘targeting’ charges varied enormously in their 
backgrounds and experiences. At the outset of this research I assumed that since witnesses 
with military experience would have more familiarity with questions of targeting they would 
(together with the experts) provide the majority of and the most technically useful evidence in 
relation to the relevant charges.  
 
What quickly became apparent, however, was that those subjected to the effects of targeting 
were particularly knowledgeable, if not in a technical sense, in a sense of extensive experience 
of the situation that could be relied on. To demonstrate the role that civilian witnesses, more 
likely to be victim-witnesses, had in proving charges of unlawful targeting, each witness 
selected for in depth analysis was given a case within NVivo and allocated to one of the 
following categories: 
 
• Former Yugoslav State Civilian 
Those witnesses who were civilian nationals of any of the Former Yugoslav states. 
 
• International Civilian 
Those witnesses who were civilian nationals of any state outside the Former 
Yugoslavia. This included those brought in by international organisations in the role of 
a civilian police force. 
 
• Former Yugoslav State Civilian Defence/Protection 
Those witnesses who stated they were members of a civilian defence or protection 
unit based in any of the Former Yugoslav states. There was not always a clear line as to 
whether these units in fact carried out military activities, but the testimony of the 
witnesses was used to assess if they did in fact fall on the civilian side of the line. 
 
• Former Yugoslav State or non-state Military 
Those witnesses who were members of any military organisation based in any of the 






• International Military 
Those witnesses who were members of any military organisation originating outside 
the Former Yugoslav states. These were usually members of the armed forces of other 
countries working under the banner of the various UN or NATO forces in the Former 
Yugoslav states. 
 
The charts in this section aim to demonstrate the scope of the witnesses (who all provided 
testimony in relation to targeting matters) and their evidence investigated by this study. It tries 
to give a sense of the type of evidence provided by these witnesses and the scale of the data 
analysed. This is done in the following charts: 
 
Bar Chart 1 –  Background (military or civilian status) of selected witnesses testifying in relation 
to targeting matters 
Bar Chart 2 – Background (military or civilian status) of selected witnesses testifying in relation 
to targeting matters divided by case 
Bar Chart 3 – Evidence provided by witnesses as to civilian status of victims 
Bar Chart 4 – Evidence provided by witnesses as to targeting of civilians 










Bar Chart 1 – Background (military or civilian status) of selected witnesses  





Chart 1 sets out the military or civilian status of all the witnesses who were selected for 
analysis in this study. It gives an idea, on a very general basis, of the witnesses relied on by the 
judges in relation to targeting matters. It is not, however, an empirical indication of greater 
reliance on one type of witness than another. 
 
Some points to note about this chart are as follows: 
 
• The witnesses were selected on the basis that the judges had explicitly relied on their 
evidence in relation to targeting matters in selected sections of the judgements. It is 
possible that not all witnesses that were relied on were specifically mentioned by the 
judges. The selection process, although attempting to be thorough for the incidents 
selected did not cover all of the possible incidents/witnesses (due to time constraints) 
and is subjective as to what constituted ‘relevant to targeting’ and the relevance of 
each witness.  
 
• It should also be noted that the line between the former Yugoslav state military and 
















































identification as military or non-military at the time of the events in question was used 
as the identifier in cases of any doubt.  
 
• Although all the witnesses provided evidence in relation to matters relating to 
targeting, there is a wide range of activity that this covered, from evidence relating to 
the door-to-door massacre in Ahmići to the use of artillery around Sarajevo. 
 
Despite these caveats, creating these distinctions between the witnesses permitted more 




Bar Chart 2 – Background (military or civilian status) of selected witnesses 





This chart contains the same information as Chart 1, however, it breaks down the military or 
civilian status of the witnesses by case to demonstrate the differences/similarities between the 
cases of those relied on by the judges in relation to targeting matters. 
 
The same caveats apply for this chart as for Chart 1. It is not a comprehensive list of relevant 



























































It is interesting to note the increase in the number of international civilians relied on as 
witnesses in the case of Gotovina. This, combined with the relatively low number of former 
Yugoslav state civilians in particular, has the effect that the international contingent forms well 
over half of the witnesses in Gotovina whereas the proportion is in the opposite direction in 
the cases of Galić and Blaškić. This is the case even though the number of witnesses included 
from the international military is relatively constant across the cases. 
 
 




This chart demonstrates the sources of the evidence regarding the civilian status or otherwise 
of those who were harmed or potentially targeted in the incidents under consideration in this 
study. It shows the number of coding references manually coded for a mention or description 
of civilian status of those affected or targeted by an attack(s) broken down by military/civilian 
status of the witness source.  
 
These coding references cover a range of matters relevant to establishing whether civilians 
were targeted as such. A civilian being killed or injured was not itself proof that they had been 
targeted as such, but the status of the victims killed or otherwise harmed and the areas 



























































behind the shots fired.30 The coding references included here vary from a simple answer to a 
question as to whether the people killed and injured were civilian or military or a description 
of the buildings and areas in a town subjected to artillery fire to the nature of a civilian 
protection organisation.31  
 
 




This chart shows the number of manually coded references that mentioned targeting of 
civilians broken down by military experience or otherwise of those referring to the direct 
targeting as well as the case in which they were testifying. These coding references can be 
distinguished from those of ‘civilian status’ by the fact that they were not simply evidence of 
who was killed or injured, or what was in fact civilian or military, but of an intention to harm 
civilians. This includes testimony of seeing the mortars fired to opinions of the overall 
objectives of military campaigns.32 
 
The chart demonstrates, by way of introduction to one of the themes that will be explored 
further in Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent), that it was on the whole those with 
                                                          
30 See Chapter 3’s section on Distinction for a detailed description of this principle. 
31 Galić Trial Transcript, 22 March 2002, page 6016, Gotovina Trial Transcript, 14 May 2008, pages 2784-
2790 and Gotovina Trial Transcript, 27 May 2008, page 3695. 







































































military experience testified extensively as to the direct targeting of civilians. The terms picked 
up in the manual coding exercise which looked for specific mentions of civilians being targeted 
has not, however, picked up the extent to which the overall testimony showed civilians also 
demonstrating that they and other civilians were being targeted. Despite this, it has 
highlighted that it was in the case of Galić that there was the most input from civilians in this 








One theme that emerged from coding the data was the role of the accused outside the purely 
military sphere, put here under the heading ‘political role’. This is not so much to describe that 
the military men were also politicians, but their relationship to the broader ambitions of the 
political leaders of their communities, usually the desire for territorial gain by taking control 
from the ‘others’, which led to much of the criminal behaviour in the war (much of it carried 
out by military or paramilitary groups).  
 
This subject was mainly coded within the judgments, however, it also was evident from the 
trial transcripts themselves. This chart shows the number of coding references manually coded 
in the trial transcripts to the political role of the accused again broken down by military/civilian 






























































relationship of General Gotovina to a government minister close to the president of Croatia to 
evidence of the use in Galić’s orders of derogatory terms for the opposition.33 One of these 
references that was important to the judges in the Galić case was that of Patrick Henneberry, 
Senior UNMO and later UNPROFOR commander of the North LIMA side of Sarajevo from July 
1992 to February 1993 who testified that Galić subscribed to the ultimate goal ‘to either 
destroy the city or rid it of Muslims’.34  
 
The judges’ views on the generals’ agreement with, or enabling of, the broader political project 
seems to have played a role in their assessment of the intentions behind their direction to 
their subordinates on the use of artillery. How this evidence was translated into the judgments 
is considered in Chapter 6 (Responsibility).  
 
 
Description of civilian or military background of witnesses relied on for specific incidents 
 
The following pie charts give an indication of the different military or civilian status of the 
witnesses relied on in relation to three shelling incidents considered in detail in this thesis, the 
First Scheduled Shelling Incident (Football Match), Second Scheduled Shelling Incident (Water 
Queue) and Fifth Scheduled Shelling Incident (Markale Market). These can be contrasted with 
the chart for the witnesses who were relied on in relation to Knin (which has included all those 
relied on in both the factual/evidence and legal findings sections as representing a more 
accurate comparison with the witnesses compiled for the incidents in Sarajevo where there 
was no such distinction drawn). 
 
These charts were created by utilising the witness cases created in NVivo which already 
categorised the witnesses by their civilian or military status. Categories were added to the case 
descriptions to add whether the witness was relied on in relation to any of these incidents. The 
data which listed the witness, which incident(s) they had testified in relation to and their 
civilian or military status, was exported to Excel where these charts were produced from a 
simplification of the data into number of witnesses in each civilian/military category per 
incident. The charts are intended to be descriptive of the witnesses giving testimony regarding 
                                                          
33 Gotovina Trial Transcript, 19 November 2009, page 24844-24845 and Galić Trial Transcript, 31 January 
2003, page 18785. 




the incidents which were selected as being important in the decisions the judges made as to 
matters of targeting, not part of a quantitative analysis of the data. 
 
 








Former Yugoslav civilian defence or protection Former Yugoslav state civilian
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Pie Chart 3: Percentage of each type of witness for Galić Fifth Scheduled Shelling Incident 
 
 
Pie Chart 4: Percentage of each type of witness for factual and legal findings in relation to Knin 
 
 
There are clearly a higher percentage of civilian witnesses – and lower proportion of 
international military witnesses – relied on in relation to the Galić scheduled incidents than in 
relation to the shelling of Knin. In relation to Knin it is the international military who form the 
majority of the witnesses. These charts demonstrate that there was a larger role given to 
civilian witnesses in the Galić case and support the findings that will be set out in the next 
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chapter (Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent)) of an important role for the evidence 
of the civilian witnesses in this case. 
 
 
The judges and the witnesses 
 
In all three cases under consideration for this study there were many witnesses called to give 
evidence over years' worth of testimony. Trying to keep the trials to schedule was a major 
challenge in itself for all those involved and perhaps where the judges had their most obvious 
managerial role, having, for example, to keep track of the time spent on examination and 
cross-examination of each witness.  
 
The mandate of the ICTY and even just human nature and sympathy led to the victim 
witnesses being given a chance to tell their stories more fully than perhaps was completely 
relevant to the trial of the accused, although that was not always the case.35 As former ICTY 
judge, Patricia Wald puts it: 
 
‘The witness testimony in its graphic and heartrending detail is quite often riveting, 
and the judges want to hear it, especially when the rules do not prohibit it.’36 
 
Something that the Nuremberg IMT and the ICTY have in common is the judges’ reactions to 
individual testimony. Judge Wald’s comment above is in the same vein as Smith’s description 
that after the initial weeks of document heavy evidence, ‘only living witnesses could break 
through the haze and bring the courtroom back to life’37 and of the judges’ ‘strong emotional 
response’ to the accounts of atrocities from the few victims called as witnesses.38  
 
Some of the judges at the ICTY have, however, been harshly criticised for the mode of their 
interactions with victim witnesses in the courtroom. No matter how well intentioned they 
were, some of the judges’ comments were simply insensitive, ‘patronizing and unhelpful’.39  
 
Judge Orie adopted a standard parting statement which appears in line with Dembour and 
Haslam’s suggestion that judges should ‘keep to their formal role’ and ‘keep their concluding 
                                                          
35 Dembour and Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 158.  
36 Wald, ‘Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 233. 
37 Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977), 88. 
38 Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, 89. 




remarks short’.40 Even he, however, was at times drawn into exchanges that clearly went 
beyond anything he was comfortable with. One example was at the end of the testimony of 
Ismet Fažlić who was injured by a shell in Sarajevo where, as Judge Orie finished his standard 
parting words, the witness asked if he could ‘say something’: 
 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, I'm a man who worked for 30 years honestly. I 
had everything.  I was wounded, and I'm 70 per cent disabled. My wife was wounded 
100 per cent, and my son 100 per cent. Three, three of us.  And I'm in a wheelchair.  
Up to you to judge. 
JUDGE ORIE:  Of course, we noticed that you and your family are bearing 
consequences of the events at that time, and I think this Bench is fully aware. 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not to blame.  I'm not guilty.  I didn't ask for the war.  I 
didn't ask for the war.  I didn't conduct the war.  I didn't want it, nor did my family.  I 
did an honest man's work, and I reached a point when I can't move around.  Now why?  
Why?  I'm not insulting anyone, because on the other side, there were similar 
incidents. I do apologise for saying this. 
JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Fazlic, you expressed to us that as an honest man, you nevertheless 
became a victim of a war. 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have all the documents, if you need them. 
JUDGE ORIE:  We don't need your documents, but don't think that this Court is not 
aware of what wars can create -- 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you all, and I had a lot of trouble to come here.  
Sarajevo, The Hague, you can imagine the transportation and everything, how hard it 
was for me, being an invalid. 
JUDGE ORIE:  Especially in your circumstances, I thank you once again very much for 
coming, and I wish you a safe trip home again.  Thank you very much. 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.  Thank you for working so well to 
punish those who are to blame. Thank you.41 
 
The relationship between the judges and the witnesses can be seen as seeming particularly 
harsh when the judges intervene to keep the witness to answering the particular question 
asked, or in keeping their answers short due to the time limits imposed by the court itself, but 
it is in the relationships between those in the courtroom, mediated by the judge, where some 
of the motivations and, potentially, humanity, of those involved in the proceedings becomes 
most apparent from the transcribed record. The testimony of Ezrema Boskailo, for example, 
stands out for the effect it clearly had on many of those in the courtroom that day.  
 
Ms Boskailo testified as to her experience of being injured in the Markale Market shelling 
incident, while she was four months pregnant and with another of her children in the 
marketplace at the time. The prosecution lawyer made a point of getting Ms Boskailo to state 
to the court why she had come to testify: 
                                                          
40 Dembour and Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 173, 175. 





Q. Now, you felt compelled to come here to testify.  Can you just tell us briefly why 
you have come. 
A. I wouldn't be able to sleep otherwise.  I have a moral obligation towards all the 
casualties whose bodies perhaps protected me and my unborn baby.  And I often think 
of that.  I wake up at night. 
Q. And those casualties were the persons who stood between where you were and 
where the shell exploded? 
A. Yes.  Yes. 
 
The interpreters, on being asked to stay on late replied: 
 
 We shall do it for the witness, Your Honour. 
 
The first question the defence lawyer asked the witness (perhaps to clarify the extent of harm 
that was being defended or perhaps because someone was concerned) was 
 
if there were any consequences of the injury and the incident on your third child. 
 
Judge Orie gave a longer than usual parting statement: 
 
JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Boskailo, this concludes your testimony in this Court. I think you'll 
now better understand why we tried to conclude it today and not let you wait for a 
couple of days and then return for just the last half hour. Because we are all aware 
that it's quite something for you. You explained to us why you came, and we do not 
underestimate what it means for witnesses to come from such a distance to tell this 
Court and to answer to the questions of the parties about those events that happened 
meanwhile many years ago, because it's important for this Court to hear from those 
who were present during these days, to hear what they have got to tell us answering 
the questions of both parties. 
 
Therefore, I'd like to thank you very much, since it is important for the decisions we'll 
have to take. So I thank you very much, and I hope you have a safe trip home. And I, of 
course, hope that they will be able to arrange for your return to your family as soon as 
possible. Thank you very much for coming.42 
 
                                                          
42 Galić Trial Transcript, 7 March 2002, pages 5055, 5057-5058, 5068-5069. 
Judge Orie’s standard parting was: 
…you have answered all the questions put to you by both the Prosecution and the Defence and 
the additional questions of the Chamber. It is very important for this Chamber to hear the 
testimony of those who have been present during the relevant times at relevant places. It will 
assist us in performing our task.  Since we also know that it is quite a journey for you to come 
from Sarajevo to The Hague, we would like to thank you very much for coming and I hope you 
have a safe journey home again. 




The presiding judge, managing the work of the courtroom over several years, was called on to 
perform perhaps an impossible balancing act of their expected formal legal role and their own 
understanding of and compassion for the victim-witnesses. The traditional role of the presiding 
judge in ensuring a fair trial requires the appearance of impartiality – as well as impartiality 
itself – between the defence and prosecution; to give no sense of grievance to the 
prosecution, defendants or their representatives. This includes that the judges show a legal, 
rather than human, response.  
 
Whatever criticisms are levelled against criminal trials for failing victims in the process, the 
judges at the ICTY were bound within a system that was only starting to consider how the 
voices of victims could best be represented, yet alone the victims compensated, when it was 
created.43 Hearing the relevant testimony of the witnesses in a fair environment and giving it 
due weight in their judicial consideration was the technical limit of their role. Faced with the 
extremes of human nature and appeals to their own, Dembour and Haslam perhaps give the 
best description of the situation the judges are in when they say ‘[w]hatever it is, the hearing 
of victim-witnesses is not an objective operation.’44 There are too many subjective factors and 





This chapter has introduced the witnesses and some of the evidence they presented to the 
judges as it relates to matters of targeting. It is this evidence from the witnesses which formed, 
alongside the judgments themselves, the primary material for this study.  
 
This chapter has set out the procedural rules applying to the presentation of evidence through 
witness testimony. These rules set out the categories of witnesses of fact and expert 
witnesses. Between the three judgements under review there were developments in the RPE 
which included a move away from a preference for full testimonies to a greater use of witness 
statements. There was also clearly some development in the use of expert witnesses as the 
RPE changed as to the mechanics of their contribution and, particularly in relation to questions 
                                                          
43 See, for example, former ICTY and now ICC Judge, Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before 
International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 44, No.s 1 and 2 (2011): 476-477. 




of targeting, the judges became accustomed to utilising their expertise. In addition, although 
from a procedural and evidential viewpoint there was a technical distinction between 
witnesses of fact and expert witnesses, some of the military witnesses presented as witnesses 
of fact provided an expert appraisal based on their military experience; the judges willingly 
listened to such experience.  
 
A further distinction was made for the purposes of this research between those with a military 
background and those without in order to compare the evidence given by each. Contrary to 
initial expectations it was evident that witnesses in both military and civilian groups gave 
evidence in relation to themes relevant to assessing questions of targeting; this included 
evidence of the civilian status of the victims, evidence that civilians had been targeted and 
even the connection of the accused to the broader political projects behind the conflicts. 
 
In setting out the background of the witnesses the judges explicitly referred to in their 
judgments in relation to four different incidents arising from the cases of Galić and Gotovina it 
can be seen that there was a significant role for the evidence provided by civilians. In the case 
of Galić these were usually victim-witnesses, or at the least those who had lived through the 
conflict in Sarajevo. The next chapter, Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent) considers 
the type of evidence these witnesses provided and argue that it was an important factor in 
their determinations in a way that Dembour and Haslam did not find; this is possibly because 
the facts regarding the shelling of Sarajevo were more contested than those in relation to the 
Srebrenica genocide and the witnesses’ extensive experience could assist the judges in their 
evidential decision making endeavours.    
 
This study has also considered whether within this framework, the judges and courtroom as a 
whole can be sensitive to the witnesses, often themselves victims, who appear before them. 
This does not always translate into the judges actually being able to help the witnesses but in 
their very inability to do so, while clearly wanting to, their ‘humanity’ is highlighted and may 
demonstrate where this humanity is likely to be translated into their judgements.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent)) considers the evidential 
problems facing the judges in their implementation of the law of targeting; in their work 
assessing the lawful or unlawful nature of the attacks presented to them for their 




evidence was used by the judges. It also compares the situations in Sarajevo and Knin 
considered in the judgments of Galić and Gotovina. In doing this it considers the role of the 
principle of humanity and other potential factors acting on the judges in carrying out the 
evidential assessments necessary to demarcate the line between unlawful and lawful conduct 










As with any criminal charge, whether or not crimes of ‘unlawful targeting’ were committed by 
the accused came down to an evidential assessment of what in fact had happened. In each 
case of determining whether or not an unlawful attack had taken place, the intended object of 
attack had to be established and this was not something that could simply be presumed from 
the locations on which the shots had landed.  
 
The second element of the research question asked how the judges approached and decided 
on matters of evidence relevant to the law of targeting before them and what influences there 
were on how the judges did this, as well as whether the principle of humanity had a role here. 
Research into the judgments and trial transcripts of Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina to find 
evidence of how the judges carried out their evidential assessments, and what influenced 
them in doing so, forms the basis of this chapter.  
 
This chapter contains the most significant analysis of information from the transcripts of the 
witnesses described in Chapter 4 (Evidence I: The Witnesses). Questions of the role of the 
principle of humanity and its relationship to the military viewpoint come to the forefront in 
considering how the judges arrived at their findings of fact based on such testimonies of those 
who experienced or were victims of artillery fire, whether they were civilian or not. 
 
This chapter aims to demonstrate that in their work on assessing the evidence of the 
commission of crimes, the judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint. This chapter also 
argues that within the judgments and trial transcripts a picture emerges of the importance of 
the evidence provided by civilian (including victim) witnesses.  
 
Establishing the details of the applicable law in the cases before the ICTY may have been 
difficult and, in some cases, controversial. This process would, however, at its core have been 
something that the judges were familiar with. Establishing what the evidence they were 
provided with meant in applying this law to how weapons had been fired was, for most of the 





Given the nature of the crimes, it was not the accused pulling the trigger of any of the 
weapons used. This chapter considers how the judges assessed the evidence before them to 
find that crimes breaching the law of targeting had been committed by those under the 
command of the accused.  
 
The standard to which the OTP had to prove their case was that they had to convince a 
majority of the judges in a Trial Chamber of the guilt of the accused ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.1 Despite (or perhaps because of) relaxed rules relating to the admission of evidence in 
comparison to some national jurisdictions, there was a lot of debate around this area within 
the hearings. The Blaškić Trial Judges point out in their judgment that ‘the discussions between 
the parties as to how evidence was to be administered were generally animated and 
acrimonious’.2  
 
The Galić Trial Judges included a section on ‘Evaluation of Evidence’ in which they state that 
‘mindful that the burden of proof lies with the Prosecution, has evaluated the evidence 
adduced at trial in accordance with the Statute, the Rules, and accepted international 
standards and general principles of law’.3 In setting out how they assessed the evidence, the 
Gotovina Trial Judges stated that they did so in line with ‘the Statute, the Rules, and the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal’ but where these sources did not provide the answers they 
‘decided matters of evidence in such a way as would best favour a fair determination of the 
case in consonance with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law’.4 The Galić 
Trial Judges do not provide any further detail on what ‘accepted international standards’ 
would be, if any different from ‘general principles of law’. 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges included a specific paragraph on the ‘Standard of Proof’ which 
included that 
 
…. each and every element of the offences charged against an accused must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden remains with the Prosecution throughout the 
trial. An accused must be acquitted if there is any reasonable explanation of the 
evidence other than the guilt of the accused.5  
                                                          
1 Rule 87(A) RPE. 
2 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 36. 
3 Galić Trial Judgement at paragraph 185. 
4 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraph 30. 





This chapter starts by considering the nature of the evidence that was presented to the judges 
in relation to targeting related matters before going on to consider the judges’ approach to 
this evidence. It then considers the different forms of witness evidence (expert, military and 
civilian) in some detail before concluding with a comparison between the approaches adopted 
to the charges relating to Sarajevo and Knin.  
 
 
The problem of proving intention/effects-based assessments of targeting intentions 
 
The specific focus of this research is on the act of targeting. From the view of considering the 
evidence this means looking at how it was established whether the guns, howitzers, rockets or 
mortars used in the conflict were intentionally used to direct fire at civilians or civilian 
populations or to fire indiscriminately. It is important to acknowledge that proving that 
civilians were killed or injured does not demonstrate by itself that they were being targeted or 
that weapons were being used indiscriminately. The judges had to use the proven facts to 
establish the intention of those firing the shot. This chapter seeks to demonstrate and evaluate 
how this intention was established by the judges from the evidence before them. 
 
It is the knowledge and intention of those firing the shot in question which is key to whether or 
not a crime has been committed. The person (or crew) firing the gun, howitzer, rocket or 
mortar has (have) to ‘wilfully’ direct their attack against a civilian population or individual 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities for this act to be criminal.6 A mistake or negligence 
in firing, even if civilians have been killed or injured, is not a criminal act. 
 
The problem in the cases regarding targeting presented to the judges at the ICTY was that 
what the particular weapons had been fired at and why was the very heart of the case but 
where there was also very little evidence (what evidence there was will be described in this 
chapter). In some of the instances that the judges looked at it was at least clear as to whose 
troops had been firing the artillery and other weapons. In others, it was not. Even when the 
judges knew who fired the shot, however, the question of the intention behind each shot in 
question remained.  
 
                                                          




How does a prosecution go about proving that a soldier firing a shot did so intending it to hit a 
civilian population or individual civilian? Very little, if anything, was known about those who 
physically fired any of the shots in question and therefore their potential motivations as 
individuals for doing so. There was not a written order from any of the accused clearly telling 
their subordinates to attack civilians presented in evidence. The nearest they got to this was an 
ambiguous order from Gotovina (discussed in detail in the next chapter (Responsibility)). There 
were no complete records of shots fired against the targets they were firing at presented in 
evidence.  
 
In sum, in the absence of direct evidence of intention, what did the judges find did prove that 
there had been an intentional attack against civilians? To answer this, and establish what 
influences may have been apparent, an analysis of the trial judgments and witness testimony 
of certain of those witnesses referred to in the trial judgments was carried out with the 
following questions in mind: 
 
• How did the judges establish what was targeted and by who?  
• In particular, how did the judges establish an intention to target a particular 
location/population/civilian?  
• What evidence was available and what was relied on/of most use to the 
judges?  
• What were the problems the judges had to overcome in establishing facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt in evidential situations grounded in conflict?  
• What experience of the witnesses seemed to be of most value?  
• Did military or expert evidence have a particular impact? 
 
The overall problem facing the judges could be described as how did they overcome an ‘effects 
based assessment’ of the legality of a particular action whose illegality depends on the 
intention of those who fired it as they did so; that very particularly provides that it is not the 
actual result that counts? This chapter examines the evidence provided by those with relevant 




Approach to targeting evidence 
 
This section sets out the general approaches taken by the judges to the evidence in each of the 







The judges considered what had happened during the hostilities in the Lašva Valley at the level 
of each village as well as looking at the broader picture of the conflict in each municipality. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3 (Law), there is no discussion or explanation 
of how the charges of unlawful attacks against civilians as a war crime were considered in 
relation to the unlawful attack elements of the persecution charge.  
 
As is perhaps apparent from their contents headings for sections B., C. and D. referring 
repeatedly in some way to an ‘attack’ and then the civilian and Muslim nature of those 
attacked, the judges seem to have considered the lawfulness of an attack within the 
framework of the persecution charge. As William Fenrick puts it, ‘the unlawful attacks appear 
to have been regarded, essentially, as a component of persecution’.7 With this in mind, 
however, the judges were also seemingly assessing whether the attacks could be justified as 
being in accordance with the laws of war, and part of this was looking at the overall picture of 
the conflict and attacks, seeing patterns of unlawful and unjustifiable behaviour.  
 
The reliance on the pattern of attack, that is recurring details in each of the separate attacks, is 
explicitly set out in relation to the villages in the municipality of Kiseljak under the heading 
‘The systematic and massive nature of the April and June 1993 attacks’.8 The judges come to 
similar conclusions as to Blaškić’s responsibility based on the scale and manner of the 
atrocities (even, in the case of Busovača, in the absence of any physical evidence of orders 
from Blaškić)9 in relation to attacks carried out in the municipalities of Busovača and Kiseljak.10 
In relation to Busovača they held: 
 
…the Trial Chamber is convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that it followed from the 
scale of the atrocities carried out, from the scale of the assets used to achieve them 
and especially from the fact that the attacks were carried out at the same time and in 
the same way on the municipalities of Busovača, Vitez (particularly the villages of 
Ahmići, Nadioci, Pirići and Šantići) and Kiseljak (particularly the villages of Behrići, 
Gomionica, Gromiljak, Polje Višnjica, Rotilj and Višnjica) that General Blaškić had 
ordered the offensives against Loncari and Ocehnici.11 
                                                          
7 William J. Fenrick, ‘Commentary: A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: 
Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor V. Tihomir Blaškic’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 13, no. 04 (2000): 946 
8 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 624 onwards.  
9 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 589. 
10 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 588-591 (Busovača) and 659 (Kiseljak). 




In relation to Kiseljak they held that: 
 
…the indubitable conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which the offensives 
progressed and the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated is 
that the military operations of April and June 1993 were ordered at the highest level of 
the HVO military command by the Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander - 
General Blaškić. In this regard, the Trial Chamber will recall three striking points 
already brought out:  
 
- the offensives conducted in April in the municipality of Vitez and to the north 
of Kiseljak and in June to the south of Kiseljak all evolved along similar lines;  
- the attacks on Kiseljak were on each occasion led mostly by HVO troops, and 
more precisely by the Ban Jelašić Brigade whose commander received orders 
directly from the accused.  
- and finally, the offensives all produced the same result: the systematic 
expulsion of Muslim civilian inhabitants from their villages and, in most cases, 
the destruction of their dwellings and the plunder of their property.12 
 
The methods and patterns of the attacks are clearly important evidence to the judges. It is 
possible that this is an application of Rule 93 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence that 
evidence of a ‘consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law’ may be admitted in the interests of justice, although the rule itself is not 
mentioned in the Blaškić Trial Judgement.13 The only mention of the ‘consistent pattern of 
conduct’ in the Blaškić case occurs in the Appeal Judgement where it states: 
 
521. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber drew a second inference: 
it inferred from the scale of atrocities, the scale of assets, and the manner in which the 
attacks and crimes were carried out, that the Appellant ordered the offensives in 
Loncari and Ocehnici. It seems that the Trial Chamber had viewed these aspects as 
evincing a consistent pattern of conduct signifying the Appellant’s responsibility. 
However, the Appeals Chamber considers that general assertions such as the “scale of 
atrocities” and the “scale of assets” are too broad and sweeping to give rise to an 
inference that the Appellant ordered the attacks in Loncari and Ocehnici. 
 
The Appeals Chamber did not disagree with the possibility of making an inference from a 
consistent pattern of conduct, but they did not agree that there was sufficient evidence to do 
so in this case. The indirect nature of the evidence as to the intentions of those carrying out 
the attacks, such as that referred to by the Appeals Chamber, leads to room for interpretation 
and disagreement as to the correct inference to be made. It also provides room for those with 
expertise to guide the judges’ decision making as will be considered later in this chapter. 
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The use of a ‘pattern of attack’ in the broad sense is also a feature of the Galić case. Compared 
to the unlawful attack case against Gotovina, where shelling over two days was in question, 
the case against Galić used evidence of the patterns of shelling of Sarajevo over the course of 
nearly two years. The phrase is not used in the body of the Galić Trial Judgement itself, 
however, in the Galić Appeal Judgement the Appeals Chamber noted that  
 
The Trial Chamber [Galić Trial Decision on Indictment Schedules, para. 23.] proposed 
that evidence regarding additional, unscheduled incidents could be introduced at trial 
pursuant to Rule 93 of the Rules in order to prove a consistent pattern of conduct 
relevant to the charges in the Indictment, including a campaign.631 Use of this type of 
evidence has been endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in other cases.632 In sum, the 
Trial Chamber properly used evidence regarding unscheduled incidents and the 
general situation in Sarajevo to support conclusions on the existence of a pattern of 
conduct: the campaign of shelling and sniping attacks against civilians. 14 
 
The Galić Trial Chamber also specifically refer twice to a ‘pattern of conduct’ 
 
The overall evaluation of the evidence with regard to these two scheduled incidents 16 
and 17, and of other strikingly similar events, indicating a pattern of conduct in the 




‘The evidence shows that the SRK attacked civilians, men and women, children and 
elderly in particular while engaged in typical civilian activities or where expected to be 
found, in a similar pattern of conduct throughout the city of Sarajevo.’16 
 
The Galić judgment, at trial and appeal, shows the judges defining and applying the terms of 
the laws of war with more confidence and more fully than in previous judgements, probably 
because although they were charged alongside crimes against humanity, in this case it was the 
alleged war crime of the infliction of terror that was at the forefront, with no overarching 
persecution (as a crime against humanity) charge. The fact that these laws of war were at the 
forefront of the judges’ minds can be seen in the factors set out in paragraph 188 as to what 
they had considered in assessing whether civilians had been targeted. These factors were: 
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• distance between the victim and the most probable source of fire;  
• distance between the location where the victim was hit and the confrontation 
line;  
• combat activity going on at the time and the location of the incident, as well as 
relevant nearby presence of military activities or facilities;  
• appearance of the victim as to age, gender, clothing;  
• the activity the victim could appear to be engaged in; and 
• visibility of the victim due to weather, unobstructed line of sight or daylight. 
 
and the judges stated that these factors were used to see whether a scheduled incident was 
beyond reasonable doubt representative of the alleged campaign of sniping and shelling (as 
the shell or bullet was targeted at civilians); or 
 
• whether it is reasonable to believe that the victim was hit by ABiH, 
• by a stray bullet, or 
• taken for a combatant. 17 
 
As well as considering the possibility that civilians were harmed by forces other than those 
under Galić’s command, the judges were looking for the possibility of the deaths of civilians 
occurring through mistake – whether by a bullet simply going astray or a misidentification of a 
civilian as a combatant. From the factors they set out it appears the judges were also thinking 
about whether the civilians were in proximity to military objectives that could be legitimately 
targeted (albeit if in compliance with the principle of proportionality). It is not clear, however, 
where the judges got these factors set out in paragraph 188 from. There is no authority or 
reference given for these factors in paragraph 188. The judges also do not, at this point, make 
a reference to the distinction between mistake and recklessness; the latter would engender 
criminal responsibility whereas the former would not where bullets have gone astray or 
civilians been misidentified. 
 
The evidence presented in the judgement to show deliberate targeting of civilians shows the 
variety of testimony provided to the court. For example, from paragraph 212, the judgement 
presents the overview evidence that civilians were being targeted by the SRK. The court, for 
                                                          




example, cites two of Ashton’s examples of firefighters coming under fire.18 The first described 
firefighters responding to fires caused by shelling being fired upon in turn, where there was a 
clear pause and resumption in the shelling – what is described as an intentional double tap 
attack on the responders. The second is more ambiguous in what it tells, with the shelling not 
stopping when the fire department responded to a fire in a bakery compound – perhaps it is 
that the bakery compound was coming under fire that is the most relevant point here.  
 
In the next paragraph the judges refer to the targeting of ambulances and state that: 
 
They were sometimes driven at night, without flashing their lights, and not on main 
roads to avoid being fired upon. Witness AD, an SRK soldier, testified that the 
Commander of the Ilijaš Brigade gave orders to his mortar battery to target 
ambulances, a marketplace, funeral processions, and cemeteries further north from 
the city, in Mrakovo. 19 
 
The first part of this evidence is that the ambulance drivers knew they were targets as they 
had to avoid being shot at. The second is the evidence of an SRK soldier that orders were given 
to his mortar battery to fire at ambulances, among other unlawful targets. The judges then 
return to evidence from international observers of other civilian activities being targeted. 
 
It is strange that the evidence from Witness AD, directly stating that he was given orders to 
target ambulances, a marketplace, funeral processions and cemeteries, is almost hidden within 
less direct evidence of civilians being fired upon. This is first hand evidence that some SRK 
soldiers were ordered to fire at civilian targets. This leaves the link to be made from his 
commander giving these orders to these orders being passed down from Galić, but it is a 
necessary first step in showing that Galić gave such orders. There is real mixture of evidence 
cited here which perhaps demonstrates that the judges were willing to take into account the 
broad picture of the evidence in making their determinations as to what had happened as well 
as any demonstrable intention behind it. 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia dissented in relation to 8 out of 23 scheduled sniping incidents, 3 out of 5 
scheduled shelling incidents and certain unscheduled incidents (those in relation to Koševo 
Hospital).20 The shelling incidents he dissented on were: 
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• Scheduled Shelling incident 1 (the football match), where he did not agree that the 
prosecution had proven that projectiles were fired deliberately or indiscriminately at 
civilians. He could not discount the ‘significant ABiH presence’ in and immediately 
around the parking lot as the reason for it being shelled.21 
 
• Scheduled shelling incident 2 (the water queue of civilians in Dobrinja ‘C5’), where he 
did not agree that there was sufficient proof that the projectile in question ‘was 
deliberately fired from SRK-controlled territory with the intention of harming civilians’. 
There was again an ABiH military presence that he thought could have been the 
intended target.22 
 
• Scheduled shelling incident 5 (Markale market on 5 February 1994 was caused by a 
120 millimetre mortar shell), where he was not satisfied that the evidence sufficiently 
demonstrated that the mortar had been fired from SRK controlled territory or 
‘deliberately aimed at Markale market’.23 
 
In relation to Koševo Hospital he noted the evidence of ABiH military activity around the 
hospital and that it was possible that it was this military activity that had been the target of the 
incoming fire.24 
 
The key to his dissent was the standard of proof. He thought that in these cases there was 
sufficient room for reasonable doubt to prevent a finding of guilt. Reading his dissent can give 
the feeling that the majority did, at the least, discount the scale of the ABiH presence in 
Sarajevo and the lack of distance between possible military objectives and the civilians living in 
the city. He also highlights that ‘no witness appearing before the Trial Chamber saw those who 
fired the bullets or mortar shells responsible for the incidents discussed below and SRK soldiers 
repeatedly testified that they had not targeted civilians in ABiH-controlled territory 
deliberately’.25 
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With so little direct evidence such as that of Witness AD, the Galić Trial Judges had no choice 
but to consider a wide range of indirect evidence. The factors that the Galić Trial Judges were 
considering in relation to each incident showed an understanding of the complexity involved in 
establishing the intention behind a shot from its effects. The level of disagreement from Judge 
Nieto-Navia as to what the evidence has in fact proven beyond reasonable doubt, however, 
again demonstrates the difficulties with the indirect evidence that formed the bulk of the 
evidence presented as to the actual intentions behind the strikes that killed and injured 
civilians. There was again, as for in the case of Blaškić and as will be seen, Gotovina, room for 





The Gotovina Trial Judges set out in some detail how they had approached the evidence before 
them. They had perhaps some of the most relevant witnesses to the use of artillery by the 
accused’s forces including, in particular, Marko Rajčić, the chief of artillery of the Split MD at 
the relevant time, however, they also faced the difficulties inherent in this, including problems 
of potential self-incrimination. The trial judges in Gotovina set out specifically that they 
 
considered the individual circumstances of a witness, including his or her possible 
involvement in the events and fear of self-incrimination, the witness’s relationship 
with any of the Accused, and whether the witness would have an underlying motive 
which could affect the witness’s credibility and reliability.26 
 
What seems particularly striking between the Gotovina and Galić judgements is that the judges 
in Gotovina clearly set out the potential military objectives in Knin before going into details of 
the evidence as to where the artillery fire hit.27 This is in addition to considering Rajčić’s 
evidence as to what targets had been identified in advance.28 The approach in Galić is the 
complete opposite, quite possibly because of the approach of the OTP in selecting scheduled 
incidents for the Galić case as well as the big difference in the size and complexity of Knin and 
Sarajevo and duration of the events under consideration. It may also be influenced by the fact 
that the Trial Chamber in Gotovina had at least some artillery lists and operational diaries.29 A 
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detailed comparison of the judges’ findings in relation to the shelling of Knin and Sarajevo 
comprises the final section of this chapter. 
 
The trial judges in Gotovina did not set out a comparable set of factors to those in Galić in 
relation to the shelling charges although they did set out a very general approach to the 
assessment of the shelling during Operation Storm: 
 
The Trial Chamber has received and reviewed in chapter 4.4 above, evidence in 
relation to incidents of an alleged unlawful attack on civilian and civilian objects in 
Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Gračac, Knin, and Obrovac. In relation to each of these towns, 
the Trial Chamber has considered its findings on the HV’s orders and artillery reports, if 
any, and compared them with its findings on the locations of artillery impacts, with a 
view to establishing what the HV targeted when firing its artillery during Operation 
Storm. To the same end, the Trial Chamber has considered the amounts of shells fired, 
the types of artillery weaponry used, and the manner in which they were used during 
the attacks. The Trial Chamber has evaluated this evidence in light of the expert 
testimony provided by witnesses Konings and Corn, including with regard to the 
accuracy of artillery weapons and the effects of artillery fire.30 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges state at one point that they were ‘necessarily cautious in drawing 
conclusions with regard to specific incidents based on any general impression’.31 This may 
indicate a different approach to that taken in Galić where significant evidence giving the 
‘general impression’ was presented and discussed. The Gotovina Trial Judges also, under the 
heading ‘General Considerations’, set out in some detail the destructive capabilities, accuracy 
and varied potential uses of artillery, mortar and rocket systems weapons as described by the 
expert witnesses Corn and Konings and Andrew Leslie, a witness with significant military 
experience.32 The judges go on to summarise the expert evidence they received on the ‘effects 
of using artillery against specific objects in Knin, including with regard to the anticipated 
military advantage and risk of collateral damage and incidental injury’.33 Although the Galić 
Trial Judges had some evidence of this sort before them from the hearing, scattered through 
the testimony of the international military witnesses as well as their expert witnesses, they did 
not set it out in the judgement in the detail included in the Gotovina Trial Judgement. Within 
this section on general considerations, the Gotovina Trial Judges also set out the views of the 
expert witnesses on the interpretation of the orders before them.34 
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Some more detailed guidance as to what the judges in Gotovina were looking for is given in 
relation to the towns for which they found there to be insufficient evidence with regard to 
artillery projectiles to consider the charges in any detail. They stated: 
 
The evidence is insufficient for the Trial Chamber to determine the number of 
projectiles fired at these towns or, with only a few exceptions, to determine the times 
and locations of impacts of the projectiles. Moreover, the evidence insufficiently 
establishes whether there was an SVK presence in these towns or whether there were 
other objects offering a definite military advantage if fired at.35 
 
This at least points to the judges wanting to know: 
 
• The number of projectiles fired, times and locations of impacts 
• Was there a military presence or other military objectives? 
• Was firing at these towns part of the military pre-planning of the HV 
 
They go on to mention the lack of reference to these towns in the artillery orders and artillery 
reports that they have seen in evidence, saying: 
 
The towns are not mentioned in the HV’s artillery orders by Gotovina, Rajčić, Firšt, or 
Fuzul. The artillery reports which the Trial Chamber has received in evidence do not 
provide further details as to what the HV fired at in or nearby these towns. Under 
these circumstances, the Trial Chamber cannot determine what the forces firing 
artillery projectiles which impacted on or nearby the aforementioned towns targeted. 
The Trial Chamber does not consider an unlawful attack on civilians or civilian objects 
in these towns to be the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Instead, the 
Trial Chamber considers that the evidence allows for the reasonable interpretation 
that the forces who fired artillery projectiles which impacted on or nearby these towns 
were deliberately targeting military targets.36 
 
In rejecting a motion from Gotovina’s Defence requesting the Trial Chamber to issue an order 
preventing the Prosecution from ‘claiming that the Prosecution's fact witnesses are experts in 
artillery and thereby competent to tell the Trial Chamber whether particular targets were 
civilian or military’, the Trial Chamber held that: 
 
The determination of whether a specific target is civilian or military is ultimately one to 
be made by the Chamber. The Chamber considers that there is no need for an order 
preventing the Prosecution from describing their witnesses in any particular way, nor 
is there a need for an order preventing the Prosecution from eliciting opinions from 
fact witnesses. 
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That said, the Chamber reminds both parties that it is best assisted by a fact witness 
when that witness describes what he or she has personally observed, although certain 
testimonies do not always allow for a clear distinction between facts and conclusions. 
 
If the testimony of a witness contains opinions or conclusions, the Chamber would 
expect the parties to explore the factual basis of the opinion or the conclusion. That 
would also be the proper time for the Defence to raise the matters brought up in the 
motion. 
 
In this respect, the Chamber is aware that witnesses have different backgrounds and 
different professional experiences which enable them to observe, understand, and 
interpret observations in different ways.37 
 
This decision highlights the fundamental roles of witnesses as providers of fact and judges as 
the final arbiters of what those facts mean. They were, however, unwilling to be too 
restrictive, not letting a specific designation as an expert witness or not determine how they 
used the testimony given, seemingly willing to listen to expertise in the broader sense. 
 
Two days later and in relation to the same witness, Andrew Leslie, the Trial Chamber again had 
to set out what information they thought it would be useful for them to hear from the witness.  
Leslie was a career artillery officer but the Defence were strongly contesting that he should be 
should be asked about the legality or otherwise of targeting certain buildings or areas in Knin 
given that he was not an expert witness and therefore that he was not there to give his 
opinion on these matters. Judge Orie stated that  
 
I'm not seeking a long debate on what exactly is a legitimate target but about 
structures and about factual matters….Which a knowledgeable person could link with 
military targets, non-military targets, and whether legitimate or not, we will final be 
able to decide that.38 
 
Leslie was an interesting witness who the Defence were keen to keep from being asked too 
much as he was critical of the use of artillery against Knin. Although he was not an expert for 
the purposes of the trial he was an extremely senior military officer with extensive knowledge 
of the use of artillery by the Canadian armed forces. His view of the lack of targeting of specific 
targets in the initial phase of bombardment seems to have been accepted, or at the least cited 
at length, but his view that a shell landing within 400m of its target was the appropriate 
distance for a first shot was not.39 Again, it was not at all clear why 400m was not accepted but 
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200m, with no apparent basis in the evidence, was applied. This 200m decision will be 
discussed in the next section ‘Use of experts in relation to targeting matters’.   
 
The next two sections consider the use of two different forms of expertise that were presented 
to the judges, that of ‘expert witnesses’ and that of the ‘military witnesses’. They consider how 
the expertise of these witnesses may have guided the judges as to the factual conclusions as to 
intention to be drawn from the indirect evidence before them. 
 
 
Use of experts in relation to targeting matters 
 
Fenrick points out that it ‘is occasionally suggested by military personnel that only those with 
combat experience can judge combat conduct or that only military courts are competent to 
evaluate military conduct’. His view is, however, that although ‘[d]ue regard must be paid to 
military factors, to the realities of combat, and to the opinions of military experts when 
prosecuting unlawful attack cases’ the ICTY has shown that ‘competent prosecution, defence 
and adjudication of unlawful attack cases is not beyond the practical competence of non-
specialist tribunals’.40 
 
It is not unusual for judges to adjudicate on matters in which they have no particular expertise. 
Their skill is in being able to assess and utilise the expertise placed before them through the 
means of expert witnesses and expert reports. The jurisprudence of the ICTY is that expert 
evidence will be admitted if the expert witness ‘can impartially offer specialised knowledge 
that will assist the chamber in understanding the evidence before it’.41  
 
Fenrick has also noted that  
 
As there is no established judicial hierarchy or rule of precedent in the international 
legal environment except within specific tribunals, if international judicial decisions are 
to have an impact beyond specific cases, they must persuade by their analysis of 
complex facts and the cogency of their legal reasoning.42 
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That is, if the judgements made by the ICTY relating to targeting are to have any broader 
relevance to IHL practitioners (in the military, governments or NGOs) or in future cases they 
must demonstrate that they are sound enough in their application of the law to the facts 
before them. The expert knowledge presented to them must have been incorporated in a 
persuasive manner. This section will consider the judges’ approaches to certain key decisions 





The Blaškić Trial Judgement does not mention the term ‘expert witness’ at all, although some 
witnesses, such as Professor Janković, discussed in this section, were described as such during 
the hearing.43 The Blaškić Trial Judges’ approach in finding that there was insufficient evidence 
to show that Zenica had in fact even been shelled by the HVO is a forerunner of the 
consideration of expert shelling evidence by the Galić Trial Chamber. 
 
In seeking to prove that the HVO was responsible for shelling Zenica, the prosecution 
presented the sort of evidence that would become very familiar in the Galić trial, that is, crater 
analysis of the physical marks left by the shells to determine the calibre of the shell fired (and 
therefore its azimuth and range) and the likely direction of its source.44 The prosecution used 
three witnesses to provide this evidence, namely Lars Baggesen, Mladen Veseljak and W.45 Lars 
Baggesen was a major in the Danish army at the time of testifying and former ECMM monitor 
based in Zenica.46 Mladen Veseljak was the on duty judge in Zenica called out to perform an 
initial investigation of the shelling of the city.47 Witness W was a member of the ABiH with 
knowledge of the use of artillery and crater analysis who played a role in the crater 
investigation led by the Chief of Staff of the 303rd Brigade in Zenica.48  
 
The prosecution backed this technical analysis of the crater up with an analysis of the military 
context around Zenica at that time, namely that the shelling of Zenica could be explained as a 
response by the HVO to an ABiH counter-offensive and that the Bosnian Serb artillery could 
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not be responsible for it given the nature of their artillery assets and location at the time of the 
shelling.49  
 
The defence, among other arguments, used Professor Janković, an expert in flight mechanics, 
to counter the prosecution’s technical evidence.50 Using ‘mathematical calculations made 
according to standardised models and using the hypothetical calculations put forward by the 
Prosecution’, he had concluded ‘that the two types of Russian and Yugoslav 122 mm howitzer 
likely to have been used in the acts could not have reached the centre of Zenica from the HVO 
positions west of the town because of their insufficient range’.51 
 
It seems that the judges were impressed by the ‘mathematical’ and ‘scientific’ approach of 
Professor Janković’s calculations and asked him to provide further evidence.52 They stated that  
 
The Prosecution’s demonstration relative to the calibre and trajectory of the shells 
used to shell Zenica town seemed insufficient when compared to that of the 
Defence.53 
 
The Trial Chamber seems to have found the prosecution’s arguments on the military situation 
and reasoning more persuasive than their technical analysis, but even so they found that the 
evidence of the defence raised reasonable doubt against the proposition that the HVO was 
responsible for the shelling.54 
 
 
Experts and crater analysis of Markale Market shelling: Establishing source of fire  
 
The presentation by the Galić Trial Chamber of their assessment of the shelling of the Markale 
Market on 5 February 1994 follows the same logic as used elsewhere in the judgement with 
the added complication that there were many more people involved in investigating this 
incident which had the highest profile of any in the case. It shows how the judges here 
approached complex technical evidence, including expert witness evidence.  
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The judges were provided with technical evidence from non-expert witnesses as well as from 
expert witnesses. Expert witnesses in this sense mean experts designated as such for the 
purposes of the trial, the non-expert witnesses may also be experts in their field. 
 
The judges considered the reports of the local investigative team, UN investigative teams and 
the defence experts then non-technical evidence concerning the source of fire. The most 
technical aspect of assessing from where the shell was fired arose from the relationship 
between the depth the tail fin reached in the ground and therefore the speed of the projectile 
on impact with the angle of descent of the projectile. This involved calculations of speed on 
firing, speed on impact, height differences between location of firing and location of impact 
and details of the composition of the ground. It is interesting to note that the Galić Trial Judges 
were willing to put a greater emphasis on crater impact analysis and believed it to be 
sufficiently ‘scientific’ in comparison to the Blaškić Trial Judges.  
 
There is a problem raised here about the judges having the information they really need to 
hand, repeated in the Gotovina Trial Judgement. The majority were, however, of the view that 
they had given the defence the benefit of the doubt in all their calculations and were sure that 
the shell could only have been fired by the SRK: 
 
489. This further consideration [an assessment of the best possible defence case on 
the known facts] assures the Majority that the experts’ findings are buffered by a large 
margin of safety. There is no doubt that, given the characteristics of the remains of the 
explosion of the 120 mm mortar shell at Markale market, the shell could not have 
been fired from any place on the ABiH side of the confrontation lines in a direction 
north-northeast of Markale market. 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia, however, breaks down what seemed like a well-reasoned conclusion by the 
judges based on what he considers to be insufficient evidence and too much uncertainty to 
reach the required standard of proof.55 Despite this, the appeal judges upheld the majority’s 
position. They found that given all the accepted and disputed evidence, the fundamental 
question was ultimately that of the angle of descent.56  
 
Despite finding ‘certain shortcomings’ the appeal judges would not reverse or revise the Trial 
Chamber’s findings.57 They concluded that 
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Neither the Trial Chamber’s slight misreading of the UNPROFOR Report, nor its mildly 
confusing language render its decision unreasonable. Had the UNPROFOR report been 
the only evidence the Trial Chamber had to consider, an inaccurate analysis of the 
report may well have proved fatal, but an examination of the trial record shows that 
the Trial Chamber had much more evidence before it than simply the UNPROFOR 
report: it also had the Sablijca report; the Zečević report; the Viličić report, tendered 
by the Defence; and testimony from Bosnian experts, members of the UNPROFOR 
team, and Viličić.58 
 
In relation to the Galić Trial Chamber’s decision to reject certain figures without a clear 
explanation, the Appeals Chamber held that  
 
Of course, it might have been clearer had the Trial Chamber better explained why it 
disregarded Russell’s conclusions, but a Trial Chamber does not have to explain every 
decision it makes, as long as the decision, having a view to the evidence, is 
reasonable.59 
 
This approach can be contrasted with that of the appeal judges in Gotovina. The Galić Appeal 
Judges looked at the trial record to see all the evidence the trial chamber had had before it and 
considered in total what the trial chamber had looked at to reach its decision. The Gotovina 
Appeals Chamber did not seem to do this and was criticised by Judge Agius for not considering 
‘the totality of the evidence’.60  
 
The Appeals Chamber in Galić did, however, decide that they had to rectify the Trial Chamber’s 
findings in that the ‘Trial Chamber was incorrect to find that the shell was deliberately aimed 
at Markale market, but correct to find that it was deliberately aimed at civilians’.61 This was 
based on the fact that the nearest military presence was found to be 300m away from the 
market and that Witness Hamill testified to the fact that an experienced mortar crew could get 
within 200 or 300m of their target on their first shot, so ‘whether the SRK was aiming for the 
market itself or for some other target within the surrounding 300 m, it was aiming for a target 
within a civilian area, and this shelling incident was thus an example of shelling that 
deliberately targeted civilians’.62  
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This does not seem entirely logical. On the basis of Hamill’s view that an experienced mortar 
crew could, while in fact trying to hit it, land a first strike 300m from a military objective, it 
could be that those who fired the shot that landed 300m from the military objective were in 
fact targeting the military objective. An alternative interpretation might be that the area was 
overall a civilian one and not one that a shot should have been fired into at all. If there were 
military objectives near this civilian area, the law would require precautionary actions to be 
taken and proportionality calculations to be carried out before a decision was made to target 
it. It would not, if the principle of proportionality was met, however, prohibit any attack on the 
military objective. Despite all the expert and technical evidence produced in this case, there 
therefore remain questions of the exact intention behind the firing of the shell that hit 
Markale Market on 5 February 1994. 
 
Use of experts in Gotovina: The use of a ‘200m rule’ as a presumption of legality 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges expressly set out how they approached the testimony of expert 
witnesses. They stated: 
 
In assessing and weighing the testimony of expert witnesses, the Trial Chamber 
considered factors such as the professional competence of the expert, the material at 
his disposal, the methodologies used, the credibility of the findings made in light of 
these factors and other evidence, the position or positions held by the expert, and the 
limits of the expertise of each witness.63  
 
They go on immediately to describe three further decisions they had made regarding expert 
evidence. The third is the most straightforward, setting out what the Prosecution were not 
entitled to know about the instructions and communications between the Defence and their 
expert, and included that ‘the sources and methodology used for an expert report must be 
clearly indicated and accessible, so as to give the parties and the Trial Chamber the possibility 
to test or challenge the factual basis and the methodology relied upon, in order to assess the 
probative value of the report’.64 This is a natural extension of the approach the judges 
indicated that they would take in the preceding paragraph. 
 
The first and second relate to the substantive content of the expert reports and the 
boundaries of what the judges were looking for from the expert opinions. 
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The first finding was in relation to a Gotovina Defence motion requesting the court to prevent 
the Prosecution from using their expert witness Konings to testify as to whether ‘targets 
selected and hit during Operation Storm were legitimate military targets’.65 The judges held 
that they were 
 
not bound by the conclusions of the expert. However, the opinion of the expert as to 
whether, and why, he considers a target to be a legitimate military objective, although 
ultimately to be determined by the Trial Chamber, may assist it in making decisions in 
relation to the criminal liability of the accused.66 
 
The second finding was that ‘parts of an expert report that dealt with purely legal matters are 
of no assistance to the Trial Chamber’.67 The judges found that the remaining parts of the 
report would, however, ‘assist it in understanding matters at the intersection between the 
laws of war and technical aspects of the conduct of military operations’.68 They pointed out 
that they were ‘fully aware of where to draw the lines between these matters’.69 Despite this 
second finding in particular, there seems to be a lot of ‘law’ contained in the judgement’s 
summary of expert witness evidence, for example in relation to military targets and 
proportionality.70  
 
The testimony of expert witness Harry Konings was the Prosecution's key evidence in relation 
to the use of artillery in areas where civilians may be present. At the time of testifying Konings 
was a lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Netherlands Army working in their Land Forces Doctrine 
and Training Centre as a staff officer in Land Operations Doctrine.71 Konings was obviously very 
experienced and up to date in the application and development of practice in this area within 
the Netherlands armed forces and NATO. He had first-hand experience of the effects of 
artillery used in areas where civilians were present including, in particular, in Sarajevo. Despite 
it being clear that he did know a lot about what was and was not permitted by law, he did not 
come across in his testimony, however, as confident in his ability to discuss the legal regimes 
within which this practice took place.72  
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This lack of confidence was taken up by the defence expert witness Geoffrey Corn, a former 
senior military lawyer in the United States Army and, at the time of testifying, an associate 
professor of law at South Texas College of Law, who made the point that Konings was 
conflating restrictions imposed through choice in rules of engagement with those required by 
law. It was clear that Konings was talking about 'best practice', not what would be necessary to 
avoid committing criminal acts.  
 
It is not clear how discussing NATO doctrine and practice was expected to be relevant to the 
charges against Gotovina. The basis on which it was being presented was never clearly stated 
although it could conceivably be because it would be based on the relevant international law. 
Corn, in contrast, explicitly draws upon API and the ICRC Commentary, especially towards the 
end of his testimony when discussing particular targets within Knin.73  
 
There was an intrinsic problem in the assessment of the shelling carried out as part of 
Operation Storm, as for the shelling of Sarajevo in Galić, in that no one knew what the 
intention for each shell as it was fired actually was – and could not tell from the damage it 
caused. The use of a ‘200m rule’ in the Gotovina Trial Judgement was, however, a confusing 
development in the judgements at the ICTY. This section will discuss where it appeared, how it 
was used by the judges and the criticism that has been made of this approach.  
 
A first, and important, point to note is that on close reading it is apparent that the shot landing 
within or without 200m from a particular location rule was not used by itself to establish the 
legality of the overall use of artillery. It was part of a layered appraisal of the use of artillery. 
This does not mean that its use is not a difficult concept to fit with the application of IHL, but it 
does make it more complicated to assess its place in the overall judgement and the reactions 
to it in the Gotovina Appeal Judgement and otherwise. 
 
The first mention of a 200m range is among the judges’ factual findings in relation to the 
alleged unlawful attack against civilians and civilian objects in Knin, in footnote 5359 which 
reads as follows:  
 
In light of the evidence received from witnesses Konings, Corn, Rajčić and Leslie 
regarding the accuracy of the artillery weapons the HV had at its disposal during 
Operation Storm, the Trial Chamber has generally not further specified in its factual 
findings the locations of impacts within a 200 metre range of relevant objects. 
                                                          





From here, the 200m distance criterion is in fact used in two stages, namely: 
 
1. Using it to identify shots fired at (or presumed fired at) known targets (those on target lists 
and stated to have been fired at): 
 
Paragraph 1898 of the Gotovina Trial Judgement contains a summary of expert and 
technical evidence as to the accuracy of the weapons used in the attack on Knin and 
factors that could affect this accuracy. This includes that: 
 
According to Rajčić, the 130-millimetre cannon at a distance of 26 kilometres 
has an error range of about 15 metres along the axis, and about 70 to 75 
metres in distance, with the normal scattering dispersion of a 130-millimetre 
shell being an area with a diameter of 35 metres. Both Konings and Rajčić 
testified that the BM-21 122-millimetre launcher generally covers a broader 
area than the 130-millimetre cannon. 74 
 
This leads on to the judges’ adoption of a presumption that projectiles landing within 
200m of an ‘identified artillery target’ were in fact deliberately aimed at that target: 
 
Evaluating all of this evidence, the Trial Chamber considers it a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence that those artillery projectiles which impacted 
within a distance of 200 metres of an identified artillery target were 
deliberately fired at that artillery target.75 
 
This is in effect a presumption of legality for the shells found to have landed within 
200m of a military objective, the judges having carried out a separate assessment of 
whether the targets were lawful targets (that is, military objectives) according to IHL. It 
has also been taken to mean that it is a presumption of illegality for shells landing 
outside the 200m distance although, as will be seen in 2. below, there were further 
considerations that the judges took into account before declaring that the shells that 
had landed outside 200m were evidence of an unlawful attack. 
 
In reaching their conclusion, the judges refer to the testimony of Konings, Rajčić and 
Leslie, although they in fact decided not to apply Leslie’s opinion in this regard. Neither 
Konings, Rajčić nor any other witness as far as this study has found, however, 
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mentioned such a use of a 200m radius and it remains unclear how the ‘200m’ rule 
arose. 
 
It is possible that the judges chose 200m as granting a significant benefit of the doubt 
to anyone applying Rajčić’s figures, having discounted Leslie’s 400m figure as an outlier 
from those of Konings and Rajčić. It is not clear, however, why they would not have 
explicitly stated this.  
 
It seems there was actually very little relevant information provided to the judges on 
the accuracy of the actual weapons that were utilised by Gotovina’s forces. A question 
raised as part of this is whether Leslie’s figure stated to be in relation to the ‘first shot’ 
was not directly comparable to the evidence that Rajčić and others provided, which 
may have been distances of margins of error for an ‘aquired target’.76 
 
2. Consideration of shells landing outside the 200m mark  
 
If a shell landed beyond 200m from ‘the objects the HV identified as military targets 
and reported firing on’ it was not presumed to have been fired at that target, but it 
was also not presumed to have been an unlawful shot.77 The judges went on to carry 
out a further appraisal of these known impacts, considering whether they ‘could have 
been the result of errors or inaccuracies’.78 In doing this they state that they 
considered the testimony of Konings, Rajčić and Leslie ‘on the accuracy of the HV’s 
artillery weaponry at the range used on 4 and 5 August 1995 during the shelling of 
Knin’.79 They specifically state that they considered: 
 
• the distances of the impacts from identified artillery targets; 
• the number of artillery projectiles that landing distances of 300-700 metres 
away from the identified artillery targets; 
• the location of the impacts in relation to the general geography of Knin;  
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• the fact that ‘on at least two occasions, the TS-4 reported firing at the general 
area of Knin or at Knin, without specifying an artillery target’.80 
• The lack of evidence of military objectives near these impact sites, finding ‘no 
evidence indicating any fixed SVK or police presence in or near the 
aforementioned areas, nor evidence otherwise indicating that firing at these 
areas would offer a definite military advantage….’.81 
  
They concluded that: 
 
….too many projectiles impacted in areas which were too far away from 
identified artillery targets and which were located around Knin, for the artillery 
projectiles to have impacted in these areas incidentally as a result of errors or 
inaccuracies in the HV’s artillery fire. Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that the HV 
deliberately fired the artillery projectiles targeting these areas in Knin.82  
 
The Trial Chamber’s decision to use a 200m radius as a determinant of whether a particular 
shell was aimed at a military objective was heavily criticised by many experts in IHL.83 The trial 
judges’ approach was seen to leave no room for error and therefore have created a de facto 
strict liability for commanders ordering attacks.84 The Gotovina Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief 
contained the calculation that, using the Trial Chamber’s own figures, 96% of the artillery fire 
around Knin landed within 200m of lawful military objectives.85 The experts who put forward 
the Gotovina Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief were concerned that: 
 
it is difficult to reconcile these statistics (even in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution) to an unlawful target decision-making and execution process. Indeed, the 
Amici believe that almost any commander would consider such a ratio of valid to 
invalid effects to indicate legally compliant operations.86 
 
It is interesting, however, that the Gotovina Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief in fact endorsed the 
need for ‘some benchmark of acceptable error’ and cited with approval Leslie’s 400m 
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proposal.87 In their view, the question was, apparently, one of the correct margin of error 
taking into account all the necessary operational parameters rather than whether it was 
possible to apply a margin of error to a situation such as that in the attack on military 
objectives within Knin. 
 
Rogier Bartels criticises the judgment from a different perspective. His view is that rather than 
analysing what elements of the attack had been directed to military objectives, the judges 
should have accepted that the attack was directed against military objectives and assessed the 
strikes using the principle of proportionality.88 Bartels main argument against a 200m (or 
400m) rule is that ‘it would effectively create a free fire zone around targets in built-up civilian 
areas. In a small city such as Knin, stretching out over only a couple of square kilometres, the 
existence of a number of military objects within the city would effectively allow for the city to 
be targeted as a whole’. This would not comply with Article 51(5)(a) API and, critically, 
‘disregards the attacker’s obligation to take proportionality into account. It essentially makes 
void any analysis of the expected incidental damage’.89 
 
The writers of the Gotovina Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief also noted that they had ‘considered 
the legality of this attack as a whole in accordance with controlling international humanitarian 
law standards, and not as a series of isolated targeting actions’.90 It does not seem that the 
Gotovina Trial Judges thought that they were going against such an opinion; their conclusion 
that ‘too many projectiles impacted in areas which were too far away from identified artillery 
targets and which were located around Knin, for the artillery projectiles to have impacted in 
these areas incidentally as a result of errors or inaccuracies in the HV’s artillery fire’ sounds 
very similar to a consideration of the attack as a whole.91  
 
It is unfortunate that the Gotovina Trial Judges chose to use this 200m distance, for even the 
limited reasons on close reading it seems they did, with apparently nothing to support it from 
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the testimony of the experienced military practitioners before them. The majority of the 
Appeals Chamber made short work of reversing the Trial Judges’ decision as to the lawfulness 
of the attacks against Knin and other towns, in large part because there was no apparent basis 
for this 200m rule.92 
 
 
Role of military experience  
 
Those with military backgrounds appear to have particularly informed the judges' 
understanding of the application of the laws of war and use of the key 
words/phrases/concepts through their testimony even though they were not official ‘expert’ 
witnesses. They were particularly clear when they thought what had happened was or was not 
acceptable military conduct. Given the range of countries for which they had served, this may 
have given an unofficial ‘international’ benchmark of acceptable conduct.  
 
In the Blaškić Trial Judgement, the judges particularly explicitly rely on testimony from certain 
military witnesses in relation to the nature of the attacks under discussion (although still not 
directly as a source of a definition). This can be seen in the case of witness Watters. But then 
again, in using the description of the situation in Stari Vitez provided by Bower the judges 
seem to again miss the point that they are describing what could be a perfectly legitimate 
military position to take, containment of the enemy, although they are vague as to 
civilian/military mix in Stari Vitez given that there does appear to be a genuine fight after initial 
surprise attack.93 
 
The exact words and phrases used by these witnesses obviously depend on the questions they 
are asked and their own level of specific training in the use of artillery and/or the laws of 
war/humanitarian law, as well as their own discipline and experiences.  
 
Two words that frequently arose in the testimonies of the witnesses with military experience 
in relation to both descriptions of the shelling of Sarajevo and Knin were ‘indiscriminate’ and 
‘random’. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Law), in both the cases of Galić and Gotovina it is the 
question of whether civilians were targeted as such that is in issue (whether as a war crime or 
crime against humanity in respectively), not whether the shelling was indiscriminate. The trial 
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judges in Galić had, however, decided that certain indiscriminate shelling could be found to be 
directly targeting civilians. This was upheld by the Appeals Chamber, who held that  
 
In principle, the Trial Chamber was entitled to determine on a case-by-case basis that 
the indiscriminate character of an attack can assist it in determining whether the 
attack was directed against the civilian population.94  
 
Following this approach, descriptions of indiscriminate shelling had to be examined to see if, in 
effect, civilians were being directly targeted.  
 
The word ‘indiscriminate’ is well known in humanitarian law, for example, Article 51(4) API 
prohibits and sets out various examples of ‘indiscriminate’ attacks. The word ‘random’ does 
not, however, have any similar pre-determined legal meaning.95 The judges gave an indication 
that the word ‘random’ in this context does have some history with a reference in a footnote 
to the explanation given by the British Prime Minister to the House of Commons in 1938 of the 
British protest to General Franco regarding the bombing of Barcelona that  
 
The one definite rule of international law, however, is that direct and deliberate 
bombing of non-combatants is in all circumstances illegal, and His Majesty’s 
Government’s protest was based on information which led them to the conclusion 
that the bombardments of Barcelona, carried on apparently random and without 
special aim at military objectives, was in fact of this nature. 96 
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The following paragraphs set out some of the clearest testimony regarding the ‘random fire’ 
and discuss what those using the word considered it to mean or signify and how the judges 
incorporated this in their judgments. 
 
The word ‘random’ was used in the testimony of Michael Carswell, a former Deputy Sector 
Commander of the UNMOs in Sarajevo and a retired major from the Canadian armed forces at 
the time of his testimony. Judge El Mahdi specifically asked Carswell what was the ‘exact 
meaning of the term that you used, of the word that you used’. Carswell’s response ties the 
‘random’ nature of the fire to the lack of a ‘military value’ in the firing of these shots: 
 
A. Yes, sir. "Random," the way I would term it, with artillery, would be a round that 
would be fired with no real military value. Basically, the gun just lead into an area, in 
and on an area, and fired with -- without having identified anything specific in that 
area. 
JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So, you are saying, if I understand you correctly, you 
are saying that "random" means that these were shots that were not targeting military 
targets; is that correct? 
A. In my opinion, yes, sir.97 
 
Jeremy Hermer, a former UNMO in Sarajevo and a major in the Royal Marines at the time of 
his testimony, also used the word ‘random’, describing what he perceived as an unusual use of 
mortar (and other indirect fire weapons), with an explanation of why it was apparent that this 
pattern of fire he had experienced was not being directed at a specific target: 
 
Q. Did you also see examples where mortar fire was being used against other than 
specific targets, as you have put it? 
A. Yes. The -- within Sarajevo throughout that period there was what I would term 
"general background activity" throughout any one 24-hour period. For example, one 
would experience general impacting of indirect fire within the city. And this was very 
different from the coordinated, sustained attacks on specific targets that I have 
mentioned. These rounds on this -- these incidents appeared to be essentially random, 
often single rounds fired from artillery or mortar weapons without any kind of follow-
up action, which, in respect to indirect fire weapons, is very unusual. Generally, with 
an indirect fire weapon, it is very difficult to hit a specific target, if not impossible to hit 
a specific target, with one round. These weapons by their nature are what we term, 
"area weapons" and they are designed to cover an area of ground with fire. They are 
not of any real use used individually, one at a time, firing one round. Even if a weapon 
has been accurately sited and accurately adjusted on to a target, atmospheric 
conditions will change throughout any given period, be it temperature, wind speed, or 
humidity and this will affect greatly the accuracy of that weapon so that you could 
never guarantee where a round is going to land. Therefore, to fire one round and not 
follow it up or adjust it on to a target would seem pointless, in military terms.98 
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Hermer did, however, give a reason for which this tactic could be deployed: 
 
The only situation on which I could imagine advocate the use of such weapons in such 
a manner, would be to generally suppress or harass a large area.99 
 
These pages of Hermer’s testimony are cited at paragraph 644 of the Galić Trial Judgement, in 
the section on Galić’s ‘Control over Shelling Activity’. They do not appear, however, to refer to 
these specific passages and there is no reference to the word random. The judges instead 
concentrate on the testimony Hermer gave as to the description and use of multiple launched 
rocket systems (‘MLRS’), the judges describing them as ‘inherently inaccurate’.  
 
Pyers Tucker, former military assistant to General Philippe Morillon in Sarajevo and a British 
Army Officer commissioned into the Royal Artillery with substantial experience and training in 
this role before he arrived in Sarajevo, testified of ‘single shells landing arbitrarily around the 
city, to no identifiable purpose’ again making a link to there being no ‘military purpose’ behind 
these shots: 
 
Life in Sarajevo was very unpleasant for these people. There were daily random 
shelling of various parts of the city. There was constant sniper fire and there were 
intense periods of small arms and artillery fire around the perimeter from time to time 
as attacks by one side or the other continued. It was a horrible situation. 
………… 
When I arrived in Sarajevo, there were two types of incoming fire. There was 
concentrated fire, in other words, multiple shells landing in a short space of time in a 
particular area. The second type of fire was single shells landing arbitrarily around the 
city, to no identifiable purpose. 
………… 
Q.  I had asked you to clarify what you meant by, and I quote, "no identifiable 
purpose," whether you could put that into relation to military or civilian targets. 
 
A.  It was not to any military purpose. These were shells which were just landing 
somewhere within Sarajevo. In other words, in the built-up areas, civilian areas. They 
were not fired at during any attacks or to defend. They simply were fired into the 
city.100 
 
Within their consideration of whether there was a campaign of shelling by SRK forces against 
civilians, the judges consider the ‘Pattern of Fire into ABiH-held Areas of Sarajevo’ noting that 
‘[a] general pattern of fire was noticed in Sarajevo during the Indictment Period’.101 Within this 
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section the judges cite part of the first paragraph of Tucker’s testimony set out above, 
specifically including the word ‘random’. They also include the testimony of Witness Y (whose 
testimony was heard in closed session so we do not know their identity) that the shelling ‘was 
deadly because of its random nature’.102 
 
Carl Harding, a former UNMO in Sarajevo and retired member of the Royal Air Force regiment 
at the time of his testimony, gave evidence that compared the understandable military attack 
in Otes to a barrage of artillery fire into the city on 31 October 1992. This tied the random 
nature of the shots to the lack of a military objective but also, notably, not to the lack of a 
functioning system of command and control; this was because of the coordination of the start 
and end times of the attack and the amount of ammunition used: 
 
A. Well, Otes was a proper military attack, and we would have said those former 
orders to instigate the attack, there was command and control at various levels to 
achieve the objective which was in such a concentrated area. On the 31st of October, 
there was no concentration of fire. It was random from what I could see, and from 
what my observers could see, although it started at the exact time of 1000 and it 
finished at 1600, there was no obvious objective to be seen by myself or the 
observation posts. 
Q. Now, did the timing, what you just referred to, the direction of fire and the range of 
calibres involved, tell you anything as to the degree of planning involved and the levels 
-- the command levels which would have been involved? 
A. Do you refer to Otes or the 31st of October? 
Q. To the 31st of October. 
A. Well, on the 31st of October, all the weapons started to fire exactly the same time, 
1000 hours. And there was an obvious ceasefire at 1600 hours. The weapons were 
from various locations around the city. They must have been by the amount of 
ammunition that was landing. So there was a certain amount of command and control 
and orders given for them to start firing at the same time. But the targets that they 
were given were not obvious to us, as the rounds were so spread out as opposed to 
Otes when all the rounds fell within the square I marked on the map.103 
 
Although the military witnesses describing this random fire could not always definitively say 
that it was not in fact directed to mobile military targets within otherwise civilian areas, they 
did have an answer to this Defence argument. For example, in Jeremy Hermer’s testimony 
under cross examination he accepted a theoretical possibility that there was a mobile military 
target at a location he had described as civilian. In his answers under redirect examination, 
however, he gave evidence of how few mobile military targets he had actually seen.104 
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Francis Thomas, who served as United Nations Senior Military Observer, Sector Sarajevo and 
was a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces at the time of testifying, testified to 
certain cases where there was no possibility of there being a mobile military target within a 
civilian area: 
 
These are cases that I can categorically say that military observers saw civilians being 
shelled, but there was no Bosnian presence.105 
 
There was also evidence given that the return fire in response to fire from mobile targets was 
not limited to attempts to attack those mobile targets. Richard Mole, a Lieutenant-Colonel in 
the British army when he was posted to Sarajevo as a United Nations Senior Military Observer, 
testified to ‘a degree of overkill in response’.106  
 
The Galić Trial Judges use the concept of ‘random’ shots when in relation to the shelling of the 
football match they state:  
 
Had the SRK forces launched two shells into a residential neighbourhood at random, 
without taking feasible precautions to verify the target of the attack, they would have 
unlawfully shelled a civilian area. 107 
 
This use of the term ‘random’ fire by the witnesses such as those described above was most 
clearly incorporated into the trial judges’ ‘Conclusion on Whether there was a Campaign of 
Sniping and Shelling in Sarajevo by SRK Forces’ where the judges observe that ‘The most 
populated areas of Sarajevo seemed to be particularly subject to indiscriminate or random 
shelling attacks.’108 This finding is an important part of the overall conclusion that the forces 
around Sarajevo were engaged in a campaign directed against civilians as such. 
 
The concept of ‘random’ firing of artillery arose again in the testimony provided in the 
Gotovina case. Andrew Leslie, at the time of testifying a Lieutenant-General in the Canadian 
Armed Forces with a particularly detailed knowledge of the use of artillery (having been a 
gunner and artillery officer and risen to command the 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery before rising even further through the ranks) distinguished the idea of ‘random’ shots 
from how groups of guns would target a particular object if that was their actual intention. He 
provided a detailed description of this targeting process: 
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Q. Now, this process you've just described, with a shell and then another shell and 
then a group of shells, were you familiar with that process; and if so, can you tell us its 
significance? 
A. I am familiar with the process. And in my opinion, the significance is that after the 
additional -- the original opening barrage, which appeared to be random and relatively 
evenly distributed across the entirety of the town, the Croatian gunners were then 
engaging in what is known as target grid procedure, wherein a battery of guns, which 
can be two, three, four, five, six guns grouped together, would be adjusted by visual 
observation on to a specific target. The process is one gun fires of that grouping; the 
visual observation correction is then made to move that shell; corrections are then 
computed and passed to the other guns; another round is fired from the original gun 
to adjust that specifically on to where your target might lie. Then once the observer is 
relatively satisfied that his one gun is in the target area, because artillery is an area 
weapons system, or certainly was in those days, then all the guns of the battery would 
be fired at that single point; and therein you'd have three, four, five, or six detonations 
in relatively close proximity both in time and space. It's a process I've seen hundreds of 
times in a variety of training exercises in Canada and other artillery ranges throughout 
NATO. 
Q. So that's the process of directing the weaponry toward a particular target? 
A. Yes.109 
 
Expert Witness Corn provided the counter argument to the proposition that there was random 
fire into Knin, essentially targeting civilians, when he set out that ‘there were military 
objectives dispersed all over the city by the enemy forces’ and that one interpretation of the 
evidence would be that from a distance ‘it will look like there are rounds exploding all over the 
city because there were objectives all over the city’.110 This is cited at paragraph 1170 of the 
Trial Judgement. This testimony of witness Corn is particularly interesting as it discusses what a 
witness within Knin would actually be able to tell (or not) about the intended effect of the 
shots they were observing. 
 
In Section 4.4 of the trial judgment, ‘Unlawful attacks on Civilians and Civilian Objects’, the 
Gotovina Trial Chamber noted Dawes’ use in his witness statement of the word random to 
describe the shelling at a particular point in time.111 It also refers to Stig Marker Hansen, an 
ECMM monitor in Knin from June to September 1995 and head of ECMM Knin from 
approximately 5 September to 23 September 1995112 and Joseph Bellerose113 using this 
description to differentiate the different patterns of shelling they observed. 
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These witnesses with military experience also provided evidence describing their impression of 
the deliberateness of attacks on civilians implied by this ‘random’ firing. This was their view of 
the intentions of those behind the guns/mortars/rockets and those who were commanding 
them.  
 
The former Senior Military Observer, Richard Mole, provided evidence of a lack of military 
objective for some of the ‘random’ shots fired into Sarajevo. In addition to this, there is a sense 
from his observations on what he was told that there was more than a disregard for the 
civilian population, it was in fact inevitable they were going to be hurt by the actions of those 
‘warming the barrels’: 
 
Q. In relation to the incident where you were given the -- incident or incidents where 
you were given the explanation of warming the barrels, were you able to draw any 
conclusions as to where the round or rounds were likely to land? 
A. The rationale for firing the weapon that had been given to me was as irrational and 
as vague as the assumed target; in other words, I don't think there was a specific 
target. 
Q. Were you able to form any view as to whether the rounds fired on that occasion 
threatened, potentially, civilians? 
A. In that the rounds were random, in that they were fired towards the city of 
Sarajevo, there's a very high percentage chance that they were random and fired into 
civilian areas, because it was not explained to me that they were targeting a military 
target. I've told you the reasons why they fired the weapons. That would hardly be a 
sensible answer if they had a legitimate military target.114 
 
Mole’s testimony also pointed out a link between the random shelling of Sarajevo and the 
pressure put on the Bosnian Presidency to act in a certain way: 
 
Q. When you say, "the usual severe response," what do you mean? 
A. It was a usual modus operandi that random shelling of the city of Sarajevo would 
occur if certain other events were having been brought to the attention of the 
Presidency side, not fulfilled.115 
 
Although the judges do not cite this particular testimony of Mole’s which mentions ‘random’ 
shelling, the various correlations between the attacks found to be directed against civilians and 
the need for the Bosnian Serb politicians and military to put pressure on the Bosnian 
Presidency was a key element in the judges’ consideration of Galić’s responsibility as has been 
discussed in Chapter 6 (Responsibility). 
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Under the sub-heading ‘Control over Shelling Activity’ in the section ‘Was General Galić in 
effective command of the SRK Forces throughout the relevant period?’ the judges refer to 
Tucker’s testimony regarding a threat by a senior Bosnian Serb commander to shell the city 
that Tucker took to mean that if this commander’s demands were not met, ‘the execution of 
the threat implied the firing of artillery shells at random into Sarajevo, in other words, at the 
civilian population in Sarajevo’.116 
 
The witnesses of the shelling of Knin in the Gotovina trial used the term ‘harassment’ alongside 
‘random’ to describe what was happening. The ‘harassment’ of military forces would be a 
legitimate use of artillery but many of the witnesses were convinced it was the civilians that 
Gotovina’s forces intended to harass. Robert Williams, a Military Information Officer for 
UNPROFOR in Knin at the time of Operation Storm, with the rank of Colonel in the Canadian 
Armed Forces at the time of his testimony, described sporadic shots not aimed at any 
particular military target: 
 
Q. …Colonel, can you explain to the Court what you mean by "harassment fire" in the 
residential areas? 
A. Certainly. What I mean by "harassment fire" is not directed at a specific military 
targets but one or two shells directed in an area to convince people to leave, not 
necessarily targeted at a house but near enough to a house or building to encourage 
the occupants, if they remained, that they should leave. 
Q. And what was it about what you saw that made you think it was intended to speed 
up the flight of civilians? 
A. The fact that it was fairly sporadic. The heavy bombardment had already occurred 
earlier in the day. It lessened in the afternoon and then random or fairly random shots 
in one or two in different areas to encourage people to leave. It was not an intense 
bombardment from any-- from my point of view and my opinion only, military 
usefulness.117 
 
Joseph Bellerose, Sector Engineer for UNCRO Sector South and in Knin at the time of Operation 
Storm, retired at the rank of lieutenant-colonel from the Canadian armed forces at the time of 
testifying, was clear in his witness statement that his view was that the shelling of Knin was for 
the purpose of making the civilian population leave. He was questioned on the basis for this 
view in some detail during his testimony. He repeatedly used the word ‘random’ to describe 
the nature of shells that were being fired as opposed to the fire being directed against a 
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military objective. In defining what he meant by ‘harassment fire’ he also emphasised the 
random nature of the locations where the shells were landing: 
  
Q. …First let me ask you, what was the basis for your opinion that the shelling was 
carried out to drive away the civilian population? 
A.  In my opinion, if there would have been military target in those location that would 
have been causing a threat to the Croat forces, they would have been more intensive 
and direct at a specific target, be more concentrated. 
Q. Can you tell the Court what you observed that was not consistent with that? 
A. The artillery fire wasn't concentrated into one location. It was landing all over the 
town more to a random fashion and at random interval. 
… 
Q. Thank you. You also offered the opinion that it was deliberate harassment fire, and I 
would like you to please explain for the Court what you meant by that. 
A. Because it was like a random firing all over the place and random interval, you 
know, for me, I believed that this is -- this is a situation that will make the occupants of 
the town, if they were still there, wondering if they were going to be next or when the 
next round was going to land, if it would be close to their place. Just that, I don't know, 
it's hard for me to explain, but it wasn't -- makes you wonder if the next round is going 
to be in your backyard as opposed to, you know, five -- 500 metres or, you know, five 
miles down the road.118 
 
This testimony of Bellerose is specifically cited at paragraph 1337 of the Gotovina Trial 
Judgement, including a quote of Bellerose’s phrase ‘in a random fashion and at random 
intervals’. This is the second time that Bellerose’s use of the word random is mentioned by the 
judges, this mention is in relation to the shelling on 5th August, the first mention related to his 
description of the shelling on 4th August.119  
 
The prosecution expert, Konings testified as to his interpretation of an artillery report that 
stated ‘In irregular intervals, a total of 18 projectiles were fired from a T-130 millimetre at the 
general area of Knin’ that: 
 
…a total of 18 projectiles against irregular intervals -- on irregular intervals bring me to 
the feeling, to the idea - and, of course, I do not have the hard proof of that in this case 
- that this is a random use of artillery against the so-called general area of Knin which 
can be everything.  It's not confined.  It can indeed be some forest areas. It can be 
indeed the military area, but it can be damn-well a civilian area because they are the 
most in Knin. 
 And by doing so, firing 18 projectiles in irregular intervals against an area 
where we cannot deny that there are a lot of civilians in there, you advocate here the 
use of artillery in a harassing way.  There is no proof of that.  It is only a report.  I know 
that, but it is already ordered in the OP order that we discussed in the beginning that 
the artillery had to put the town of Knin under artillery fire under shelling also there 
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without any specification without any effect, without any objective to be reached by 
that artillery.120 
 
In section 4.4.2 ‘General Considerations’ relating to unlawful attacks, the judges summarise 
Koning’s evidence and although they do not cite this specific passage this summary also 
contains a reference to random firing as mentioned in Konings’ expert report: 
 
Konings stated that when giving the order to shell a city the detailed specification of 
military targets is an absolute precondition, otherwise the vague nature of the order 
may be interpreted as ordering, or at least permitting, commanders to fire randomly 
into the named cities. Firing rounds at a city without specifying a target involves 
willingly and deliberately taking the risk that those rounds will fall in an area where 
only civilians live, and can have only the psychological effect of harassing fire on 
civilians. Konings further stated that the 4 August 1995 report of TS-4, which referred 
to firing artillery at a general, civilian populated area, required further detailed 
explanation with a clear reference to implied rules of engagement and objectives.121  
 
Although this alleged intention to force civilians from their homes by the use of harassment 
fire was accepted by the Trial Chamber, it was overturned by the Appeals Chamber’s findings. 
The final section of this chapter will consider what the difference was between the cases of 
Galić and Gotovina that led to such different appeal findings. First, however, the contribution 
of civilian witnesses will be considered. 
 
 
Role of civilian evidence 
 
A theme that emerged from the analysis of the judgments and the testimony referred to in 
them, was that the evidence non-military witnesses who had lived through a military campaign 
could provide the judges was arguably equally important as those with military experience in 
educating the judges. They were the key source of information on the physical effects of 
artillery. At times they were also particularly clear as to from where a shot had been fired 
where a technical analysis was unable to give a firm answer. 
 
When any witnesses gave evidence that they knew from where a shot had come from the 
question is whether this is because that is where they knew the shells landing on their area 
had usually come from or whether it was that they could tell from experience where a 
particular shot had been fired from. Excluding the possibility that a shot could have been fired 
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from somewhere else was an integral part of the judges’ assessment of the scheduled shelling 
events. Civilian witnesses had a depth of experience that could not lightly be put aside.  
 
Civilian non-technical witnesses in fact learned relevant technical information from their 
experience. For example, Mehmed Travljanin, a policeman and café owner in Sarajevo, 
testified that   
 
And it was normal for us in Sarajevo in those days to hear explosions, and we would 
try and assess even how powerful it was. Even old women knew the type of shell, 
whether it was 62 or 155.122 
 
This section considers two examples of this strength of non-technical witness testimony, firstly 
the water queue shelling incident and then in relation to the shelling of Markale Market. 
 
 
The water queue shelling incident 
 
In this charge the source of fire was not so strongly contested as for the Markale Market 
charge. It was the intended target that presented the harder question to the judges. In this 
incident it is the behaviour of the civilians while they are waiting for their turn to collect water 
that is perhaps the most telling.  
 
Rasim Mehonic, a pensioner at the time who had been waiting in the queue, testified that the 
people queuing for water were doing so knowing that they were a potential target and 
attempting to wait under cover to minimise the chance of being shot: 
 
Q. When you say that there were about 100 canisters, is it on the basis of the number 
of canisters that you have come to the conclusion that there were 100 people or were 
there actually 100 people? 
A. I concluded on the basis of the canisters because I couldn't see the people as they 
were hiding under the stairway and I couldn't count the people. 
Q. So you are telling us that in the street where you saw the canisters, you weren't 
able to see the people; the people weren't lining up in a traditional line? 
A.  How could they line up as there were snipers shooting and they wouldn't let 
anyone in peace?  Would you stand there and let someone shoot at you?123 
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Witness AE, also a pensioner at the time and waiting in the queue for water, provided similar 
testimony. She refused to agree that the risk to the civilians was because of their proximity to 
the confrontation line and gave evidence to the effect that the risk was instead due to the 
danger inherent in being a civilian within Sarajevo at that time: 
 
Q. I will repeat it, Madam Witness. You said that the authorities, that is to say, your 
police, had warned you. Is that correct?  Have I understood you correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I see that you agree with that. Thank you. Madam Witness, were you warned of the 
existence of such a risk? Is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Madam Witness, was this risk really connected to the proximity of the 
confrontation line? 
A. No. 
Q. Madam Witness, what was this risk related to? 
A. Well, the risk concerned you leaving your house every day. You could be killed. 
Q. But, Madam Witness, would you agree with me in saying that you risked being 
wounded and there was a greater probability of this happening if you were near the 
line of confrontation or at the line of confrontation, and the risk was greater than if 
you had been at a distance from this line? 
A. I don't agree with you.124 
 
The witnesses knew that they were a potential target and likely to be being targeted. This was 
from their experience of the conflict and what it meant for civilians in Sarajevo. This was 
translated into the Trial Judgement where the Trial Judges stated: 
 
In view of the evidence in the Trial Record, the Majority is satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that the intended objective of the mortar shell fired on 12 July 1993 in Dobrinja 
“C5” was not the construction work for a trench leading to the airport tunnel, nor the 




Markale Market  
 
The source of fire of the shell that hit Markale Market on 5 February 1994 was strongly 
contested and the judges spent a significant section of their judgment describing and analysing 
the evidence they had before them. The judges were not able to reach a unanimous decision 
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on this charge and Judge Nieto-Navia included a strong dissent on the majority’s findings on 
the responsibility of Galić for this shelling.126 
 
Despite his thorough demolition of the majority’s calculations regarding the technical analysis 
of the Markale Market shelling, when turning to the section of the majority’s findings entitled 
‘c.  Non-technical evidence concerning the source of fire’, Nieto-Navia is, however, less 
convincing. He only describes how Witness AF’s evidence cannot be relied on to establish the 
source of the shell. He does not counter the evidence from Suljić (who interviewed people 
from along the trajectory of the shell) or Witness AK-1 who were also specifically relied on in 
this regard by the trial chamber. He also does not mention Witness P who gave similar 
evidence mentioned earlier in the judgment.127 This section attempts to demonstrate that it is 
possible that it was the experience of the citizens of Sarajevo (as opposed to the technical or 
expert evidence) that gave the majority the confidence to find, beyond any reasonable doubt, 
that General Galić’s forces had fired the shell that hit Markale Market. 
 
Under their heading ‘c.  Non-technical evidence concerning the source of fire’, the majority of 
judges refer to Witness AK-1’s evidence as follows: 
 
At the time of the incident, Witness AK-1 was at her house in Sedrenik, located 
approximately 500 metres south to the confrontation lines, when she heard firing from 
the direction of Mrkovići.128  
 
The testimony surrounding that specifically referred to by the judges sets out the experience 
of the civilian witness that leads to her confidence in her knowledge of where the shot was 
fired from. It also includes that she was sure that the shot she heard fired from Bosnian Serb 
territory was the one that hit Markale Market.  
 
This experience becomes apparent when Witness AK-1 testifies to frequently hearing shots 
from Bosnian Serb held areas and, because of the geographical location of her house, being 
able to see the shells landing on the city: 
 
Q. Thank you. Now, did you hear shells being fired during the conflict? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was this a frequent or infrequent observation that you made of hearing shells 
fired? Did you hear it frequently or infrequently? 
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Q. Can you say if you heard the sound of the firing coming from any particular 
community? 
A.  Yes, yes. From when -- they were fired from Mrkovici, then one could hear them 
better when they were fired from Mrkovici than from some other parts of the city. 
When they came from this part, I could hear them well.129 
 
Witness AK-1 was sure she heard the shot that hit Markale Market on 5th February 1994 being 
fired and that it came from a Bosnian Serb held position. 
 
Q. Now, while you were out on the balcony, did you hear anything in particular after 
12.00? 
A. Yes. I heard a shot being fired, but I didn't move. I just stayed on the balcony. 
Q. When you say "a shot," could you tell us what you heard? A shot sounding like 
what? What did the shot that you speak of sound like? 
A.  Well, that sound, that sound was the regular sound that I heard always both from 
Mrkovici and from Trebevic. It's like when a plastic bottle bursts. 
…………………… 
Q. Did it -- from what type of weapon did it -- did this shot sound like it was fired from? 
Heavy or light weapon? 
A. That sound was always made by a shell. 
Q. After you heard this sound which you describe as always being made by a shell, did 
you observe anything in the vicinity of the city? 
… 
A. I'm rather high up. My house is on a slope, and it was a clear day where I lived, 
because we're on a hill. But in the city, it was rather cloudy. It was rather overcast. And 
nevertheless, I could see smoke coming out from that part of the market, lots of 
smoke. 
Q. Which market is that? 
A. Markale. 
Q. About how long after you heard the shot of the shell from Mrkovici did you see the 
smoke coming from Markale? 
A. Well, it didn't take long. Could have been --     
Q. Could you estimate the time? Just an estimate, please. 
A. Well, a couple of seconds. Not long. 
Q. What do you mean by "a couple"? Could you just give us an estimate in numbers? 
We know it's an estimate. We know you can't be certain. 
A. I don't know. Could have been five seconds, say. Really, I can't judge. I can't assess 
that.130 
 
Witness Suljić was a lawyer who spent a year in the ABiH before transferring to work as a 
crime scene inspector for the Security Services Centre (the police force in Sarajevo) and was in 
the War Crimes and Genocide department at the relevant time. The judges refer to his 
testimony as follows: 
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Suljić testified that after it was determined that the shell was launched from the 
direction north north-east, he conducted interviews with persons living along the flight 
path of the shell and these interviewees confirmed that the shell was fired from the 
direction of Mrkovići.1646 [1646 Sulji}, T. 6903. ]131 
 
Witness Suljić’s testimony (including at the page referred to by the judges in their footnotes) 
again provided more detail and evidence of his confidence in his findings. Under cross 
examination he provided the following testimony which set out why he was convinced by what 
people he interviewed told him, even if they were ‘lay persons’: 
 
Q. Can you please tell us what these people told you, what they had heard? 
A. All these people -- most of these people who were in their apartments at the time 
or just outside their houses, they stated that they had heard at the specified time the 
shell being fired, the sound of the shell flying over and the explosion, which was 
followed by a plume of dark smoke from the location of the city centre and the 
Markale location, according to their testimony. 
Q. Can you confirm that all these people that were interviewed were, in fact, the 
people who are lay persons, who have never been in contact with any shells? And did 
they not confirm to you that they were not present when shells were fired? 
A. Since this was the second year of the war, all the citizens had quite a lot of 
experience and quite a lot of knowledge of the shells and projectiles so that these 
citizens, in fact, had already seen the explosions of projectiles. 
Q. According to you, on the basis of the sound that follows the firing of the shell, is it 
possible to determine the direction from which it was fired on the basis of the sound? 
A. If you hear the moment of the firing and the explosion of the shell that follows later 
on and if you hear the sound of the projectile flying over your head, you can assume 
from which direction the shell had been fired, more or less. And you can see where it 
exploded.132 
 
The problem with this evidence is apparent, however, in the use of the words ‘assume’ and 
‘more or less’ in the final paragraph of the extract. These words do not tend to convince on a 
beyond reasonable doubt standard because of the element of presumption and lack of 
accuracy involved. Beyond this, however, it is also clear that those living in Sarajevo did have 
significant knowledge of who was firing from where and at what. 
 
Witness P, another civilian, could actually see certain firing positions from her house:  
 
A. During the war, I was in Sarajevo. I worked throughout the war. I would have to pass 
through the town. Everything was shelled. And from the window of my house, I was 
able to see the firing positions. When you're looking straight ahead from my window, 
the view is not obstructed in any way, so it was possible for me to see the positions 
from which the shelling came. 
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Q. Which district could you see from which the shelling came? 
A. Borije, straight ahead. Then to the right, Trebevic. And Spicasta Stijena on the left-
hand side, with Mrkovici just above it.133 
 
Her evidence as to the source of the shell that hit Markale Market relied on her knowledge of 
the location of the firing positions and being able to tie this in with the sound she heard on the 
day of the shelling of the Markale Market:  
 
Q. …At about 12.00 that day, where in particular were you in your house? 
A. I said -- sorry, I was at home, at the window, talking with a neighbour living above 
me. 
Q. While you were there talking with your neighbour, did anything happen that you 
noticed? 
A. It was incredibly quiet, a very calm day. 
Q. And did you notice anything while you were there talking with your neighbour? 
A. No. No. Nothing. 
Q. Very well. Can you say what the weather was like that day? 
A. Quite nice. 
Q. And while you were there at your window talking with your neighbour, what 
happened? 
A. We heard a bang -- I mean, that something was fired. And there was this strident 
sound going over the building. 
Q. The sound you heard, the bang you heard, from which direction did it come? 
A. From Mrkovici. 
Q. About what time did you hear this bang? 
A. It was 12.00, 20 past 12.00, thereabouts. I'm not quite sure. I don't know the exact 
time. 
Q. Now, after you heard that bang, did you hear or observe anything in the town of 
Sarajevo? 
A. And then we heard a harsh sound, and I knew that that shell had fallen nearby.134 
 
There was further evidence from Hadzimuratovic, a taxi driver who was near the market when 
the shell hit it, corroborating the other witness’ statements: 
 
Q. You said a shell fell. Prior to when this shell fell, did you hear or see anything? 
A. Yes, I heard the whistle of the shell as it flew over my head. 
Q. When you first heard the whistle of the shell, which direction was it coming from? 
A. It came from the north, from the direction of Mrkovici. 
Q. Was this the first time you had heard the whistling of a shell? 
A. Yes -- no. It wasn't the first time for me. It was the first time that day.  
Now, after you heard the whistling of the shell passing over you, did you hear anything 
after that? 
A. Yes, I heard the glass being broken and explosion, and then people started running 
towards me, fleeing from the market. 
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Q. Where did the sound of the explosion come from? 
A. To my left. 
Q. Do you know the place where it came from? 
A. Yes, from the market.135 
 
The judges had seemingly had similar critical thoughts about the evidentiary value of this form 
of testimony as in the same paragraph as the references to Witnesses AK-1 and Suljic’s 
evidence set out above, the judges finish by stating: 
 
Weapon specialists indicated that the noise made by the firing of a mortar can be used 
to determine the approximate direction of fire. Hamill testified that an observer 
hearing the sound of a mortar being fired “will not be able to determine a location, 
just a direction.”136 
 
In their conclusions to their findings on the shelling of Markale Market the judges state that: 
 
The Majority also emphasises that non-technical evidence supports the finding that a 
heavy weapon was fired from the direction north-northeast of Markale market from 
SRK-controlled territory at the time of the incident. The Trial Chamber finds reliable 
the testimony of Witness AF who heard at the time of the incident the sound of a 
heavy weapon being fired from behind an SRK position, Spicasta Stijena, at Mrkovići. 
The fact that Witness AF was at his mother’s house in Sedrenik when he heard that 
sound and not at his place in Vratnik does not cast doubt on his ability to assert a 
direction. The Majority is convinced by the evidence in the Trial Record, which 
establishes that the noise made by a firing mortar can be used to determine the 
approximate direction of fire.137 
 
This shows that the majority of the trial judges found it important to include the evidential 
support that non-technical evidence gave their finding of the source of fire of the Markale 
Market shell. This is consistent with their approach to other shelling incidents which included a 
record of the absence or presence of non-technical witness evidence as to the source of fire 
alongside more technical assessments, although even where there was such evidence they did 
not always find it sufficiently strong to base their findings on.138 The judges also set out in 
some detail the non-technical evidence they had received as to the source of the shelling in 
the different areas of Sarajevo in general as opposed to in relation to the scheduled 
incidents.139 
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The next section will set out a comparison of the approaches to and evidence received in 
relation to the shelling of Sarajevo and that of Knin in order to demonstrate the critical roles of 
expert, military and non-technical evidence in relation to charges of attacks against civilians. 
 
 
Comparison of the application of the principle of distinction in charges related to the shelling 
of Sarajevo and Knin in the context of expert/non expert/technical evidence 
 
One of the main impressions that arises from the transcripts of the trial of Galić is that the 
civilians living in Sarajevo through the indictment period had become, through hard 
experience, the experts on the shelling of the city. This is meant in the sense that they did not 
just know ‘what it was like’ to live through the years of the war in Sarajevo, they also tended to 
where the shots were being fired from and reasons for the different patterns of shelling. The 
argument of this section, building on the earlier parts of this chapter, is that their evidence was 
crucial to the findings of the trial chamber that the civilians rather than military objectives 
were being targeted. 
 
The shelling of Sarajevo and Knin were very different sets of actions. The shelling of locations 
within Sarajevo occurred over several years, in Knin it was only for 2 days. The number of 
troops within and defending Sarajevo was significant, those within Knin a lot less so. The 
Gotovina Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief succinctly summarised the situation in regard to Knin: 
 
As the Trial Chamber acknowledged, this was not a situation of blatant indiscriminate 
attacks on civilian population centers, or groups of assembled civilians.  Based on the 
Trial Chamber’s own findings, the targeting in Knin involved placing numerous lawful 
military objectives located within the city under attack in an effort to disrupt and 
degrade enemy capabilities in support of a deliberate main effort attack against 
entrenched SVK defensive positions with the objective of breach and exploitation of 
those defenses.140  
 
In the case of Sarajevo there was no attempt to take control of the city after the initial phase 
of the conflict. Although there was significant intermingling of civilians, military personnel and 
some military objectives, there was also less of a military imperative to fire into the city given 
that there was not a drive to take control of the city. The reference from the Gotovina 
Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief to ‘blatant indiscriminate attacks on civilian population centers, 
or groups of assembled civilians’ seems to be a reference to the attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. 
                                                          





The means by which unlawful attacks were charged were also different. Galić was charged 
with ordering unlawful attacks as a war crime, Gotovina was charged with ordering unlawful 
attacks as an act of persecution as a crime against humanity. In the case of Sarajevo the judges 
were presented with specific incidents in the form of a schedule to the indictment which 
formed the backbone of the evidence presented to them, however, they also recorded in the 
judgment the evidence of the general situation in Sarajevo and about other incidents by area. 
In relation to the scheduled incidents, they took the evidence for each separately and in turn 
considered whether there was a possible military objective that could have been the actual 
object of the attack. In relation to Knin, there was no such schedule. The judges started by 
asking where the military objectives were and whether they were what was being targeted. 
This seems to be the reverse approach to that adopted for Sarajevo in the Galić Trial 
Judgement. This could be because of the relatively smaller size and therefore complexity of 
Knin, but also perhaps because of criticism such as that from Judge Nieto-Navia that the 
approach to the situation in Sarajevo did not do the complexity of the intermingling of military 
and civilians justice. 
 
The part of the Galić Trial Judgement regarding the second scheduled shelling incident is an 
example of the Galić Trial Judges’ approach to the assessment of the question as to whether 
the attacking forces were respecting the principle of distinction or whether they were 
targeting civilians. A single 82mm calibre mortar shell landed on a water collection point, a 
queue of approximately 50-60 people in Dobrinja ‘C5’, and killed over ten and wounded over 
ten more.141 As can be seen from the witness evidence set out in the section on non-technical 
evidence above, those queuing for water had been there for many hours despite the fact that 
they felt unsafe as a concentrated group of civilians collecting water. 
 
The majority of the Trial Chamber were of the view that the shell originated from SRK held 
territory. They found that there were ‘no immediate military objectives near the well’ and, 
given in particular that the area around the well was repeatedly shelled after this specific 
incident, that the intended target had not been ‘the construction work for a trench leading to 
the airport tunnel, nor the ABiH command and frontlines, but the well where civilians were 
expected to be found and used’.142 
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Judge Nieto-Navia, however, did not agree and was not ‘satisfied that the Prosecution has 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that this projectile was deliberately fired from SRK-
controlled territory with the intention of harming civilians’,143 given the lack of certainty of the 
direction of the source of the shell and the ‘significant ABiH presence in the vicinity of the 
water pump’.144  Judge Nieto-Navia refers specifically to the presence of  
 
• the entrance of the tunnel from Dobrinja to Butmir, under construction at the time, 
which was placed from 30 to 200 metres away from the site of the incident by varying 
sources of evidence.145 (He also points out that it was unclear if the SRK knew of the 
location of the Dobrinja entrance.) 
• an ABiH command post approximately 100 metres from the water pump.146 
• The front line. Evidence was presented that it could have been ‘as close as 50 metres’ 
to the site of the incident.147 Other evidence was presented that it was about 150 to 
200 metres away.148 
• Military trenches about 50 metres from the site of the incident (although witness was 
not sure if they were present at the time).149 
• ABiH positions near the airport which were the objects of SRK fire in the area.150 
 
Given the 200m rule adopted in Gotovina and the criticism of it for requiring too strict a 
standard of those firing at military objectives, the distances here are quite immediate. If the 
logic of the Gotovina case was followed (and these military objectives accepted as such) shells 
or bombs landing within these distances set out by Judge Nieto-Navia would have been 
accepted as having been lawfully fired. 
 
Something was clearly of importance beyond actual physical distances in the assessment of the 
application of the principle of distinction in the case of Galić at least. In both cases the artillery 
gunners were seen as being capable of being accurate, given that they were professional and 
well trained. Both had significant intelligence of their potential targets. All were under a duty 
according to IHL to apply precautions in attack.  
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The expert witness Richard Higgs, who had recently retired from the British Army having 
served in it for 22 years gaining expertise in artillery, small arms and mortars,151 testified as to 
the fact that the distance by which the shot had missed the entrance to the tunnel, the angle 
by which it was fired and the fact that a second shell was not fired meant that, in his opinion, it 
was not the entrance to the tunnel that was being targeted: 
 
Q. What observations, if any, would you make on the theory that the intended target 
was not the water line, but the area immediately in front of the tunnel entrance? 
A. Now, the evidence, as I have it, does not lead to that -- for me to make that 
conclusion, as the round has missed by quite a considerable distance, take into 
account that this is a city location and some of the factors that go with that. And also, 
that -- then the tunnel was not reengaged with a more accurate round. 
Q. What about the difference in angle? Is that of any significance or not? 
A. The degree by which it has missed would not be one I would expect to see if this 
target had been pre-recorded. It is too great. And for that reason, it makes me believe 
that the round did hit its intended target.152 
 
The trial judges do not refer to this evidence from Higgs in their majority conclusion that ‘there 
was no immediate military objectives near the well, which could have explained the firing of a 
shell in that area’. They emphasised the fact that ‘the area around well where civilians pumped 
water was repeatedly shelled after the shelling incident of 12 July 1993’ and that the target 
‘was not the construction work for a trench leading to the airport tunnel, nor the ABiH 
command and frontlines, but the well where civilians were expected to be found and used’.153  
 
The testimony of the non-expert witnesses as to the dangers to civilians waiting to collect 
water therefore seems to have been the crucial element in the majority’s finding. Their finding 
was also, however, in accordance with the expert assessment of Higgs that the entrance to the 
tunnel was not the intended target and there was ‘no military purpose in firing one round 
alone at this location’.154 
 
The judges in the Gotovina Trial Judgement considered the attacks against several towns and 
villages, however, Knin was the main focus of their judgement and therefore has been the 
main focus of this study. One of, if not the key question, the judges were presented with in the 
Gotovina trial was whether the town of Knin was targeted as such, that is, without any 
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distinction to be made between any possible military objectives and the civilian and civilian 
objects within the town.  
 
The evidence given by Mrkšić demonstrates the difficulty of the evidence that was being 
presented to the judges in the Gotovina case. Within a few minutes evidence was presented of 
intelligence of ‘fire transferred on….residential buildings’ and then Mrkšić’s assessment of the 
seemingly opposite that  
 
They had to have had a GPS system and a target analysts group because it was so 
precise. I never asked these gentlemen here what it was they shelled us with. But they 
continued to shell me, not the town, and that is something which amazed me, because 
had they continued, they would have finished their job.155 
 
The Trial Chamber concluded, however, that the HV had at times deliberately fired on civilian 
objects and areas and that this was ‘consistent with the plain text of those orders to put towns 
under artillery fire, meaning to treat whole towns, including Knin, as targets when firing 
artillery projectiles during Operation Storm’.156 As well as the evidence of the locations in 
which shells had landed, the ‘TS-4’s reporting of firing at Knin or at the general area of Knin on 
two occasions on 4 and 5 August 1995, as well as with the 7th Guards Brigade’s reports of 
firing at S-numbered targets on the Ivančića map’, this finding that the HV had not complied 
with the principle of distinction was strongly influenced by the ‘impression gained’ by the 
witnesses such as Dreyer, Forand, Bellerose, Hendriks, Gilbert, Liborius, and Stig Marker 
Hansen ‘that the shelling impacted all over Knin and was indiscriminate’.157 
 
What is interesting here is that the impression that those actually subject to the shelling in 
Knin seem collectively to have given the trial judges of an indiscriminate bombardment was 
not passed on to the appeal judges. Despite the extent to which the trial judges had included 
this evidence in their judgement, the majority of the Appeals Chamber emphasised the 
seeming caution the Trial Chamber had in relation to this evidence. The majority of the 
Appeals Chamber found that the trial chamber had viewed the relevant evidence of Dreyer, 
Forand, Bellerose, Hendriks, Gilbert, Liborius, and Stig Marker Hansen ‘cautiously, noting that 
many witnesses had little artillery training, may have had trouble assessing artillery impacts 
while under fire, and may have mistaken shelling outside of Knin for shelling inside the town’ 
and that the ‘Trial Chamber relied on this evidence only in the context of other findings on the 
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record’.158 The majority of the Appeals Chamber found that on this basis it ‘would not be 
reasonable to rely on these testimonies independent of further supporting evidence’.159 
 
The civilian witnesses who provided evidence in relation to Knin, and equally, the military 
witnesses, had had much less time to establish knowledge of the situation than those in 
Sarajevo. It is apparent that with a shorter military campaign there will be less evidence to 
show an intention to harm civilians as part of the campaign, if that was in fact the case. There 
was very little evidence relied on from the civilians themselves in the Gotovina Trial Judgement 
in relation to the shelling of Knin. A significant number of the international military in Knin for 
the two days it was shelled seemed, however, to have no doubt that fire was being directed at 





The second element of the research question asked how the judges approached and decided 
on questions of evidence in relation to the law of targeting and what influences were apparent 
on this, including whether the principle of humanity had a role here. In the demarcation of the 
law of targeting, establishing what crimes had been committed from an assessment of the 
evidence before them measured against their legal definitions was at the heart of the judges’ 
work. It was also, however, not a straightforward process.  
 
The absence of direct evidence of the intentions behind those firing the shells and bombs that 
killed and harmed civilians led to the judges having to consider a substantial amount of indirect 
evidence of this intention that was available to them, including the effects of the shots fired, to 
make their decisions. In some cases there was disagreement between the judges as to 
whether the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt had been met.  
 
In this landscape of indirect evidence, there was room for the judges to be guided as to what 
the intention must have been by those with ‘expertise’ on the matters before them. The use 
made of expert witness as such, however, can be seen to be less than problem free. The 
debate over the question of who in fact shelled Zenica in the case of Blaškić was a forerunner 
to the debates over expert evidence that would be a feature of the Galić case. In Blaškić the 
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mathematical calculations of the defence expert were found to be convincing compared to the 
reasoning of those who had examined the impact point although they could not completely 
refute the prosecution case. In Galić, and in relation to the shelling of Markale Market in 
particular, the use of expert evidence again could not provide certainty as to the source of the 
shelling with nothing more. It definitely could not provide evidence as to the intention of those 
who fired the shot. In the case of Gotovina there was an apparent lack of the necessary 
technical evidence that an expert witness would have been expected to provide, in particular 
in relation to margins of error of the weapons that were being used and the distinction 
between the expected margin of error on a first shot and then subsequent ones. 
 
In the absence of expert witnesses providing all the guidance the judges were looking for, it is 
clear from the trial transcript that the judges were interested in hearing the experiences and 
opinions of those with military backgrounds. They did not enforce a strict expert/non-expert 
division in this regard. The judges were strongly guided by the military experience presented to 
them They apparently considered that their findings as to the existence of unlawful attacks 
were in line with a body of military opinion even if this did not always turn out to be the case 
when their judgments were issued and considered at Appeal.  
 
The Blaškić Trial Judges relied on the views of the international military as to the nature of the 
attacks they were considering and on the level of organisation that must have been behind 
them. In Galić the military witnesses guided the judges as to what the use of artillery around 
Sarajevo was aimed towards. The Gotovina Trial Judges heard a significant amount of 
testimony from those with military experience that the shelling of Knin could not be reconciled 
with the principle of distinction. The Gotovina Trial Judges did not apparently think their view 
set out in their judgment was at odds with this. It is, however, inexplicable as to why these trial 
judges thought the ‘200m rule’ represented the testimony they had before them. 
 
The trial judges also relied on those with lived experience of the conflict even in relation to 
areas where technical or expert evidence was also presented. The contrast between the 
evidence witnesses could present in relation to the shelling of Sarajevo and Knin showed the 
value of the knowledge survivors accumulated through their experience. The findings of this 
study indicate the importance of civilian and civilian victim witnesses to proving that crimes of 
unlawful attack have taken place but also in proving who carried out the attacks; the potential 




investigated further. The judges clearly gave this evidence an important role, possibly as a part 
of their perceived role of ensuring the testimony of the victims was heard and recording the 
experiences of the victims and witnesses to the events under examination at the ICTY. 
 
A common feature of these three cases was that the judges were able to take the evidence 
obtained by the OTP and come to findings as to whether criminal breaches the laws of war had 
been committed. Importantly, in showing that a court of law could make factual findings that 
breaches of the principle of distinction as reflected in API had taken place, even in the difficult 
evidential situation that will inevitably surround a conflict, they were putting the principle of 
humanity found within API into action. 
 
The next chapter will turn to the last element of the demarcation of the law of targeting, 
where the line is finally drawn to demarcate the guilt or innocence of the accused. That is, how 
the judges approached the criminal responsibility of those commanders charged with targeting 
offences. It will look to the evidence presented to see what it was that the judges considered 
sufficient to find responsibility on the part of a commander, that is, not someone who fired, or 
potentially even directly ordered, the particular shots in question, for targeting offences. The 
question of indirect, or circumstantial evidence, will again be considered but in the context of 












This chapter looks at how the judges used the law and evidence to make their findings as to 
the guilt or innocence of the commanders before them. The question addressed by this 
chapter is what findings did the judges make in relation to individual criminal liability for acts 
breaching the law of targeting and, given this, can any influences can be identified regarding 
the judges’ findings as to criminal responsibility of military commanders specifically as it 
relates to the launching of unlawful attacks?  
 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the lack of use of convictions on the basis of Article 7(3) of 
the ICTY Statute regarding command or superior responsibility despite the real difficulty in 
proving any order has been given to launch an unlawful attack. This in turn translates into a 
need to rely on circumstantial evidence and therefore a broad consideration of the role and 
actions of the accused, including their political motivations. It also seeks to show that the ICTY 
judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint and they considered that their judgments 
were always supported by a body of military opinion – even if in places there were strongly 
opposing views. 
 
Guénaël Mettraux, in The Law of Command Responsibility, presents a powerful summary of 
the role of and standard expected from military commanders: 
 
The right equilibrium thus had to be found between the need to protect the weak and 
defenceless through adequate efforts on the part of people in authority with a view to 
prevent and punish crimes whilst accounting for the often grim realities of military 
command and political leadership. The world does not need saints. It can live with 
decent men. The law of superior responsibility is not attempting to hold leaders of 
men to a higher standard than that.1  
 
Michael Smidt describes the key role of the commander in combat operations being that ‘[t]he 
leader is the individual that establishes the command climate - the unit's collective sense of 
                                                          





right and wrong’.2 The question raised by these points from Mettraux and Smidt is what in fact 
is legally expected of a ‘decent’ commander given the power they exercise? The question the 
judges at the ICTY had to answer goes one step further; at what point does the conduct of a 
commander become not only not good and proper, but criminal? 
 
As emphasised in Chapter 1 (Introduction), the fact that the Prosecutor of the ICTY had 
decided to bring cases against military commanders, to ask judges to assess the legality of how 
they conducted their campaigns – that is, assessing how they did what it is they have been 
trained to do and do as part of their very existence – is extremely rare and potentially an 
important precedent. As the early cases at the ICTY were prepared and heard, there was no 
existing rulebook on what was relevant or not to the prosecution of commanders for acts 
carried out by their subordinates. 
 
As also mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction), findings of the ICTY have always been open to, 
at the least, the suggestion that they contain judge made law. In the specific context of 
command responsibility, Mettraux states that ‘[a] great deal of the law-making activity of 
international courts and tribunals was necessary to transform the doctrine of command 
responsibility from an anarchy of sometimes contradictory precedents into a consistent body 
of law’ and points out how little the principle of legality has been considered by the judges in 
setting out the boundaries of command responsibility.3 
 
After establishing that unlawful attacks had taken place, in Blaškić there was a critical and 
ultimately decisive (given the result of the appeal) question over who exercised command over 
the individuals carrying out the relevant attacks. The trial chamber, having found that it was 
Blaškić who was in command, considered whether Blaškić purposefully issued orders that led 
to the attacks and then, even if not, did he have a duty to investigate and punish the 
perpetrators and if so, had he done so.  
 
The trial judges in Galić set out early on in their judgment that there were two stages to the 
decision they were required to make. They firstly had to establish ‘whether the Prosecution’s 
allegations that SRK personnel committed the criminal acts alleged in the Indictment have 
been proved beyond reasonable doubt’ and secondly, ‘what, if any, criminal responsibility 
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General Galić incurs for any such criminal acts committed by SRK personnel’.4 Galić was in fact 
found guilty, by the majority, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, that is under individual 
responsibility rather than command responsibility.  
 
In Gotovina it was clear who was carrying out the attacks in question, who their commanders 
were and who had ordered the attacks take place. The question was what specifically had 
Gotovina and Markač ordered to be fired at. This ultimately seems to have come down to the 
content of one specific order that was, however, capable of more than one interpretation and 
an assessment of the conduct of the shelling that took place. The OTP case was, however, not 
simply based on a charge of ordering an unlawful attack. Their case was that Gotovina and 
Markač were individually criminally responsible due to their role in a joint criminal enterprise. 
A large section of the Gotovina Trial Judgement is therefore taken up with evidence relating to 
the alleged existence of a joint criminal enterprise (‘JCE’) of which, on any reading, Gotovina 
and Markač were only a small part or not a part at all. Questions relating to this JCE are 
discussed later on in this chapter. 
 
Despite the technical legal nature of what responsibility entails, whether or not someone is 
responsible is again fundamentally a question of evidence or the absence of evidence. This 
chapter therefore concentrates on the evidence that was found sufficient to decide that a 
commander was criminally responsible for crimes committed in the midst of ongoing 
hostilities, against the background of the debate over the nature of command responsibility in 
general and at the ICTY in particular.5 It is clear that the evidence of the effects on the ground 
of a particular artillery shot are only very imperfect evidence of what was in the mind of the 
person firing and potentially even less of what their commander intended and whether this 
met any level of criminal responsibility.  
 
Given a lack of evidence of a mental state or intention, what evidence does suffice? William 
Fenrick states that ‘[g]enerally speaking, circumstantial evidence will be essential to proving 
responsibility for persons in superior or command positions.’6 This chapter will consider how 
the judges at the ICTY put this into practice. 
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It might be obvious, but it is perhaps worth pointing out, that, evidence given in private session 
apart, the judgements contain the best evidence the judges have had before them, albeit not 
the totality of evidence. If there is something that seems ambiguous, or cannot be explained, 
then that is the position that remains. The very purpose of a criminal trial to simply establish 
guilt or innocence of a particular individual and the partial picture it can present limits the 
information that it can provide as to the ‘personality, motive, and rationale’ of the accused.7 
Whatever the evidence before them, however, the judges have to decide on guilt having been 
proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 
 
In considering what influenced the judges in finding criminal responsibility (or otherwise) of 
the commanders, this chapter first considers what is required for criminal intention. It then 
looks to how the judges approached the question of ‘ordering’ criminal conduct which, given 
that none of the commanders had physically committed any of the crimes charged, was the 
main route by which the commanders had potentially incurred individual responsibility. Finally, 
it looks to the role of evidence of ‘agreement’ or ‘collusion’ with the overarching political plan 
as a factor in a commander’s criminal responsibility. 
 
 
Criminal intention  
 
As William Boothby sets out, the requirements on commanders as to the degree of care they 
are required to take in launching an attack is not straightforward.8 The charges brought against 
Galić, Blaškić and Gotovina, however, alleged more than a lack of sufficient care; they alleged a 
criminal intention of the commander behind the criminal acts of targeting carried out by their 
subordinates.  
 
The term ‘command responsibility’ used in legal literature is usually a very specific one, 
referring to a particular means of criminal liability that can be incurred by those in a position of 
command for actions carried out by their subordinates. This legal doctrine of command (or 
superior) responsibility was incorporated into the ICTY Statute in Article 7(3).  
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It is possible, however, for commanders to incur individual liability through acts of their 
subordinates in other ways, for example, by ordering or by aiding and abetting the actions of 
others as included in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Thomas Henquet puts the situation very 
clearly when he describes command responsibility in a broad sense, covering the different 
ways in which a superior may incur responsibility for the conduct of his subordinates, and 
which is covered by both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute: 9 
 
Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute thus cover distinct modes of command 
responsibility. Responsibility under Article 7(1) for participation in a crime through a 
subordinate may be termed “direct command responsibility.” By contrast, failure to 
act in the face of subordinate criminal conduct results in “indirect command 
responsibility” or “command responsibility strictu sensu” under Article 7(3).10 
 
This acknowledgement that the potential individual responsibility of commanders is broader 
than the doctrine of ‘command responsibility’ is a useful one to give, albeit perhaps blindingly 
obvious once it has been stated. It also needs to be kept in mind to establish exactly what 
‘command responsibility’ is being discussed at any time. The idea of ‘command’, however, 
remains a key concept even when considering Article 7(1) responsibility of commanders.  
 
In the three cases under consideration, it is the Article 7(1) individual responsibility that was 
the key charge against the commanders. Henquet describes a preference by the judges right 
from the start of the work of the ICTY for convictions to be made under Article 7(1) rather than 
Article 7(3), emphasising the individual responsibility of those in command, the criminal nature 
of their own actions rather than those of their subordinates.11 Harmen Van der Wilt also cites 
this reason that Article 7(1) ‘better reflected the involvement and culpability of the accused’ 
for the lack of Article 7(3) convictions, given that ‘[one] might have expected that superior 
responsibility would have abounded in the case law of the ICTY to sustain the conviction of 
military commanders’. Van der Wilt provides some other potential explanations as being the 
difficulty in proving command responsibility this long after the events in question and perhaps 
a reluctance on the part of the judges to convict for such serious crimes on the basis of ‘had 
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reason to know’, potentially an omission or less than definite intent.12 Gideon Boas, James 
Bischoff and Natalie Reid point out (in relation to convictions on the basis of JCE) a ‘visceral 
desire to label the accused a ‘committer’ of the crime in question, as if that label carried with it 
a special stigma that the other forms of responsibility lack’.13 
 
Boas, Bischoff and Reid also highlight the Blaškić Appeal Chamber’s finding that where criminal 
responsibility is charged for the same conduct under both Article 7(1) and 7(3) the judges must 
enter a conviction under Article 7(1). They conclude, however, that this is an unnecessary and 
unhelpful limitation on the ability of trial judges to determine the most appropriate form of 
responsibility of the accused.14 
 
None of the commanders in the cases in question here was found guilty of carrying out 
unlawful attacks solely under Article 7(3) ICTY Statute. Blaškić was initially found guilty 
pursuant to Article 7(1) and ‘in any event’ found to meet the conditions of Article 7(3) although 
this was overridden on appeal, Galić was found guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) and Gotovina 
and Markač were also initially found guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) through participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise, also overridden on appeal.  
 
Daniel Heilmann describes Galić as a ‘borderline case’; what seemed like a classic case of 
command responsibility brought under Article 7(1) through circumstantial evidence that Galić 
had ordered the crimes. He states 
 
Ultimately the question at the heart of the issue concerns the point at which the 
superior has such effective control over his troops and their actions that it amounts to 
control over the crime itself (which is perpetrated on the ground by his subordinates). 
If a critical threshold is crossed (e.g. by an omission that amounts to facilitation), the 
superior himself may become an indirect (co-)perpetrator of the crime.15 
 
Given this description of the importance placed on Article 7(1) for the responsibility of 
commanders, this chapter therefore (and contrary to expectations at the start of this research) 
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concentrates in particular on how the judges found individual responsibility under Article 7(1). 
This can be found to be incurred in several ways, or ‘modes’ in addition to actually having 
physically carried out the act in question. This includes planning, instigating or ordering a crime 
and aiding and abetting in the execution of a crime as well as through participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise (‘JCE’). Each of the modes has been defined by the ICTY judges but the key 
mode for commanders is through ‘ordering’ whose definition and application will be 
considered in detail below.  
 
In considering the guilt or innocence of military commanders, the judges were inferring 
responsibility from principles of the ‘qualities’ of a chain of command. That is, the 
commanders in question were not firing the artillery but by virtue of their position they were 
responsible for those who were and were in a position to give orders and expect to have them 
obeyed, to decide where the troops, guns and mortars were deployed and providing 
ammunition.  
 
One point to note is that although the judges at the ICTY use the terms ‘mens rea’ and ‘actus 
reus’ in setting out the requirements for criminal responsibility other than as a direct 
perpetrator, it is not in fact correct to describe them in this way. As is stated at the very start 
of the practitioner volume ‘Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, discussions 
of whether a commander is liable for a crime they did not physically commit is the attribution 
of responsibility for the crime through a means other than commission of the crime. This 
attribution of responsibility does not require a mens rea or actus reus and the ICTY judgments 
have created some confusion by referring to these terms in this context. It is only the 
underlying criminal act that is defined by its actus reus and mens rea.16  
 
This is an important distinction as concerns commanders’ responsibility for questions of 
targeting as it means that there is a differentiation between their liability and that of those 
firing the shots. The question is not whether they committed the crime of unlawful attack but 
whether they ordered it and therefore hold some criminal responsibility for its commission.  
 
There are, however, still mental/intent and physical/participation requirements for criminal 
responsibility to be found. One interesting factor for the purpose of the cases under 
consideration was that a criminal order could be given with ‘direct intent’ (an intention that a 
                                                          
16 Boas, Bischoff and Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library Volume 1: Forms of 




crime ordered be committed) or ‘indirect intent’ (awareness of ‘the substantial likelihood that 
a crime would be committed as a consequence of’ the order given).17 How the judges applied 
this criminal intention is the focus of the next section. 
 
 
Criminal Intention for ‘ordering’ 
 
Blaškić was charged with having ‘together with members of the HVO, planned, instigated, 
ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of unlawful 
attacks on civilians and civilian objects and wanton destruction not justified by military 
necessity in the following cities, towns and villages, and, or in the alternative, knew or had 
reason to know that subordinates were about to do the same, or had done so, and failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof….’, that is on the basis of both Article 7(1) and 7(3) responsibility.18 
 
The Blaškić Trial Chamber held that the relevant criminal intent for ordering a crime was that 
the accused ‘directly or indirectly intended that the crime in question be committed’.19 
Interestingly they highlighted the Akayesu Trial Chamber opinion that there ‘is no requirement 
that the order be in writing or in any particular form; it can be express or implied. That an 
order was issued may be proved by circumstantial evidence’.20 The Blaškić Trial Chamber also 
stated that ‘an order does not need to be given by the superior directly to the person(s) who 
perform(s) the actus reus of the offence’, stating that it was ‘irrelevant whether the illegality of 
the order was apparent on its face’ as it was the mens rea of the commander, not subordinate 
following the order, that was important.21  
 
Blaškić was found to have ‘ordered the attacks that gave rise to these crimes’ and to have 
been negligent about or given orders while ‘intentionally [taking] the risk that very violent 
crimes would result’ or that he ‘had to have known that… extremely violent crimes would 
necessarily result’ in the case of the others.22 These confusing pronouncements on the 
requisite mens rea for ordering a crime with less than direct intent were overridden by the 
                                                          
17 Boas, Bischoff and Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library Volume 1: Forms of 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law, 344.  
18 Blaškić Second Amended Indictment dated 25 April 1997, paragraph 8. 
19 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 278. 
20 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 281. 
21 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 282. 




Appeals Chamber. They established the requirement for the ‘awareness of the substantial 
likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order’.23 
 
Galić was charged with ‘individual criminal responsibility for planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting, in the planning, preparation or execution of the 
campaign of shelling and sniping against the civilian population of Sarajevo and the acts set 
forth below by the forces and persons under his command, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the 
Statute of the Tribunal’ as well as for responsibility pursuant to Article 7(3).24 The prosecution 
had narrowed the emphasis to ‘ordering’ by the time of writing their Final Trial Brief.25 
 
The majority of the Galić Trial judges in explaining the differences between the potential 
Article 7(1) and 7(3) liability emphasised that ‘the key point in all of this is that a superior with 
a guilty mind may not avoid Article 7(1) responsibility by relying on his or her silence or 
omissions or apparent omissions or understated participation or any mixture of overt and non-
overt actions, where the effect of such conduct is to commission crimes by subordinates’.26 
This is clearly aimed at the particular situation of Galić where there was little evidence of what 
his participation involved. They noted that Galić would have been aware of regulations 
‘concerning the application of the laws of war to the armed forces of the SFRY’ which provided 
for responsibility as an instigator or participant for a commander who allowed his subordinates 
to continue to commit violations of the laws of war, which the judges conclude translates to 
Article 7(1) type liability.27 
 
With an obvious eye again to the type of evidence they had before them, the judges state that 
‘Proof of all forms of criminal responsibility can be given by direct or circumstantial evidence’28 
and go on to give the example that ordering (emphasised by the Prosecution in its Final Trial 
Brief): 
 
                                                          
23 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 42: 
The Appeals Chamber therefore holds that a person who orders an act or omission with the 
awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that 
order, has the requisite mens rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to 
ordering. Ordering with such awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime. 
 
24 Galić Indictment dated 26 March 1999, paragraphs 10-11. 
25 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 167. 
26 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 169. 
27 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 170. 




may be inferred from a variety of factors, such as the number of illegal acts, the 
number, identity and type of troops involved, the effective command and control 
exerted over these troops, the logistics involved, the widespread occurrence of the 
illegal acts, the tactical tempo of operations, the modus operandi of similar acts, the 
officers and staff involved, the location of the superior at the time and the knowledge 
of that officer of criminal acts committed under his command.29  
 
The judges set out that the ‘requisite mens rea for all forms of participation under Article 7(1) 
is that the accused “acted in the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a criminal act or 
omission would occur as a consequence of his conduct.”’ They also set out that the ‘mens rea 
of the accused need not be explicit but may be inferred from the circumstances’.30 
 
The judges were willing to look at the difference between de jure and de facto command and 
ensure that the accused was, in fact, the commander exercising command power, and, further, 
whether this was actually ‘effective’ power.31 In considering the ‘Effectiveness of the 
Command and Control of the Chain of Command’ the Galić trial judges specifically consider the 
following elements of the chain of command: 
 
(a) The Structure of the SRK  
(b) The Reporting and Monitoring Systems of the SRK  
(c) Was the SRK Personnel under Strict Control?  
(i) Procedure for Instructions and Orders  
(ii) Control over Sniping Activity  
(iii) Control over Shelling Activity  
(iv) Control over SRK Weaponry  
(d) Was General Galić in a Position to Punish his Subordinates?32  
 
In this section of the Galić Trial Judgement, the judges emphasised the ‘functioning’ chain of 
command, the strength of the ‘hierarchy’ and the military professionalism seen by the 
witnesses, of whom there were many present and former members of various armed forces.33 
                                                          
29 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 171. 
30 Galić Trial Judgement at paragraph 172. For authority for this point the judges cite the Čelebići Trial 
Judgement at paragraph 328 which in turn cites the Tadić Trial Judgement at paragraph 676. Paragraph 
676 of the Tadić Trial Judgement cited the jurisprudence of two of the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials 
including that of the Justice Case which noted that ‘knowledge and intent can be inferred from the 
circumstances’. 
31 For example, see Galić Trial Judgement at paragraph 606 onwards. 
32 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 614 onwards. 




The forms and means of communication (in the broadest sense) were also important.34 In 
terms of Galić’s control over the shelling activity, the judges set out evidence regarding the 
level of coordination involved, the authorisation that must have been required for the amount 
of ammunition used and the links between periods of particularly frequent or infrequent 
shelling to broader political events which implied the shelling was used as a means by Galić 
and his superiors to bring pressure on the Sarajevan political leaders.35  
 
Galić would really have had to have been actively oblivious, as well as having some form of 
agreement between his subordinates not to tell him anything about what was happening, and 
he would have had to forget anything directly told to him, for him not to have knowledge of 
what was happening.36 There is clearly a further important step required for a finding that 
Galić was responsible for ‘ordering’ what happened. The discussion of Article 7(1) liability in 
this case shows the judges were thinking about the breadth of the evidence they could accept 
to show the required awareness and, that there was a majority finding here, demonstrates 
that there were fundamental disagreements even regarding the legal details of the basis on 
which Galić could be convicted.  
 
The Galić Trial Judges considered Galić’s place in the overall political and military structure, 
considering those above, next to and below him in the chain of command, although they do 
not provide great detail on this. They did not find him to be ‘the unique architect of that 
campaign’37 and in the section specifically on Galić’s liability, it was found that  
 
In sum, the evidence impels the conclusion that General Galić, although put on notice 
of crimes committed by his subordinates over whom he had total control, and who 
consistently and over a long period of time (twenty-three months) failed to prevent 
the commission of crime and punish the perpetrators thereof upon that knowledge, 
furthered a campaign of unlawful acts of violence against civilians through orders 
relayed down the SRK chain of command and that he intended to conduct that 
campaign with the primary purpose of spreading terror within the civilian population 
of Sarajevo. The Majority finds that General Galić is guilty of having ordered the crimes 
proved at trial.38 
 
Gotovina and Markač were charged, ‘in addition or alternatively’ to their participation in a 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (‘JCE’) with ‘individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the 
                                                          
34 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 618-628. 
35 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 637-652. 
36 See, for example, Galić Trial Judgement at paragraphs 618-623. 
37 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 747. 




Statute pursuant to the modes of liability of committing, planning, instigating, ordering, and/or 
aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, and/or execution of the crimes charged’ as well 
as under Article 7(3).39 The nature of JCE criminal liability is described in more detail in section 
5.3 below. 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges summarised the requirements for liability for ordering as: 
 
1959. Ordering. Liability may be incurred by ordering the principal perpetrator to 
commit a crime or to engage in conduct that results in the commission of a crime. The 
person giving the order must, at the time it is given, be in a position of formal or 
informal authority over the person who commits the crime. The person giving the 
order must intend that the crime be committed or be aware of the substantial 
likelihood that the crime would be committed in the execution of the order.40 
 
The trial judges, however, found Gotovina and Markač liable pursuant to the mode of liability 
of JCE. It was found that Gotovina’s order ‘to unlawfully attack civilians and civilian objects 
amounted, in and of itself, to a significant contribution to the JCE’ and that he ‘intended that 
his actions contribute to the JCE’.41 The trial judges did not find it necessary to come to any 
conclusions on the other modes of liability alleged in the indictment.42 The Gotovina Trial 
Chamber found that 
 
considering the nature of his conduct and in particular the unlawful attack, the Trial 
Chamber finds that Gotovina knew that there was a widespread and systematic attack 
against a civilian population and that his acts were part of that attack…. the Trial 
Chamber finds that Gotovina had the state of mind that the crimes forming part of the 
objective should be carried out.43 
 
Markač was found to have ordered unlawful attacks on Gračac as well as having taken no 
action to prevent or to report or punish crimes committed by those under his control in Gračac 
on 5 and 6 August 1995. The Trial Judges made the same findings regarding Markač’s 
contribution to the JCE as for Gotovina. 44 
                                                          
39 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraphs 1955, 1961. 
40 Gotovina Trial Judgement at paragraph 1959 citing the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, 
paragraphs 28-30; Galić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 176; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, 
paragraph 481, Semanza Appeal Judgement, paragraph 361, Milošević Appeal Judgement, paragraph 
290, Boškoski and Tarčulovksi Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 160, 164, Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, 
paragraph 213 and Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 42 – demonstrating the depth of authority that 
had been accumulated on this definition. 
41 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 2370-2371, 2375. 
42 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraph 2375. 
43 Gotovina Trial Judgement, paragraphs 2370-2371. 





The Appeals Chamber concluded, by a majority, that the Trial Chamber had been wrong. They 
held that the artillery attacks ordered by Gotovina and Markač could not be found beyond 
reasonable doubt by a reasonable trier of fact to have been unlawful. In consequence they 
found that there had not been a JCE of which they were a part ‘to permanently remove the 
Serb civilian population from the Krajina by force or threat of force’.45 By a majority, they 
found no grounds to enter a conviction under any alternate mode of liability for both Gotovina 
and Markač.46  
 
The outcome of the ICTY jurisprudence is to make it clear that someone who gives an order 
where there is a substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the execution of 
the order will be criminally liable for that order (as well as where they have directly ordered a 
crime be committed). This level of intent has been seen to draw on a recklessness standard 
which requires at the least an awareness that the crime will probably occur.47 This can be 
compared to the mens rea required for someone to have been found to have committed the 
crime of unlawful attack which is that they have to have done so ‘wilfully’. This standard is 
drawn directly from the IHL standard set out in Article 85 API and its ICRC Commentary and 





Following on from the previous section which set out the importance of ‘ordering’, as opposed 
to command responsibility, as a means of criminal responsibility for unlawful attacks in these 
cases, this section considers how the judges approached the evidence they were presented 
with of the orders given by the accused. It will demonstrate that there was a real question in 
all the cases over whether orders to launch unlawful attacks had been given by the accused.  
 
This chapter will first look at the interpretation of orders that were in evidence before the 
judges - various ‘defensive’ orders interpreted as ‘attack’ orders by the judges in Blaškić and 
                                                          
45 Gotovina Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 83-84, 96. 
46 Gotovina Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 99-136, 137-157. 
47 Boas, Bischoff and Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library Volume 1: Forms of 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law, 350.  




key orders to attack in Gotovina. It will then consider the inference of the existence of 
unlawful orders (even in the presence of orders to comply with IHL) in the case of Galić. 
 
 
Interpretation of orders 
 
In Blaškić there was a real question of what technical/de jure command of an area/territory 
translated to in terms of actual effective control over what was happening in it and how this 
translated to criminal responsibility or not. Blaškić’s orders were used as evidence of his power 
of command over particular units.49 The judges also considered the views of independent 
observers, an order from Blaškić’s own superiors and evidence of the ‘frequency of the 
meetings between the accused and the commander of the Vitezovi’.50  
 
The scope of Blaškić’s criminal responsibility was also mainly determined by the interpretation 
of orders he had given presented in evidence to the judges. This includes information obtained 
from the orders as to who was under his command as well as what he was asking them to do.51 
In the Blaškić Trial Judgement the judges concluded, for example, that those who had carried 
out the lorry bombing of 18 April 1993 in Stari Vitez had been under Blaškić’s command and 
could not have carried out the attacks without his orders, in particular given that he was the 
only person who could have authorised the use of the explosives used in the bombing.52 This 
implication drawn from circumstantial evidence of authority over military resources was also 
raised in the context of control of artillery in the Galić case.53  
 
The Blaškić Appeal Chamber in fact agreed that ‘the Trial Chamber’s finding that the Appellant 
was in control of explosives in the Vitez factory and that he was therefore responsible for the 
lorry bombing could have been reasonably reached on the basis of trial evidence’. They also 
noted, however, that this was circumstantial evidence only and that it was contradicted by 
new evidence that had been admitted on appeal.54  
                                                          
49 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 519-525. 
50 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 526-528. 
51 See, for example, Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 433-495. 
52 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 530. 
53 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 653, 697-699. 
54 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 448-455, which included the following: 
448. The Appeals Chamber notes that the explosion did not take place in the centre of Stari 
Vitez, and that the casualties included three solders and four civilians.  However, the Appeals 





The ‘gaps’ in the documentation provided were noted by the judges.55 Within the orders they 
did have before them, Blaškić was also seen to have shown the position he had adopted on the 
broader political picture, including elements that were seen to be incitement to commit 
crimes, not professional military instructions. These terms were also, however, subject to 
debate as to their correct interpretation, as can be seen from the discussion as to the meaning 
of ‘mop-up’ operations below.56 
 
In relation to the attack on Ahmići, Blaškić denied that he had ordered the attack. Blaškić’s 
defence provided three orders he had given just before the time of the attack and described 
these as orders to take a defensive position.57 The Trial Chamber did not interpret these orders 
in line with Blaškić’s arguments and nor did they take them at face value. They in fact found 
that the third order (D269) was an order to carry out an attack and in fact it was the order for 
the attack that did take place.58 Having noted that there was no evidence that there was an 
imminent attack that would justify Blaškić’s order to attack, which becomes key in the appeal, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ordered the bombing, and that the Trial Chamber convicted him for ordering the bombing on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence.  Before concluding on this part of the appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber will briefly examine two additional arguments raised by the Appellant. 
…. 
454. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s finding that the Appellant was in 
control of explosives in the Vitez factory and that he was therefore responsible for the lorry 
bombing could have been reasonably reached on the basis of trial evidence.  However, 
additional evidence does show that explosives were available in the region to all sides of the 
conflict, and that the HVO did not have sole control over the factory that produced explosives.  
The Appeals Chamber considers that the trial and additional evidence do not satisfy it beyond 
reasonable doubt that the explosives used for the lorry bombing of 18 April 1993 could not be 
secured without the authorization of the Appellant. 
 
55 See, for example, Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 588-589. 
56 Blaškić Trial Judgement at paragraph 646:  
Based only on the text, the Trial Chamber notes that the accused used particularly clear terms 
in entrusting the commander of the Ban Jelašić Brigade with an attack mission. He gave the 
order to “engage in the blockade of Višnjica and other villages” and to “take control of” or 
“capture” Gomionica and Svinjarevo. Despite the contention of the Defence, the terms used do 
not suggest that General Blaškić ordered the commander to capture only the ABiH positions 
allegedly located in the towns. On the contrary, the eighth paragraph implied that his task went 
well beyond that. The accused employed radical words in the order which have connotations of 
“eradication”: “All assault operations must be successful and to that end, use units of the 
Military Police and civilian police for the mopup”. 
 
57 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 432. 




they then asked whether ‘the troops acted beyond the accused’s orders’59 and looked to 
establish whether Blaškić had ordered an attack against the Muslim population.60  
 
In order to do this the judges first looked to establish the control that Blaškić exercised over 
the various military units that they had found to be involved in the attack. They then went 
back to the question of whether the crimes committed by these forces had been ordered, 
finding that the scale and coordination of the crimes committed meant that they had to have 
been ordered by ‘a single command, which accordingly could only be superior to the 
commander of each of those units’.61 
 
The judges then go back to the contents of Blaškić’s order and consider that it was designed to 
incite racial hatred and therefore presumably to prompt those under his command to commit 
crimes against the Muslim population. Under the heading ‘The Content of the Orders’ the 
judges compared the evidence of what happened on the ground to what was contained within 
the orders, noting that the ‘orders recommend the modes of combat that were actually used 
on the ground on 16 April’ including, for example, the mention of ensuring control over fuel 
consumption and using blocking (observation and ambush), search and offensive forces which 
correlated with the use of petrol weapons and the ethnic cleansing tactics used on the 
ground.62 They mention the use of artillery which was, according to Blaškić, specifically under 
his direct command.63  
 
                                                          
59 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 438. 
60 Blaškić Trial Judgement, heading III B. 1. d) iii) ‘The accused ordered an attack aimed at the Muslim 
population’. 
61 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 467: 
iv) The massive and systematic nature of the crimes as proof that they were committed on orders  
467. Lastly, the idea that these crimes could have been committed by uncontrolled elements is impossible 
to reconcile with the scale and uniformity of the crimes committed on 16 April in the municipality of Vitez. 
The Trial Chamber adopts the opinion expressed by witness Morsink, a professional soldier acting as an 
observer for the ECMM at the material time:  
I believe that one or two minor cases may have been committed by small, uncontrolled groups, 
but the large-scale and systematic manner in which these events took place, entire villages 
being burned, and other villages, we saw that it was the Muslim houses that were systematically 
selected, and we saw that the same type of events were taking place at the same time period in 
different locations, and it would be impossible, in my opinion, for this to have been carried out 
by uncontrolled groups.  
The planned nature and, in particular, the fact that all these units acted in a perfectly coordinated manner 
presupposes in fact that those troops were responding to a single command, which accordingly could only 
be superior to the commander of each of those units.  
 
62 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 470. 




The judges also highlighted the testimony of some of the victims who heard those carrying out 
the massacres referring to doing so on orders. One of these witnesses, Witness A, ‘said that he 
heard a person named Cicko speak in these terms with regard to the events of 16 April: 
“everyone is washing their hands now as regards Ahmići, but we all know that Blaškić has 
ordered that no prisoners of war were of interest to him, only dead bodies”’.64 This is, 
however, the only reference to an unambiguously criminal order from Blaškić related to the 
crimes in Ahmići. The fact that the judges cited it is evidence that they put some weight on it, 
however, they do not comment on it or use it any further as evidence of direct criminal orders 
issued by Blaškić. 
 
The judges then proposed an alternative means by which Blaškić would be individually 
responsible for the massacre even if he had not directly ordered it, namely through 
recklessness: 
 
Even if doubt were still cast in spite of everything on whether the accused ordered the 
attack with the clear intention that the massacre would be committed, he would still 
be liable under Article 7(1) of the Statute for ordering the crimes. As has been 
explained above, any person who, in ordering an act, knows that there is a risk of 
crimes being committed and accepts that risk, shows the degree of intention 
necessary (recklessness) so as to incur responsibility for having ordered, planned or 
incited the commitment of the crimes.65 
 
The Appeals Chamber completely overturned the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation to 
Blaškić’s order D269.66 This included the finding that there was no proven ‘awareness on the 
part of the Appellant of a substantial likelihood that crimes would be committed in the 
execution of D269’.67 They did this on the basis of the evidence produced in the original trial as 
well as additional evidence provided for the appeal. Their key reasons were given as: 
 
• ‘the Trial Chamber interpreted the instructions contained in D269 in a manner 
contrary to the meaning of the order’.68  
 
                                                          
64 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 472. 
65 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 474. 
66 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 332-348. 
67 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 347. 




The implication in the following paragraphs, although they do not specifically say so, is 
that the Appeals Chamber found that this order should be taken at face value.69 This is 
in part because of the following reasons: 
 
• There was a legitimate military objective present in the area and D269 was a justified 
and legal order in response to the military situation. 
 
(The presence of the ABiH forces linked with the fact that Blaškić did in fact have 
reason to believe that they intended to launch an attack in the relevant area – shown 
by the additional evidence produced for the appeal.)70 
 
• The lack of any evidence that Blaškić issued D269 with the clear intention that a 
massacre would be committed or that the crimes that were committed were done so 
in response to this order.71  
 
This last point is particularly interesting as it highlights the Appeals Chambers’ view that there 
was a lack of any proof of Blaškić’s intention for crimes to be committed but also that there 
was no evidence that the crimes were committed in response to Blaškić’s orders; a causal link 
was missing. The Trial Chamber had found Blaškić criminally responsible based in large part on 
the strength of the principle of command and the evidence they had of the chain of command. 
This was fundamentally challenged in the new evidence presented to the Appeals Chamber 
and, in particular, that which demonstrated that other people had in fact planned and ordered 
the commission of crimes in the Ahmići area. 
 
An important note arises, however, from Judge Weinburg de Roca’s strong partial dissent. She 
pointed out that the Appeals Chamber did not conclude on how the participation of others in 
the planning and ordering of the attack on Ahmići affected the role played by Blaškić and that  
 
                                                          
69 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraph 330:  
The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber interpreted the instructions contained 
in D269 in a manner contrary to the meaning of the order. Even though the order was 
presented as a combat command to prevent an attack, the Trial Chamber concluded that it was 
part of an offensive strategy because “no military objective justified the attack” and in any 
event it was an “order to attack.”  
 
70 Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paragraphs 333-335. 




There is no legal requirement that a person giving orders be a sole decision-maker or 
be the highest or only person in a chain of command. It is entirely possible that a 
commander, who is himself acting on the orders of a hierarchical superior, or who is 
acting in concert with, or at the behest of other political or military leaders, may 
nevertheless be criminally responsible for ordering crimes.72 
 
The Blaškić Trial and Appeal Judgements show the limits of inference from and interpretation 
of orders. In the case of Blaškić an alternative explanation was presented at appeal for the 
events that occurred that the judges accepted meant that the orders he gave were not 
unlawful and were not the cause of the crimes that took place. The Appeals Chamber 
preferred this alternative explanation including, in particular, because of additional 
information they had been presented with as to the potential military objectives in the area 
(giving Blaškić’s orders a legitimate purpose) and the commanding roles of others that linked 
them, and not Blaškić to the crimes that took place in the villages of the Lašva Valley.  
 
The Trial Chamber in Gotovina found that he ordered an unlawful attack based in part on 
exhibit P1125, an Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, dated 2 August 1995. 
Alongside other orders to attack the enemy forces, the Trial Chamber set out that: 
 
Gotovina tasked all artillery-rocket groups with providing artillery support to the main 
forces in the attack operation, through powerful strikes against the enemy’s front line, 
command posts, communications centres, and artillery firing positions and by putting 
the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gračac under artillery fire.73 
 
The controversial phrase here was ‘by putting the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, 
and Gračac under artillery fire’. This sentence is one of the key pieces of evidence for the Trial 
Chamber’s finding of guilt against Gotovina. This was again the Trial Chamber interpreting an 
order and finding certain of its contents to be an order for an unlawful attack. There was also a 
clear potentially legal interpretation that the judges could have accepted. This was namely that 
set out by Marko Rajčić, chief of artillery of the Croatian forces during Operation Storm, that 
the order was to fire at pre-set legally vetted targets within the named towns.74 The judges 
had also heard testimony from the experts on the meaning of this order and its potential 
interpretation, with the expert witness Geoffrey Corn allowing that there was more than one 
potential interpretation, one, however, being that the ‘order could be read as a high-level 
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order in a broader context to strike previously identified targets within Knin as tactical 
support’.75  
 
The trial judges found that given the partial evidence they had in terms of pre-set artillery 
targets and contemporaneous artillery reports, the only evidence they could rely on was the 
evidence they had of where (some of) the shells had in fact landed. They assessed that some of 
these shells had been deliberately fired at areas with no military objectives (a not 
uncontroversial process – as described in Chapter 5 (Evidence II: Finding criminal intent)). They 
concluded that this deliberate firing at areas in Knin which were ‘devoid of military targets’ 
was consistent with the ‘plain text of those orders to put towns under artillery fire’, that is to 
treat the whole town as a target.76 They stated that this was was supported by the (very 
limited) firing reports they had seen, the ‘general impression gained by several witnesses 
present in Knin during the attack’ and the finding of the ‘insufficient regard paid to the risk of 
civilian casualties and injuries and damage to civilian objects in the disproportionate firing at 
two locations where the HV believed Martić to have been present’.77  
 
The Appeals Chamber found, by a majority, that the Trial Chamber’s ‘impact analysis’ of where 
the shells had been targeted was ‘erroneous’ and that it was ‘at the very core of’ the finding 
that the artillery attacks on the towns were indiscriminate.78 They noted that neither of the 
expert witnesses Konings or Corn suggested that the only interpretation of the order to attack 
the towns was that it was an order to indiscriminately attack.79 They concluded that:  
 
Given that the relevant portion of the 2 August Order was relatively short, and did not 
explicitly call for unlawful attacks on the Four Towns, the text of the 2 August Order 
could not, alone, reasonably be relied upon to support a finding that unlawful artillery 
attacks took place. 80 
 
The fact that the ‘impact assessment’ the trial judges conducted was found to be incorrect 
meant that that their finding that Gotovina had issued an unlawful order to attack Knin fell 
away and with it any finding of criminal responsibility pursuant to JCE or otherwise; the terms 
of the order itself were found by the appeal judges to be insufficient to support a finding that 
Gotovina had ordered an unlawful attack.  
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Inference of existence of unlawful orders 
 
A striking difference between the case of Galić and those of Blaškić and Gotovina is that there 
was no evidence presented of the terms of any specific order by Galić to attack anywhere in 
Sarajevo. The nearest that the judgement could include was an admission by Galić to one of 
the witnesses, UN representative Hussein Abdel-Razek, that ‘civilians who crossed the airport 
tarmac were targeted because he had doubts that those movements might be for military 
purpose’.81 The trial judges also cited the evidence of Witness AD, ‘a member of the SRK 
forces, who testified that he confronted his superiors over orders to target civilian places at his 
brigade command headquarters and that his brigade commander threatened to punish him 
and the other members of his unit’.82 This evidence, however, falls some way from 
demonstrating the contents of the orders constituting the orchestrated campaign against 
civilians in Sarajevo that was found to have existed. 
 
The majority of the Trial Chamber inferred from the evidence that Galić ‘furthered a campaign 
of unlawful acts of violence against civilians through orders relayed down the SRK chain of 
command and that he intended to conduct that campaign with the primary purpose of 
spreading terror within the civilian population of Sarajevo’ and that therefore he was liable 
pursuant to Article 7(1), that is individually liable for ordering the crimes that were found to 
have taken place.83 They stated that 
 
….According to the Majority, there is an irresistible inference to be drawn from the 
evidence on the Trial Record that what the Trial Chamber has found to be widespread 
and notorious attacks against the civilian population of Sarajevo could not have 
occurred without it being the will of the commander of those forces which perpetrated 
it and that the lack of measures to prevent illegal sniping and shelling activities was 
deliberate.84 
 
The facts that led to this inference can be summarised as: 
 
• The strength of the SRK chain of command. 
 
                                                          
81 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 743. 
82 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraph 744. 
83 Galić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 749-750. 




• The fact that the level of fire into the city was reduced in response to cease-fire 
agreements or after complaints were made, which demonstrated that the fire had 
been carried out in line with the Bosnian Serb chain of command in the first place. 
 
• The increase in fire following threats made by the Bosnian Serb military to the effect 
that it would increase if certain demands were not met. 
 
• The highly coordinated nature of some of the indiscriminate attacks. 
 
• The length of time for which crimes against civilians were committed must have been 
the result of deliberate action for them to continue. 
 
• Galić’s stated agreement with the plan of his military and political superiors.85 
 
Not all the judges considered that there was sufficient evidence to find that Galić had ordered 
the crimes in question.  Judge Nieto-Navia in fact considered that the evidence supported the 
conclusion that Galić did not order attacks against civilians: 
 
For example, he personally instructed his troops in writing to respect the Geneva 
Conventions and other instruments of international humanitarian law. This written 
evidence echoes the testimonies of 16 SRK soldiers and officers posted throughout 
Sarajevo during the Indictment Period, who confirmed that they had received orders 
not to target civilians. Furthermore, the Accused launched internal investigations on at 
least two occasions when alerted by UN representatives about possible attacks on 
civilians by his forces. 86 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia pointed out that the majority had misrepresented the evidence given by UN 
representative Hussein Abdel-Razek in relation to the shooting of those crossing the airport: 
 
The Accused’s “admission” therefore related to his attempt to stop the “activities” for 
“military purposes” taking place at the airport, which the SRK had voluntarily placed 
under the control of the UN to ship humanitarian supplies but which was misused to 
allow enemy soldiers, some dressed as civilians, to enter the city. 87 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia also considered that the majority had been particularly influenced by Galić’s 
failure to act or to prevent and punish crimes, which was not a proper consideration in relation 
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to a charge of ordering which by its very definition required a positive act.88 Judge Nieto-Navia 
thought, however, that there was sufficient evidence for Galić to be convicted on the basis of 
Article 7(3).89 
 
A key finding in the majority’s inference of Galić’s orders appears to be his stated agreement 
with the broader political project behind the conflict in Bosnia. This is discussed in more detail 
in the section below together with the role of the political in the cases of Blaškić and Gotovina. 
 
 
Evidence of ‘agreement’ or ‘collusion’ with the overarching political plan as a factor in a 
commander’s responsibility (individual or command) including participation in a Joint 
Criminal Enterprise 
 
In setting out the practical difficulties inherent in bringing charges for conduct of hostilities 
crimes, Carolin Wuerzner includes the problem of access to direct evidence of culpability given 
the likely confidential and closely guarded information of military planning and decision 
making required to do so. Those whose testimony would be most relevant would also be those 
least likely to agree to testify for fear of self-incrimination or would be least likely to testify to 
the truth if there was criminal behavior. She also describes that beyond this there is the 
important problem that there is a subjective element to the assessment of military targets that 
makes it hard to establish an individual culpability based on intention. There is, for example, 
no simple right or wrong answer in making many proportionality calculations.90 
 
A particularly interesting theme that arose out of the materials of this research (as opposed to 
having been a pre-set/expected subject) has been the importance to the judges of the links of 
the military men to the broader ‘political’ projects. This seems very far away from discussions 
of military tactics and strategy regarding targeting decision making that may provide direct 
evidence of intent. This has, however, provided evidence in the gaps identified by Wuerzner 
and is also in line with Fenrick’s observation, mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
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that circumstantial evidence would in general be necessary to prove the responsibility of those 
in positions of command due to a lack of direct evidence of their actions.91  
 
Circumstantial evidence, although indirect evidence, is not necessarily weak evidence. In the 
setting of criminal law in England and Wales it has been said that ‘circumstantial evidence is 
often the best evidence. It is evidence of surrounding circumstances which, by undesigned 
coincidence, is capable of proving a proposition with the accuracy of mathematics’, although 
with the caveat that it ‘is also necessary before drawing the inference of the accused’s guilt 
from circumstantial evidence to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances 
which would weaken or destroy the inference’.92  
 
Agreement with the broader (criminal) agenda of their political superiors seems to have been 
key in proving the intent required for criminal responsibility for acts physically committed by 
their subordinates. It is also perhaps why the Prosecutor thought it suitable to bring charges 
against Gotovina based on his alleged participation in a joint criminal enterprise, this alleged 
joint criminal enterprise being a politically led plan requiring military action to implement it. 
The use of this evidence at the ICTY starts to show what is necessary for an inference an 
intention to target civilians, based on circumstantial evidence, to the standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt.  
 
 
Alignment with broader criminal political ‘plan’ or ‘ambitions’ 
 
Eric Gordy pointed out that from the outset there was a ‘mixing of political and command 
responsibility’ in the Blaškić case.93 The crimes which formed the base of the charges against 
Blaškić were directly linked to the policy of the Bosnian Croat political leadership to take 
control of certain areas of Central Bosnia through the removal of the Bosnian Muslims who 
lived there. This bigger picture also brought in questions of Croatian state involvement in the 
conflict. The fight for control of evidence held by states and therefore the scope of the 
prosecution and defence cases went on into the appeal stages of the case and its retention 
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and release was incontrovertibly linked to the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia.94 
 
Having spent some time describing the political situation that led to the outbreak of violence in 
central Bosnia, the Blaškić Trial Judges ‘observed’ that: 
 
the HVO military offensives were merely the ultimate outcome of an overall policy of 
persecution of the Muslim populations pursued by the Croatian military and political 
authorities. In agreeing to be the Kiseljak region military commander in April 1992 and 
then Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander in June of that same year, the accused 
fully subscribed to this policy from the very moment of his posting.95 
 
The Trial Chamber note that Blaškić’s orders themselves include reflections of the broader 
picture of ethnic cleansing taking place in Central Bosnia: 
 
469. The Trial Chamber observes that the reasons adduced in order to justify the order 
of 16 April (D269) are based on propaganda designed to incite racial hatred. Order 
D267, for instance, alleges that extremist Muslim forces intended to carry out “ethnic 
cleansing” on the Croats in the region. Order D269 refers to the intention of the 
Muslim forces to destroy everything Croatian. Several international observers have 
stated that those words gave a very exaggerated picture as compared with the real 
situation.96 
 
Orders from Blaškić in relation to the municipality of Kiseljak are even more explicit, with the 
judges concluding that the orders had the connotation of requiring ‘eradication’ of those in the 
way of the HVO’s plans, particularly in his use of the word ‘mop-up’.97 The meaning of this 
                                                          
94 Gordy, ‘The Blaškić Trial: Politics, the Control of Information and Command Responsibility’, 77-79. 
95 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 660. 
96 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraph 469. 
97 Blaškić Trial Judgement, paragraphs 644-646: 
644. The Trial Chamber observes that in these orders General Blaškić used terms which were 
not strictly military and had emotional connotations which were such as to incite hatred and 
vengeance against the Muslim populations. The opening paragraph of the combat order began 
with the following assertion:  
[the] enemy continues to massacre Croats in Zenica where Muslim forces are using 
tanks to fire at people, mostly women and children.  
Using the same terms, the fourth paragraph added:  
Persist tomorrow with the attack or we will be wiped out because the MOS /Muslim 
armed forces/ and the Mujahedin are advancing against the Croats in Zenica 
supported by tanks.  
The ninth paragraph included an emphatic call to the responsibility of the commander who 
received the order to “maintain a sense of historic responsibility”.  
645. The same terms were again to be found in the combat preparation order of 17 April 1993, 
in particular in the opening paragraph:  
[t]he enemy is continuing the intense attacks against the forces of HVO and is trying to 




term ‘mop-up’ was raised on appeal and was not taken by the witnesses brought before the 
Appeals Chamber to have the same meaning as that found by the Trial Chamber. Witness 
Philip Watkins, a former British army officer and a member of the European Community 
Monitoring Mission at the time of the events in question, who was one of the witnesses 
brought before the judges in relation to the Blaškić appeal, was asked what ‘mop-up’ as a 
military term in fact meant. Watkins’ testimony was that it was a standard military term that 
could be seen as ‘insensitive’ but not suggestive of intentional harm to civilians: 
 
A. It's after intense activity, one can go from -- there's levels of intensity of activity, and 
so after maybe an attack, there would be pockets that one could in a military have left 
because they were particularly difficult, so one bypasses. And then having won the 
main objective, you would go back and sort out, either surrender or destroy the 
enemy, and that action after the main event, when the intensity is reduced to a low 
intensity activity, that mopping up is the complete control that you wish to have over 
your territory and the clearing of enemy forces. 
Q. Is it a standard military term? 
A. Absolutely, yeah. 
Q. Is there any connotation in the use of that term that would suggest harm to civilians 
or ethnic cleansing or something of the like? 
A. No, although seeing it on the screen and hearing it, as you say, of course it's what I 
would call in England an insensitive, politically incorrect thing, but it is standard 
military terminology. Anyone in the military would understand this.98 
 
This was cited in the Blaškić Appeal Judgement together with references to similar testimony 
from witnesses BA1 and BA3.99 The Appeal Judges preferred this testimony to the Trial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
HVO in the valley of the Lašva. The probable goal of the aggressor, after the accord 
with the chetniks about the surrender of Srebrenica and other regions, is the military 
defeat of HVO and the inclusion of our regions into some kind of a greater Serbia or 
New Yugoslavia.  In the combats that raged yesterday, the enemy used the favourite 
method of the chetniks: pushing women and children in front, to use them as a shield 
and then to occupy the main strategic objects.  
The order’s ninth paragraph also emphatically conferred an historic role upon the Kiseljak HVO 
commander and his troops:  
[k]eep in mind that the lives of the Croats in the region of Lašva depend upon your 
mission. This region could become a tomb for all of us if you show a lack of resolution.  
646. Based only on the text, the Trial Chamber notes that the accused used particularly clear 
terms in entrusting the commander of the Ban Jelačić Brigade with an attack mission. He gave 
the order to “engage in the blockade of Višnjica and other villages” and to “take control of” or 
“capture” Gomionica and Svinjarevo. Despite the contention of the Defence, the terms used do 
not suggest that General Blaškić ordered the commander to capture only the ABiH positions 
allegedly located in the towns. On the contrary, the eighth paragraph implied that his task went 
well beyond that. The accused employed radical words in the order which have connotations of 
“eradication”: “All assault operations must be successful and to that end, use units of the 
Military Police and civilian police for the mopup”. 
 
98 Blaškić Trial Transcript, 9 December 2003, page 298. 




Chamber’s findings and found that the language of the relevant order (D300) did ‘not 
necessarily connote eradication or forcible transfer’ and went on to consider that ‘additional 
evidence admitted on appeal also indicates that merely military considerations underlay the 
issuance of these orders’.100 
 
On appeal, the judges did not deny the crimes that the trial judges had found to have taken 
place but they did find that Blaškić’s criminal responsibility had been overstated given the role 
of ‘political commanders higher than him’.101 Gordy was presentient in pointing out that 
lessons of the Blaškić Appeal Judgement might be relevant to the Gotovina appeal. He thought 
that 
 
Quite likely one of the issues on the appeal of this verdict will be whether the two 
generals who were convicted were named as carrying responsibility that belonged to 
other people – in this case people who cannot be charged because they are no longer 
alive [namely the senior Croatian political leadership at the time: Croatian president 
Franjo Tuđman (who died in 1999), defence minister Gojko Šušak (who died in 1998) 
and military  commander Zvonimir Červenko (who died in 2001)].  
 
And quoted one of the lawyers who had defended Blaškić, Anto Nobilo, as saying: 
 
Although I may not know in enough detail how the defence represented Gotovina and 
Markač and why their defence did not succeed, I have the general impression  that 
they did not do enough to distinguish the soldiers Gotovina and Markač from politics 
and from Franjo Tuđman, but rather that they tried too much to defend Franjo 
Tuđman, the leadership of HDZ, Gojko Šušak, and their political engagement. So that 
could be a reason that the defence failed. 102 
 
The point remains, however, that the military were used to carry out the bidding of their 
political masters. The trial judges in both Blaškić and Gotovina were clearly influenced by 
evidence that demonstrated an agreement on the part of the soldiers with any criminal 
political plan and it makes sense that they would be. A soldier cannot just say that they are 
following orders and stand aloof from the actions they are carrying out for their political 
masters.103 There were, however, in the cases of Blaškić and Gotovina ultimately found to be 
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legitimate military purposes that these commanders were pursuing that could stand outside 
the broader criminal machinations of the politics of the war.  
 
In the case of Galić, the Prosecution had always accepted that there were legitimate and 
illegitimate military campaigns proceeding in and around Sarajevo. Finding Galić’s 
responsibility for ordering an unlawful military campaign seems again to have been supported 
by his political viewpoint and in this case his conviction was upheld on appeal. A stand out 
moment in the Galić trial was part of the testimony of Patrick Henneberry, Senior UNMO and 
later UNPROFOR commander of the North LIMA side of Sarajevo from July 1992 to February 
1993: 
 
Q. Last Thursday, you also told us these words: "The ultimate goal as explained by 
Indjic and indeed General Galić was to either destroy the city or rid it of Muslims." 
What was the occasion on which General Galić said that? 
A. That would have been the 16th December meeting. That meeting in fact is the first 
one I have clearly listed in my notes, although there are references to other meetings I 
had with him, and I recall that being a very significant meeting. 
Q. Were you surprised -- what was your reaction when he said that to you? 
A. As a soldier, I realised, having been there for several months, that it was beyond the 
realm of the feasible for the Serbian forces to be able to destroy the city. To damage it 
significantly, of course, but to actually destroy the city, that was not feasible for them, 
given their equipment and ammunition. As far as the comment about ridding the city 
of Muslims, that was the first time I had personally heard a very senior officer state 
that, and while I can't claim to be shocked, as I heard that before, it was dismaying 
that that statement would be made in advance of other negotiations and with the 
vehemence or certainty that it was given, as I recall.104 
 
Even from simply reading the transcript, it is possible to sense that the judges hearing the Galić 
case were palpably leaning forwards and doubling their attention to Henneberry when he 
mentions his direct experience of Galić’s view of the situation in Sarajevo. This evidence, 
including in particular a mention that Galić had stated that he wanted to ‘either destroy the 
city or rid it of Muslims’, translates into a substantial mention, including a long direct quote 
from his testimony, in the section entitled ‘IV. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERAL 
GALIĆ./C. DID GENERAL GALIĆ KNOW OF THE CRIMES PROVED AT TRIAL?/3. General Galić’s 
Responses to Protests’.105 It is mentioned again in the section ‘E. Did General Galić and his 
Subordinates Act in Furtherance of a Plan?’ alongside references to the testimony of Carswell 
and O’Keeffe as to Galić’s motivations: 
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Carswell said that General Galić justified indiscriminate attacks which would have been 
in defence of the Serbian homeland and it is their attempt to preserve the culture. 
When confronted by O’Keeffe upon the absence of military purpose behind military 
attacks launched on the city by SRK forces, General Galić responded that he was “going 
to make this area safe for his children’s children”.106 
 
This section on the existence of a plan also includes some details of how Galić’s actions fit into 
the plans of the Bosnian Serb leadership. This includes that Galić presided over a meeting 
where the strategic goal of the leadership agreed at a meeting in Banja Luka on 12 May 1992 
that ‘Sarajevo must be either divided or razed to the ground’ was presented and his 
conclusions that they should ‘implement the decisions from the meeting in Banja Luka [of 12 
May 1992], but submit them to the commands of units and municipalities; hold the present 
positions and defend them without war’ were adopted.107 
 
Although the judges in fact do not state or reach a conclusion in this section, this evidence of a 
‘plan’ emanating from the Bosnian Serb leadership was raised in the discussion on Galić’s 
individual criminal responsibility where the majority stated that they were ‘convinced that 
General Galić promoted the goals of his superiors for Sarajevo by implementing and furthering 
a campaign of sniping and shelling against the civilian population of Sarajevo’.108 
 
Henneberry’s evidence emerges again in paragraph 745 in the same section, namely, ‘F. 
CONCLUSION: DOES GENERAL GALIĆ INCUR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(1) OF 
THE STATUTE?/2. Did General Galić Order the Commission of Crimes Proved at Trial?’: 
 
‘….The Majority recalls the evidence of Henneberry, O’Keeffe, Mole and Bergeron. All 
four witnesses protested to General Galić against the indiscriminate targeting of 
civilians. Bergeron testified that General Galić was put on notice that “snipers would 
kill civilians, be it women, children, elderly people, for apparently no other reason than 
to terrorise the population”. General Galić’s response to Henneberry and O’Keeffe that 
the ultimate goal was to either destroy the city or rid it of Muslims and that “he was 
going to make this area safe for his children’s children” speaks for itself. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that General Galić acted in furtherance of a strategy to attack 
the civilian population of Sarajevo to spread terror within that population. That 
conclusion is supported by the evidence of Henneberry that a plan in relation to 
Sarajevo was communicated to General Galić’s subordinate units….’ 
 
Henneberry’s immediate superior in Sarajevo, Senior UNMO James Cutler, caused some 
discomfort in the courtroom by mentioning that he had met Henneberry in the hotel they 
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were staying in, while he was waiting to give his testimony and Henneberry was still giving his, 
and had mentioned to Henneberry about how he remembered Henneberry having been upset 
by something in their time in and around Sarajevo. This conversation had the potential to taint 
both of their evidence in the eyes of the judges.109 What it in fact seems to have done is 
backed up Henneberry’s evidence in the mind of the judges; his experience as recounted to 
them had someone else who unintentionally backed up the effect it had on Henneberry 
although it is far from clear that they were discussing the same event.110 This reliance by the 
majority is also despite the fact that Judge Nieto-Navia clearly had doubts about Henneberry’s 
evidence on this point.111 
 
The other key strand of evidence against Galić was the correlation between the use of 
indiscriminate force against Sarajevo by the SRK and various military or political manoeuvres 
either regarding Sarajevo itself or the broader conflict in Bosnia. Under the heading ‘Control 
over shelling activity’, the judges detail this evidence.112  
 
The judges cite Witness Y’s testimony that he observed ‘a definite pattern of shelling’, with 
‘shelling peaks’ corresponding to three factors: 
 
• military action or reaction on the ground, for example, in order to repel the Bosnian 
troops attacking around the area of the Jewish cemetery (trying to cut off a Bosnian 
Serb supply route) the Serbs shelled the attacking Bosnian troops but also the city 
itself; 
• visits by authorities to Sarajevo, for example, when Mrs Ogata of the UNHCR visited 
the shelling from both sides intensified as she landed and eased after she took off; and 
• negotiations taking place outside Sarajevo, for example in New York or Geneva.113 
 
The judges decided on the basis of this sort of evidence that Galić was limited on resources 
and under intense outside scrutiny, but still willing, through the use of those under his 
command, to use and kill/harm the civilian population to further the military and political goals 
of his superiors.  
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Wuerzner considers that the Galić judges made ruling on the deliberate nature of an attack 
seem simpler than it was, for example, in ruling out that the shell that hit Markale Market was 
a mistake.114 It appears to be the cumulative evidence of the intentions behind Galić’s 
campaign as a whole that filled these evidential gaps.  
 
 
Joint Criminal Enterprise 
 
In the very first full judgement handed down by the ICTY the judges discussed the possibility of 
criminal liability pursuant to Article 7(1) being incurred through participation in a common 
enterprise.115 This was the idea, broadly speaking, that those who did not physically carry out a 
crime could not escape responsibility if they had in fact intentionally contributed to its 
commission through membership of a common enterprise, although not in the traditional 
sense of aiding and abetting the crime. In the Tadić Appeal Judgement the judges explored the 
concept of common purpose, what became known as joint criminal enterprise, in more 
detail.116 Before going on to expand on their identification of the three modes by which 
criminal liability could be incurred through this doctrine, the Tadić Appeal Judges set out that: 
 
The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, 
the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody 
may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not 
personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa).117 
 
In considering the object and purpose of the ICTY Statute as well as the nature of the crimes 
that were likely to come before the ICTY, the Tadić Appeal Judges found that the ICTY Statute  
 
…does not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes which 
occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal activity 
that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons. 
Whoever contributes to the commission of crimes by the group of persons or some 
members of the group, in execution of a common criminal purpose, may be held to be 
criminally liable, subject to certain conditions.118 
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By the time of the Gotovina Trial Judgement the requirements for a finding of individual 
criminal responsibility by way of participation in a JCE had been considered in significantly 
more detail and across broader circumstances. For such liability to be incurred in the case of 
Gotovina, the judges summarised the required elements as i) plurality of persons, ii) a common 
objective which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute 
and iii) participation of the accused in the objective’s implementation.119 
 
Van der Wilt points out that without identifying every single member of a JCE and their 
individual contributions, intentions and interactions it is impossible fully to set out the precise 
nature of the JCE.120 In the context of a discussion of the ICTY’s use of JCE, van der Wilt also 
states: 
 
Obviously, legal qualifications are by definition rather coarse and abstract. They offer a 
stylized representation of an unruly reality.121 
 
The Gotovina Trial Judges did, however, appear to understand the complexity of the situation 
behind the JCE they found to exist and spent a considerable amount of the judgement setting 
out the participants, the interwoven relationships and scope of this JCE.122 
 
The Trial Chamber concluded that a JCE existed ‘with the objective of the permanent removal 
of the Serb civilian population from the Krajina by force or threat of force, which amounted to 
and involved persecution (deportation, forcible transfer, unlawful attacks against civilians and 
civilian objects, and discriminatory and restrictive measures), deportation, and forcible 
transfer’.123 The Trial Chamber found that Gotovina’s conduct amounted to a significant 
contribution to the JCE given: 
 
• Gotovina’s participation in the Brioni meeting in relation to planning and preparing 
Operation Storm; 
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• its findings in Chapter 5.8.2 (i) that the HV’s shelling of Benkovac, Knin, and Obrovac 
on 4 and 5 August 1995 constituted unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects 
and that Gotovina ordered the attacks on Benkovac, Knin, and Obrovac; and 
 
• Gotovina’s failures to make a serious effort to prevent and follow-up on crimes 
reported.124 
 
He was also found to have ‘had the state of mind that the crimes forming part of the objective 
should be carried out’ and intended that his actions contribute to the JCE.125 In addition, he 
was found to be responsible for the crimes of destruction, plunder, murder, inhumane acts, 
cruel treatment, and unlawful detentions (on their own or as underlying acts of persecution) as 
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the JCE’s implementation.126 
 
The witnesses called to testify and cited by the judges in relation to Gotovina’s responsibility 
show how it was the politics of the situation that would ultimately determine his liability in the 
eyes of the Trial Chamber. The judges had a potentially ambiguous order, but one clearly 
issued by Gotovina. They used the political context to place this and Gotovina’s liability. The 
majority of witnesses referred to in the responsibility sections of the Trial Judgement are 
politicians, the evidence related to the political situation and motivations of the Croatian 
Government. Other than Rajčić, Govovina’s subordinate, the chief of artillery of his forces, the 
key witness seems to have been Granić, deputy prime minister in the Croatian Government at 
the time. In contrast, the witnesses to both Blaškić and Galić’s responsibility were mainly 
military men, either international or members of the Bosnian Serb army.  
 
Despite the political nature of much of the evidence called in the Gotovina case due to the fact 
that he was charged as part of a JCE, there was very little definitive evidence of Gotovina’s 
own political views. In amongst the discussion of the JCE there is actually very little mention of 
Gotovina at all. His participation is mentioned only 25 times (each count being for a paragraph 
or less) in 351 paragraphs covering ‘The Brioni meeting on 31 July 1995 and the preparation 
for Operation Storm’, ‘The policy of the Croatian political leadership with regard to the Serb 
minority and return of refugees and internally displaced persons’, ‘Property laws’, ‘Croatian 
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investigatory policy’ and ‘The follow-up in relation to the incidents in Grubori and Ramljane on 
25 and 26 August 1995’.  
 
Markač is mentioned 14 times in the 233 paragraphs of the sections ‘The Brioni meeting on 31 
July 1995 and the preparation for Operation Storm’, ‘The policy of the Croatian political 
leadership with regard to the Serb minority and return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons’, ‘Property laws’, ‘Croatian investigatory policy’. This does not reveal much about him 
or his views and seems to relate mainly to his part in planning to provoke the Serbs in order to 
make their operation appear defensive rather than aggressive. He is mentioned more often in 
the section ‘The follow-up in relation to the incidents in Grubori and Ramljane on 25 and 26 
August 1995’ where he was more significantly involved. 
 
Both Gotovina and Markač’s convictions on the basis of their participation in a JCE were 
overturned on appeal. The Appeals Chamber found that without the presence of ‘unlawful 
attacks’ the very existence of the JCE itself fell apart.127 In making this finding the Appeals 
Chamber referred to the possibility of other interpretations of the circumstantial evidence 
before them, although without specifying what these might have been: 
 
In this context, no reasonable trial chamber could conclude that the only reasonable 
interpretation of the circumstantial evidence on the record was the existence of a JCE 
with the common purpose of permanently removing the Serb civilian population from 
the Krajina by force or threat of force.128   
 
This decision that the JCE had not in fact existed (as well as the reasoning behind this that the 
JCE had been based on the existence of unlawful attacks) was strongly criticised by one of the 
dissenting judges. He questioned the Appeals Chamber’s assessment of the Trial Chamber’s 
findings and also why it was necessary to override the Trial Chamber’s finding of the existence 
of the JCE (in his view on doubtful reasoning) rather than considering the contribution of 
Gotovina to the JCE.129  
 
The Trial Chamber’s consideration of the broader factors over 200 pages was overturned in a 
few paragraphs. The dissenting judges, Judge Agius and Judge Pocar, fiercely highlight this lack 
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of regard for the factual findings of the trial chamber.130 Through these dissenting opinions it 
can be seen that certain judges would have confirmed or modified rather than overturned the 
Trial Chamber’s findings of culpability. This demonstrates again in turn the difficulty of 
attempting to use a JCE, direct individual responsibility based conviction, where perhaps a 
charge of superior responsibility might have been of more use in assessing the actions of the 
accused and the troops under his command, taking in the masses of evidence of criminal 






This chapter looked at how the judges approached questions of criminal responsibility of 
commanders for war crimes committed by their subordinates and considered what had 
influenced their findings. Perhaps surprisingly given the command roles of the accused there 
was very little role for superior or command responsibility in the sense of Article 7(3) of the 
ICTY Statute in the judges’ findings in this area. 
 
Due to existing case law and a perception on the part of the judges that finding criminal 
responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) was the most desirable outcome, the judges found that 
the commanders’ criminal responsibility was best represented in terms of Article 7(1) 
responsibility for ordering unlawful attacks. This is despite the real difficulty in proving that any 
order had been given to launch an unlawful attack given the scarcity of direct evidence of 
unlawful orders being given. This, and the preference for Article 7(1) convictions, translated 
into a need to rely on circumstantial evidence and therefore a broad consideration of the role 
and actions of the accused, including their political position. 
 
This precedence given to a finding of Article 7(1) individual responsibility is interesting – and 
possibly problematic, in all three cases. There was clearly a sense that a finding of individual 
responsibility implied that the accused had behaved more reprehensibly than a finding of 
command responsibility would have implied. This desire on the part of the trial chambers to 
find that the individuals had ordered or otherwise directly engaged in committing crimes with 
                                                          





far from straightforward evidence to this effect left their decisions susceptible to success on 
appeal. 
 
These cases show the difficulty in incomplete evidence of what the commander actually 
commanded the troops to do. It cannot be expected that there would be a complete record of 
the activities of military forces in war time – particularly given the role of spoken commands 
and secrecy during war. Even if there is not all the evidence the judges would like, however, a 
decision (as to guilt or not) must be made. The question is whether evidential problems such 
as missing orders and incomplete log books mean that there is insufficient evidence to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Lack of sufficient evidence must mean that the accused is acquitted. On the other hand, lack of 
direct evidence is not in itself unusual in criminal cases, and in these cases a role was found for 
circumstantial (or indirect) evidence of individual liability and, in particular, evidence of the 
motivations of these particular military commanders. 
 
In showing how the judges assessed the orders presented in evidence, it can be seen that the 
judges did not take such orders at face value and, further, that the judges were prepared to 
infer that certain orders must have been given. In interpreting the orders or inferring the 
existing of orders, the judges looked to a range of factors which included the testimony of 
current and former soldiers. In taking into account these experienced military views on the 
actions of the accused, it is argued that the ICTY judges did not lose sight of the military 
viewpoint and they (even if not all commentators) considered that their judgments were 
always supported by a body of military opinion – even if in places there were strongly opposing 
views. 
 
The judges, following the lead of the prosecutors, saw significant importance in whether the 
commanders agreed with the broader ‘political’ aims of their own political 
masters/commanders because, in the absence of direct evidence of the commanders’ 
intentions, it provided them with evidence, albeit circumstantial, of the intention required to 
have ordered an unlawful attack. At trial level, Blaškić’s role was seen as instrumental in the 
pattern of ethnic cleansing in Central Bosnia, evidence that Galić was attacking Muslim civilians 
as such was given prominence and a huge amount was written about the high level political 




variation in the role of this evidence between the cases. In the case of Galić there was a 
substantial amount of evidence regarding what his troops had been doing over a long period 
of time, the political motivations arguments were a supporting factor to this. In the case of 
Gotovina there was much less evidence of what it was his troops had been shelling, it was 
mainly his role in the bigger picture that was of interest to the OTP and trial judges.  
 
By the very nature of the ICTY, these commanders were to a large extent put on trial for their 
role in the broader criminality of the political projects driving the war. The use of evidence 
showing agreement to a political/criminal scheme as evidence of intention shows that judges 
did not simply judge commanders on evidence relating to the practicalities of the conduct of 
commanding operations. Ultimately, however, the commanders were acquitted if it was found 
that they were pursuing legitimate military objectives. This can again be seen to demonstrate 
that the ICTY judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint of the actions they were being 
asked to judge. 
 
The next chapter is the conclusion to this project which draws together the conclusions from 
the separate threads of law, evidence and responsibility in the demarcation of the law of 
targeting that have been considered here and in the previous chapters. It concludes with some 











This research began with the purpose of investigating in detail the work of the ICTY; 
specifically, to examine the application of the laws of war as they related to questions of 
targeting and to consider how the law was defined and applied. The work of the ICTY was 
significant in this regard because it was one of the rare occasions on which these questions of 
international law had come before international judges. In this demarcation of the law, what, 
ultimately, guided the judges’ findings as to the criminal responsibility or exoneration of 
commanders for actions taking place on the battlefield? 
 
It was apparent at the outset of this study that the work of the judges in this field could not be 
seen in splendid theoretical legal isolation. The relationship between the judges and the 
evidence before them, usually derived from witness testimony, had to be considered. Asking 
what they decided and based on exactly what evidence led to questions of what factors drove 
their decision making. The consideration of how judges relied on evidence from witnesses with 
military or civilian backgrounds, expert or not, was raised through reading the judgments and 
transcripts of the hearings. In the context of the incomplete documentary record, likely in any 
conflict situation, the witnesses and the judges’ approach to these witnesses really were key to 
their findings of guilt or innocence. 
 
At an even more fundamental level, in considering what factors the judges were taking into 
account in reaching their decisions, questions of legal theory arose as to how judges reach 
decisions in cases where there is no fully formed answer in existing legal knowledge. Previous 
studies had termed what the judges had done in some such cases ‘judicial creativity’ and this 
seemed a fitting term for what the judges had achieved in the area of the law of targeting.1 
The motivations of the judges that were identified by those studying their work included 
political influences linked to the place of the ICTY in the UN system and broader international 
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relations, but more often they were termed as something moral or non-legal.2 The judges at 
the ICTY demonstrated the desire to ‘do the right thing’ and to do their bit to establish the law 
as something that would provide justice for victims but also create as full as possible legal 
protection for the innocent in future conflicts. This desire can be seen as a facet of the 
principle of ‘humanity’, so fundamental to the development of the law of armed conflict or 
international humanitarian law.  
 
The overarching research question posed in order to consider this topic was how had the 
judges in certain cases at the ICTY implemented the law of targeting and, given this, could any 
factor(s) be identified as having influenced the many decisions on law, evidence and 
responsibility they had to make in reaching their judgments? As a corollary to this question, it 
was asked whether the principle of humanity, broadly defined, was a determining influence in 
judicial decision making as it specifically related to the demarcation of the law of targeting. 
This study sought to establish, in all the decisions the judges had to make as to the law, 
evidence and responsibility, whether humanity or any other factors guided these decisions 
and, in some cases, their creativity.   
 
To consider the ‘law of targeting’ at the ICTY involved an appreciation of the framework in 
which the demarcation of the law was taking place. As set out in Chapter 2 (The framework for 
the demarcation of the law of targeting at the ICTY) this included elements of international 
humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict, public international law, international criminal 
law, the law of evidence, procedure and responsibility as well as the case law of the ICTY itself.  
 
The thesis presented here is that humanity was a driving factor in the demarcation of the law 
of targeting. As set out in Chapter 3 (Law) and Chapters 4 and 5 (Evidence I: The witnesses and 
Evidence II: Finding criminal intent), this was evident in the direction in which the law was 
developed in accordance with the provisions of API and the ICRC guidance as well as the role 
given to the voices of those who lived through the conflict. Humanity, however, was not the 
only influence or motivation.  
 
In addition to the influence of the principle of humanity, and as was also seen throughout this 
work, there was a clear role in the decisions made by the judges for military opinion as to 
                                                          
2 As, for example, in the case of Alexander Zahar, ‘Civilizing Civil War: Writing Morality as Law at the 
ICTY’ in The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, eds. Bert Swart, 




acceptable and unacceptable conduct of military operations. This was particularly evident in 
the questions raised by the evidence the judges were presented with as discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5 (Evidence I: The witnesses and Evidence II: Finding criminal intent) and in relation to 
the criminal responsibility of the accused (Chapter 6 (Responsibility)). The judges’ desire to 
emphasise the humanitarian side of the law of armed conflict was not, perhaps contrary to 
expectations, often in opposition to the views of those with military experience. The judges 
also clearly relied on those military and civilian witnesses, some of whom were victim 
witnesses, who had experienced the effects of the use of artillery as was seen in Chapters 4 
and 5 (Evidence I: The witnesses and Evidence II: Finding criminal intent). 
 
As was seen in Chapter 6 (Responsibility), in considering the individual criminal responsibility 
of the commanders in Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina, the judges looked, in particular, to the 
contents and meaning of their orders as well as the potential for implied orders. The views of 
the military witnesses together with each commander’s role in the broader picture of the 
conflict both influenced the judges’ determinations here.  
 
The remainder of this chapter considers the research findings in more detail. It does this under 
the headings ‘A change of focus: Civilians and the protection of their ‘humanity’ in the 
ascendant’, ‘Key role of the military viewpoint and importance of civilian witnesses with lived 
experience of the use of artillery’ and ‘The criminal responsibility of military commanders’ 
which broadly map on to the research discussed in the chapters law, evidence and 
responsibility respectively although there is some overlap between the topics. 
 
 
A change of focus: Civilians and the protection of their ‘humanity’ in the ascendant 
 
In establishing how the judges had implemented the law of targeting this study first considered 
to what extent humanity, or any other concept or factors, influenced this implementation. The 
study has shown that in adopting the relevant provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols (and 
the ICRC’s guidance on them) and in finding that customary international law mirrors these 
provisions, the judges have without doubt confirmed the place of the ICRC’s humanitarian 
driven achievements in the development of the protection of civilians caught up in the conduct 
of hostilities. In doing this they have displaced older legal regimes which did not place such an 





In reflecting on the development of the laws of war by the ICTY judges, the law applicable to 
the siege of Sarajevo provides a useful microcosm to demonstrate what this development in 
fact means in practice for the protection of civilians and the application of the principle of 
humanity. It is apparent that, despite impressions of professional armies facing each other on 
far removed battlefields through the past, civilians have long faced the horrors of war. One 
example of this is their place in siege warfare.  
 
There have been conventions and laws of siege warfare since ancient times, from the Romans, 
through medieval wars and the crusades to the American War of Independence, American Civil 
War and the Second World War.3 The civilians under these sieges, however, had very little, if 
any, protection afforded by law. When defended cities were besieged or taken by storm in the 
European medieval period there was an acceptance that anyone in it was liable to the 
consequences, no matter how little choice they had in being there. Civilians were not 
protected by any rules as to the conduct of hostilities or laws of war. As Jim Bradbury states, 
‘What to the modern mind are ‘atrocities’, were a normal part of medieval war.’4 Bruce Collins 
points out that even by the time of the Napoleonic Wars there was a strongly held view that 
soldiers ‘had the right of conquest’ after having taken a town by force and that the 
‘eighteenth-century desire to differentiate between soldiers and civilians clearly broke down 
completely in these contexts. Sieges thus affronted Enlightenment efforts to confine war-
fighting as far as possible to professional armies.’5 
 
During the siege of Leningrad artillery orders were given to fire towards any civilians 
attempting to leave the starving city. These orders directed that the artillery should open fire 
‘as early as possible, so that the infantry, if possible, is spared shooting on civilians.’ In the High 
Command judgment the commander, Von Leeb, was found to know and approve of this order. 
In considering whether this was an unlawful order, the judges concluded that it was not. They 
acknowledged that starvation of the civilians within a besieged city along with its defending 
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soldiers was a legitimate means of conducting warfare and preventing these defending soldiers 
from expelling extra people to feed ‘so as to hasten the surrender’ was not unlawful.6  
 
Despite the protection afforded to civilians through the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it was in 
fact the Additional Protocols of 1977 that recognised a change that meant that this military 
behaviour of the past was no longer acceptable to a large number of states. The Additional 
Protocols addressed the position of civilians who found themselves in the firing line of a 
conflict and it was in the negotiation of the Additional Protocols that the protection of civilians 
was first properly considered in the context of the conduct of military operations. The 
provisions included in Additional Protocol I regarding the limitation on the conduct of all 
targeting operations to prevent or minimise harm to civilians reflected a real change in 
approach. The ICRC had brought their drive for humanity, even in the midst of conflict, to the 
heart of the rules on the conduct of hostilities. Where the Additional Protocols apply, there is 
no possible legal justification for firing at civilians. 
 
Although the Additional Protocols were adopted in 1977, when the Secretary General and his 
team drafted the ICTY Statute in the early 1990s they did not include any of the provisions of 
API as part of the law to be applied. The Report of the Secretary General did not say why they 
had not been included; it was left to infer that it was because they did not consider that these 
were rules that were ‘beyond any doubt’ existing customary law at the time of the acts the 
accused were alleged to have committed or because they did not think they could form the 
basis of workable prosecutions.7 At the time that the judges in the cases of Blaškić and Galić 
were reaching their judgments, it was not clear that the principle of humanity was in the 
ascendant in the restraints placed on military operations. The war crimes provisions of the ICTY 
Statute were not reflective of IHL as we now know it and did not seem to fit the change 
identified in the Additional Protocols, seemingly firmly in the LOAC school of thought. 
 
The Secretary General of the UN and the UN Security Council had provided the ICTY with a list 
of crimes that without doubt fell under their jurisdiction and this did not include Article 51(2) 
of API (‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack….) or any equivalent from customary law. The judges of the ICTY, particularly those in 
the cases of Blaškić and Galić, did not have to find that a crime of unlawfully attacking civilians 
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that mirrored the provisions of Article 51(2) API existed in international law in a form capable 
of falling under the jurisdiction of the ICTY.  
 
Despite this, the judges in Blaškić accepted that there was a crime of unlawfully directing an 
attack against civilians, ‘recognised by Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I’,8 within their 
jurisdiction. The Galić judges likewise found that unlawful attacks against civilians were 
prohibited in the terms set out in Article 51(2). In applying the principle of distinction there 
was a move from pre to post API rules. In considering the evidence against the charges in 
relation to the shelling of Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo, for example, the judges applied the 
relevant provisions of API and the ICRC commentary alongside military testimony.  In 
considering the concept of proportionality the Galić and Gotovina Trial Judges again looked to 
the API definitions. The definitions of civilian and ‘military objectives’ have been explicitly 
based on the provisions of API. 
 
The judges (as well as the OTP and defence counsel) at the ICTY have demonstrated that it is 
possible to use the targeting rules within Additional Protocol I as a basis for a prosecution and 
conviction. This can be seen to have side-lined the application of the older rules prohibiting 
wanton destruction which were less directly relevant to the protection of civilians and which 
permitted an exception for ‘military necessity’. 
 
Beyond this, however, their willingness to expand the jurisdiction of the ICTY and the 
interpretations they have engaged have shown a desire to improve the legal protection of 
civilians in war, a concept aligned with the principle of humanity. The Trial Judges in Blaškić, 
for example, also showed a tendency to discount or ignore the disorganised defence of villages 
in the light of ethnic cleansing. This is an area of the law with some room for interpretation 
and was based on facts specific to this case; what it seemed to show was how the judges 
wanted to interpret the law in the favour of the victims of the conflict, not those waging it. As 
discussed in the next section, however, this emphasis on civilians did not expand to a desire to 




                                                          




Key role of the military viewpoint and importance of civilian witnesses with lived experience 
of the use of artillery 
 
It is in the consideration of the evidence relating to the artillery shots fired that the heart of 
the law of targeting becomes apparent. Here the judges had to assess whether the shots had 
been fired with criminal intention or not. With little to no direct evidence of the intention 
behind each shot or even campaign, this assessment came down to the views of those who 
had been present, subjected to the shelling as a resident of the area or there as international 
military observers posted into the war zone. 
 
It was apparent from the treatment of the evidence by the judges that it was the experience 
and knowledge of military and civilian non-expert witnesses who had physically experienced 
the effects of the targeting decisions which had the greatest influence on their findings. The 
legal principle of humanity does not have a role in this evidential arena, but ‘humanity’ is still 
much in evidence in the trial transcripts; in the testimony of those who had suffered and 
witnessed suffering, in the reaction of the judges to these witnesses, in the brief bursts of 
deeply held opinion that escaped through the controlled examination and cross examination 
of military witnesses in the court room.  
 
This is the part of the research where expert evidence directing the judges as to the 
requirements of targeting decision making potentially had the biggest role given the technical 
nature of the use of artillery; there were in Galić and Blaškić in particular, plenty of complex 
calculations that could be presented to demonstrate the source of a shell or bomb. The 
experience and knowledge of the military and civilian non expert witnesses had, however, at 
the least, equal prominence in the judgments.   
 
The coding of the trial transcripts carried out for this research considered against the relevant 
parts of the judgments led to the conclusion that it was military witnesses and, in particular, 
international ones (in the sense that they were from outside the states of the Former 
Yugoslavia), that were key to setting the tone of the judges’ assessment of the military 
behaviour in question. The impact of these military witnesses was examined further through 
closely tracking the use of the word ‘random’ in the Galić and Gotovina testimony and 





On the whole, there was significant military opinion in the testimony at trial level that the 
accused and those under their command had breached the legal bounds of war, had acted 
unprofessionally and criminally. Tellingly, at appeal, the military viewpoint went in the 
opposite direction in the cases of Blaškić and Gotovina. At the trial level evidence was given 
that the attack on Knin was inexplicably massive and made no sense unless it was being used 
to force the civilians to leave rather than simply attack military objectives. The judges, in 
demonstrating their agreement with this position, utilised the 200m system (which did not 
have a clear source in the testimony before them) in a way, however, that did not in fact stand 
up to the scrutiny of a body of military opinion. The majority of the Gotovina Appeal Judges 
considered that they could not support a finding of unlawful attack at all. This was heavily 
criticised by the minority for not taking into account the totality of the evidence presented to 
the trial judges, which would have included the original military opinion that the attack did not 
respect the principle of distinction. 
 
The international military personnel gave a distinct impression of their views of the balance to 
be found between military professionalism and humanitarian concerns and where lines had 
been crossed into unlawful behaviour. The judges were slow to circumscribe the testimony of 
military witnesses not designated as experts even if it tended towards opinion if it was clear 
that they had relevant knowledge or experience. 
 
The international military personnel who testified before the ICTY in these cases were not 
machines, they were human beings with military experience and knowledge. Their humanity 
was often on display through their clear articulation of the effects of the war on the people 
subject to it. As a whole they gave the impression of being extremely professional and 
knowledgeable; they tended to be compelling when they talked of matters that they 
considered to be outside of acceptable or explicable military conduct.  
 
The role of civilian (including victim) evidence from those who had experienced the conflict 
first hand, in particular as to the source of fire and its intended target was also picked up 
during the coding exercise. It cannot be claimed from this research that this civilian witness 
evidence would have stood by itself as sufficient proof for the judges’ findings and it is 
apparent that the judges relied significantly on military technical assessments. Where there 
was some doubt as to what this technical evidence could prove, however, the corresponding 




conclusions. What this testimony does seem to have added in the case of Galić is a sense of 
certainty to the judges’ findings; these witnesses knew who was firing at them, from where 
and why. This was an unarguable insight into the fact that civilians were being targeted. This 
was lacking in the case of Gotovina and Knin and a weakness of that case; possibly inescapably 
so due to the short duration of the shelling operation. 
 
 
The Criminal responsibility of military commanders 
 
The third element of the research question asked how the judges implemented the individual 
criminal responsibility element of the law of targeting and whether any influences could be 
identified regarding the judges’ findings as to criminal responsibility, that is, as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused before them. In answer, this research posits that the judges 
considered a wide range of potential forms of liability and evidence pointing to liability of 
military commanders; this was based in the totality of the factual realities surrounding the 
commanders as communicated to the judges through the trial process. This is interesting 
because the written contents of the law does not concern itself with the broader picture 
within which the military commanders are operating and occurred because of the lack of direct 
evidence of innocence or culpability. 
 
There had been no comparable cases to those of the military commanders tried at the ICTY 
since the trials held after the Second World War. Even then, these provided little clear 
precedent. There had never been such trials based on the law set out in the Additional 
Protocols (and on which the responsibility provisions of the ICTY Statute seem to have been 
based). The law in this area has developed so as to be applied neutrally to both or all sides of 
any conflict; there is no relevance to whose side a commander is on, who started the conflict 
or who is on a ‘good’ side with the better intentions. Responsibility for complying with the laws 
of war is treated in factual isolation. 
 
What the law envisages is an investigation of the intentions of those making targeting 
decisions as to the military objective they were aiming for or to achieve and their knowledge 
as to the facts on the ground as to the likely effects of the weapons they chose to use to 
achieve it before they launched the attack. Did they know that civilians were likely to be 




civilians there is no question that that decision was wrong. Given the reality of gathering 
evidence as to what exactly was being decided in the midst of and following a conflict this type 
of evidence was, however, rarely before the judges. 
 
The lack of evidence of what exactly was ordered and happened in consequence led in certain 
cases to the use of inferences and circumstantial evidence to prove guilt. Although this seems 
to open a wide range of possibilities the judges seem to have filled some of the evidential gap 
by considering the broader role and intent of the commanders under consideration.  
 
In addition, the findings of criminal responsibility on the part of commanders were not made 
on the basis of the judges’ views only. In all cases they had testimony from military personnel 
that supported their findings. They always seemed to consider that they were making a finding 
in agreement with a body of military opinion before them. This, again, held for the appeal 
judgments where the trial judges’ findings were overturned in the cases of Blaškić and 
Gotovina. 
 
At the start of this research it was assumed that ‘command’ or ‘superior’ responsibility in the 
sense of the responsibility of commanders for the acts of their subordinates as per Article 7(3) 
of the ICTY Statute would form a large part of the study. On the contrary, it has not formed 
much of the final work at all. The judges at the ICTY in these three cases sought to convict on 
the basis of individual responsibility of the accused (where guilt was in fact found). This does 
not mean that the role of ‘command’ itself was not important. It was, in particular, through the 
act of their orders to their subordinates that the commanders were accused of committing 
criminal acts. To be convicted for ‘ordering’ an act requires that a chain of command exists and 
that orders will be followed. The standard consolidated through these cases was that the 
orderer must intend that a crime be committed or that there was a substantial likelihood that 
a crime would be committed in the execution of their order. The lack of a role for Article 7(3) 
demonstrated that the judges thought that convicting on the basis of direct, rather than 
indirect, criminal responsibility was a better reflection of the criminal role of the commanders 
in question despite the lack of clear-cut evidence of unlawful orders. 
 
The judges showed that they were not willing to take orders on their face value (Blaškić) and 
even at times refused to accept orders demanding compliance with IHL as reflective of overall 




out unlawful attacks from evidence of a strong, well-functioning chain of command and 
evidence of unlawful attacks being committed over a long period of time. They also 
demonstrated that they were not willing to rely only on ambiguous orders with insufficient 
corroborating evidence of unlawful attacks (Gotovina, trial and appeal).  
 
The impact of the political motivations of the commanders was, however, limited. As would be 
expected, the commanders were acquitted if they were found to have been pursuing military 
objectives irrespective of their political leanings. The contents of Blaškić’s orders found to be 
incendiary by the Trial Chamber did not change, but he was also ultimately found to be acting 
towards legitimate military ends.  
 
Although the individual responsibility of Galić and Blaškić was alleged based on the orders that 
they had given, Gotovina was charged on the basis of alleged participation in a Joint Criminal 
Enterprise. The allegation that he had issued orders to launch unlawful attacks was made in 
the context of his contribution to the Joint Criminal Enterprise. There was therefore a question 
of whether he had intended to order unlawful attacks but this was placed within the broader 
picture of the political machinations of the Croatian government of the time and whether 
Gotovina subscribed to these views. The Gotovina Appeal Judges found that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the finding that Gotovina had ordered unlawful attacks and 
the status of these attacks was found to be so fundamental to his alleged role in the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise that all other responsibility fell away.  
 
This was the area of research in which coding work in NVivo played a large role in establishing 
themes. Coding was carried out and themes arose naturally from reading the judgments and 
transcript texts. Through this process evidence relating to orders was highlighted and 
categorised. More organically, as not pre-identified in any way, the theme arose of military 
commanders subscribing to the overarching political projects of their respective political 
leaders as a contribution to a finding of criminal responsibility. This coding highlighted that the 
judges were particularly interested in the link between military commanders and the broader 
criminality of the conflict. This is perhaps not at all surprising given that the judges were 
considering persecutory intent for crimes against humanity charges, however, it confirms that 
military commanders were not judged simply on their military conduct and perhaps the 
intention requirement of the crimes means that they never could be. To show the intent 




have made the decision to deploy their armed forces and the extent to which the military 
agree with them. It also shows the sort of evidence that can go towards finding a commander 
such as Galić guilty of ordering unlawful sniping and shelling attacks in the absence of evidence 
of physical orders in fact doing so. 
 
Ultimately, the judges were willing to consider that there could be military objectives 
motivating the actions of the indicted military commanders and the soldiers under their 
command. The judges confirmed that it was the intention behind the targeting decisions that 
underpinned any potential criminal responsibility. The lack of direct evidence of this intention 
was not, however, at the trial level in particular, taken as a reason not to make a finding of 
guilt. In all cases the broader picture of the conflict and the role of the accused commanders 
within it were used alongside the effects of whatever decisions had been made to fill this 
evidential gap.  
 
If the relevance of the broader picture to the prosecution and judges was because of the 
desire to ensure that the victims of the political projects saw someone who subscribed to 
these projects answering for what happened, it is here that the implications of the project of 
broadening the coverage of IHL and its principle of humanity must, in particular, be 
considered. It is not wrong to look for evidence of the intention of those directing attacks but 
care must be taken that this evidence does not become too far removed from the actual 
actions and therefore criminal responsibility of the accused. It is important that the judges at 
appeal level were able and willing to overturn the trial judges’ findings where they considered 





The demarcation of the law of targeting carried out by the judges at the ICTY involved the 
significant development of the law of targeting in international law. The judges in the cases of 
Blaškić, Galić and Gotovina were presented with a rare, and therefore important, opportunity 
to apply the law applicable to the conduct of hostilities to the actions of military commanders 
and set precedents for future cases. Given that there was, however, room for interpretation in 
the application of the law of targeting at the ICTY it was also important to examine how the 





To summarise the results of this study, the following paragraphs set out the key findings that 
answer the central question of this research, namely, how did the judges implement the law of 
targeting and, given this, could any factor(s) be identified as having influenced the many 
decisions on law, evidence and responsibility they had to make in reaching their judgments? 
 
Firstly, the ICTY developed the law of targeting in line with the precedence of the principle of 
humanity and a worldview strongly guided by the International Committee of the Red Cross. In 
affirming that the provisions of Additional Protocol I relating to targeting can be the basis for a 
conviction, the judges rendered certain earlier provisions incorporating ‘military necessity’ 
(although not the broader principle itself) potentially obsolete in this context. 
 
Secondly, the ICTY judges did not lose sight of the military viewpoint and they considered that 
their judgments were always supported by a body of military opinion – even if in places there 
were strongly opposing views among military practitioners. This demonstrated that the judges 
had no interest in making findings that could not be applied by those who in fact have to make  
targeting decisions. 
 
Thirdly, the judges attached significant importance to the evidence provided by civilian 
(including victim) witnesses with lived experience of the effects of artillery. This was even the 
case where there was also a large amount of technical or expert evidence available. 
 
Finally, ICTY jurisprudence gave precedence to convictions pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute rather than Article 7(3) superior/command responsibility. An absence of direct 
evidence of targeting decision making by these commanders meant, alongside evidence of the 
orders they had issued, the judges considered circumstantial evidence including that of the 
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